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UNMAKING THE REMAKE: LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS, DELEUZIAN LOGIC, 
AND THE PROBLEM OF REPETITION IN HOLLYWOOD CINEMA 
 
by Dan Varndell 
 
Repetition is inherent to cinema. From the complex interweaving of genre cycles and 
Hollywood stars to the elementary mechanism of film projection (twenty-four times per 
second): cinema is repetition. It is perhaps little wonder then that psychoanalysis is often 
thought of as one of the discourses with which to write about film in the 20
th century. 
However, this thesis problematises both cinematic repetition and psychoanalytic film theory, 
stressing that each is haunted by a spectre: the remake, and the film-philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze, respectively. Despite its critical opprobrium, I explore the remake not only as a 
viable object of cinematic scholarship, but one necessary in moving past the impasse of film 
studies identified by Timothy Corrigan (1991) as ‘historical hysteria’. My research turns to 
Deleuzian film theory as a counterpart, rather than replacement, of the predominant Lacanian 
model. This is, however, neither a defence of the remake nor of psychoanalysis, but, rather, an 
attempt to submit both to a radical reassessment that, as Lacan says, aims at giving you a 
‘kick up the arse’ (1998:49). 
   
Eschewing the ‘example’ as a remnant of film theory’s current collapse in form, I suggest two 
‘case studies’ for consideration, augmented by a cache of film references: (1) Gus Van Sant’s 
shot-for-shot remake (1998) of Alfred Hitchcock’s original Psycho (1960) as a ‘symptom’ of 
Hollywood’s self-cannibalisation; and (2) George Sluizer’s The Vanishing (1993), a 
Hollywood ‘auto-remake’ of his own Dutch original, Spoorloos (1988), as a ‘fetish’ of 
Hollywood’s desire in the European ‘Other’. Rather than expose Deleuze to a Lacanian 
framework I subject the one to a reading of the other in a möbius relation, turning them 
inside-out, so to speak. Mediating these two thinkers is Slavoj Žižek, a cultural theorist whose 
own ‘filmosophy’ is revealed from amongst his often frenetic writings. In so doing, I expose a 
dark underside to Hollywood repetition, one which provides some new tools for 
understanding the popularity of cinema’s most critically neglected discourse.   3
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PREFACE 
 
“It’s the same movie, only completely different. It follows the same plot, except where it changes 
everything.” 
 
-  Desmond Howe (1993) 
 
 
Critically scorned, and yet (paradoxically) commercially successful, remakes have never been 
half as popular in academia as they have in cinemas. In fact, critics and academics seem 
united in their mistrust of the remake, with most lamenting the end of ‘original stories’ in 
Hollywood resulting in an increasingly “rear-view mirror culture” (Groen, 1998). However, 
like them or loathe them, remakes are more popular than ever, are here to stay, and deserve 
not only the acknowledgement of film studies, but a serious theory to read them with. In fact, 
in accordance with the möbius topology of this study, one should be directed first to my 
appendix, for it tells its own story about the proliferation of the remake across film history, 
space, and genre. One is inclined to reach for Freud to deal with this phenomenon, given his 
advancement of repetition compulsion, the return of the repressed, and the Oedipus complex, 
however, Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic film theory has fallen out of favour of late as 
cinema theorists increasingly turn towards Deleuze and Foucault to break the perceived 
sovereignty of the psychoanalytic discourse. A deadlock exists between these two seemingly 
incompatible and antagonistic schools of thought. Perhaps we should reach instead for 
Deleuze then, as the incumbent thinker of film theory? Alternatively, maybe we should 
attempt to reconcile the two by inviting them both to the cinema for the latest remake, and see 
what happens? This thesis suggests something far more explosive.  
  If Freud and Lacan are missing from recent Deleuzian theoretical contributions from 
philosophers like Daniel Frampton (2006), and presumed dead by film theorists like Steven 
Shaviro (1993), it at first seems tempting – as a psychoanalyst – to send out the search party 
and apply the kiss of life. However, what if we assume instead that these obituaries are fully 
appropriate? Our only correction would be to state that psychoanalysis is not simply dead, 
but, rather, it is undead, like the protagonists of so many horror remakes. Compounding this, 
what if Deleuze – far from emerging as the father of a new rebirth in film theory – has yet to 
be fully conceived; is unborn, so to speak? The problem with Deleuze is that he is mostly 
known through his work on Anti-Oedipus, which as the name suggests, is highly critical of 
psychoanalysis, and attempts to move past the oedipal family and reject Lacan’s forms.   11
However, Alain Badiou has stated that Félix Guattari was Deleuze’s “bad influence”
*, and 
Žižek has called their collaboration on Anti-Oedipus “arguably Deleuze’s worst book” 
(2004a:21). Perhaps there is ‘another Deleuze’ beneath the popular one, a Deleuze waiting to 
be born into film theory, one who is much closer to Freud and Lacan than is currently 
assumed. Was it not, after all, Deleuze’s earlier works, Repetition and Difference (1968) and 
The Logic of Sense (1969), that led Michel Foucault to proclaim that “one day, perhaps, this 
century will be called Deleuzian” (1970)?  
  This thesis takes a serious look at Hollywood cinema’s remake compulsion and 
develops a rigorous remake model based on a theory that takes in both an unknown Deleuze 
and a Lacan known all-too-well. It is neither reconciliatory nor dialogic (are not all dialogues 
hermetically sealed in academia?), but is rather what Slavoj Žižek (2004) calls “an 
encounter”. While demonstrating the pointlessness of throwing the psychoanalytic baby out 
with the film theory bathwater, it offers a truly mixed methodology aimed at testing and 
provoking debate on a body of films suffering from ‘historical hysteria’, whose symptoms 
include self-differentiation, paradox, and ultimately, schizophrenia. Now is the time then for 
film theory itself to become self-differentiated, paradoxical, and schizoid. 
  And for those who still cannot conceive of a Deleuzo-Lacanian film theory, let them 
recourse to Lacan himself, who once said: “Let’s try to practise a little brain-washing on 
ourselves” (1992:307)… 
 
 
A note on conventions 
 
Lacan often insisted that his neologisms (notably ‘jouissance’ and ‘objet petit a’) remain 
untranslated in English, thereby attaching to the terms a semantic status, a tradition I follow. 
In addition, most of Freud’s German concepts are represented with their conventional English 
translation and the German in parenthesis (for example, ‘death drive’ [‘todestrieb’]). 
However, as with Lacan, some Freudian concepts remain without translation also (for 
example, id) for the same reasons above. Some psychoanalytic terms, most notably the 
concept of ‘the uncanny’ (das unheimliche), contain considerable differences between 
translations (on which Freud writes at length), and in these cases, while I use the terms 
interchangeably, in every single case – irrespective of the specific terminology and its dual 
meanings – it is Freud’s description of the term to which I refer (unless explicitly stated 
otherwise). Moreover, I keep Freud’s spelling of the word ‘phantasy’ when referring 
specifically to the sense of the term as denoting an imaginary ‘scene’ in which an unconscious 
                                                 
* See Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamour of Being (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2000).    12
desire is played out for the subject. I retain the English spelling, ‘fantasy’, for all instances of 
a subject’s fantasising in the sense of conscious imaginings. Similarly, the word ‘Trieb’ is 
rendered throughout this thesis as ‘drive’ rather than ‘instinct’ (as it appears in Deleuze’s 
translations, some of Lacan’s, and James Strachey’s Standard Edition). It is Lacan himself 
who points out the important distinction between Freud’s ‘Trieb’ and the German ‘Instinkt’, 
when he writes that “the word Trieb… is much more revealing of urgency than the word 
instinctual. Trieb gives you a kick up the arse, my friends – quite different from so-called 
instinct” (1998:49). Also, I refer mainly to Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis only, and 
so when using terms like the death drive I am not referring to Melanie Klein’s interpretation, 
or Laplanche and Pontalis’s revisions, etc., unless explicitly stated. I will at all times 
distinguish between Lacan and Freud’s ideas on psychoanalysis as they differ, especially 
when Lacan is developing what he calls Freud’s ‘intuitions’.  
  Furthermore, when using foreign film titles for the first time I use the common 
English translation with the original title in brackets, for example, The Ring (Ringu), and the 
English title thereafter. Exceptions to this rule include foreign titles more commonly known 
by their original-language title (for example, Les Diaboliques), and my case study, Spoorloos 
and its Hollywood remake, The Vanishing. The former will always be referred to using the 
Dutch title, while the latter will be referred to using the English translation, for reasons that 
will become clear in the study. Where originals and remakes share a title, for example with 
Psycho, the former will be referred to as the ‘original’, or ‘Hitchcock’s’ Psycho, and the latter 
the ‘remake’ or ‘Van Sant’s’ to avoid confusion, even though part of the remit of this study is 
a rethinking of both the terms ‘original’ and ‘remake’. Nonetheless, for the sake of the 
reader’s (and my) sanity, these qualifying terms will be employed in this instance, and not (as 
is frequently the convention in remake theory) a title identified by the date at which the film 
was released (for example, Psycho’98, Psycho’60), for reasons that will again become clear.   
  Finally, I have used gender neutral language throughout this study. However at 
certain points, when for example I am discussing either a specifically male or female subject 
(or object), as is frequently the case in psychoanalysis, I will use pronouns accordingly, but 
do so very specifically and never anachronistically.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
RETHINKING REMAKING: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORICAL HYSTERIA, AND 
CINEMATIC REPETITION 
 
Only the mutations of the strong survive. The weak, the anonymous, the defeated leave few marks […] 
history loves only those who dominate her: it is a relationship of mutual enslavement. 
 
-  Salman Rushdie, Shame (1983) 
 
Has Freud really fallen off his Viennese pedestal? The ‘undead’ zombie-analyst 
 
It is perhaps one of the 20
th century’s greatest ironies that while film is undoubtedly the 
psychoanalytic subject par excellence, the ultimate ‘patient’ on the ‘couch’ of cultural theory, 
Freud wanted nothing to do with the silver screen – never once undertaking an analysis of 
film. That the year 1895 is the shared birthday of the publication of Freud’s first major work 
on psychoanalysis and the Lumière brothers’ first screening in a Parisian café further adds to 
this irony. As early as 1914, Freud’s disciple Otto Rank had noticed that cinematography “in 
numerous ways reminds us of the dream-work” (cited in Sabbadini, 2003:12n), so why was 
Freud so mistrustful of the cinematic apparatus, despite using examples of ‘parapraxes’ 
(minor intrusions of the unconscious) from every other cultural form including literature, 
plays, art, sculpture, memoirs, fairy tales, and of course, even jokes? Not only do 
psychoanalysis and cinema share the same birthday at the fin de siècle, but according to 
Christian Metz, both anticipated the onslaught of fascism and were “peculiar to a historical 
epoch (that of capitalism) and a state of society, so-called industrial civilisation” (2001:3). 
Mass-production and wide-spread hysteria (in both arenas) seemed to posit these two as soul-
mates, like childhood sweethearts. It was more than a source of frustration for psychoanalytic 
film scholars to know of Freud’s abstention from analysing film himself, even reportedly 
turning down $100,000 from Hollywood producer Samuel Goldwyn to write or give his 
advice on a screenplay about love (Lear, 2005:xv). However, while Freud refrained from 
hystericising film, it seems early film directors certainly did not refrain from filming hysteria.  
  It is Laura Mulvey (2003) who provides the most plausible rationale, that, perhaps, it 
was their very coincidence that prevented film from being a viable subject for analysis, that 
film, for Freud, was much too modern, a celebration of “the newest technology, the novelty, 
speed and glamour of urban life and, indeed, the robotic, androgynous body of the young 
modern woman” (Mulvey, 2003:xvii). It could be of no use to a discourse in need of a subject 
who, by definition, has been “through the mill”, so to speak. Mulvey argues that for Freud,   15
film had not yet become hystericised. Of course this has all changed today, with the cinematic 
apparatus properly consigned to a full century of new forms, revolutions, and collapses, and 
now taking on a degree of uncanniness (unheimlichkeit). It is with no small sense of relief 
then that contemporary psychoanalytic film scholars can reconcile themselves with the 
suspicion that today Freud might have had much to say on the medium.  
  It is not only film itself which has become uncanny, for film theory also has become 
somewhat uncanny, which as Freud wrote is a requirement for any model of repression where 
“the finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it” (2001:222). Psychoanalytic film theory 
gained considerable weight following the adaptation of Lacan’s revitalisation of the waning 
discourse when he proposed his famous “Return to Freud”. While Lacan also shied away 
from interpreting the silver screen, his impact on film theory is as groundbreaking as his 
impact on psychoanalysis itself – what Gaston Bachelard would call an ‘epistemological 
break’ – reacting against other psychoanalytic schools including ego-psychology, object-
relations theory, and the Kleinian school, who had in his view “misread” Freud. As the enfant 
terrible of psychoanalysis, Lacan was promptly expelled from the International 
Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), whereupon he founded his own rival school, L’Ecole 
Freudienne de Paris (EFP). Lacan’s work was highly influential, especially given his 
openness to other disciplines. François Roustang notes that while the other Freudian 
psychoanalytic schools were clique, only ever allowing analysts to join their elitist ranks, 
Lacan’s school was open: “You did not have to be an analyst, or even be in analysis, to be 
made a member of the School; it could even be said that the more remote from 
psychoanalysis your primary affiliation, the greater your chances of being warmly welcomed” 
(1990:6). Lacan embraced philosophers and mathematicians (lawyers even) and in doing so 
he opened up psychoanalysis to disciplines that previously would have been unwelcome. This 
inspired a wave of psychoanalytic film theory now equipped with the licence to apply the 
vocabulary of psychoanalysis to films that had been under the Freudian spell for over half a 
century, but without a theory to read them with. Following thinkers like Christian Metz and 
the development of feminist film studies throughout the 1970s and 1980s, psychoanalytic film 
theory grew, each reading film through the lens of a school of thought which proposed that 
the popularity of cinematic forms lay in its ability to imperfectly reflect reality and delve into 
unconscious dream states.   
  Recently however, the 100
th anniversary of the publication of Freud’s magnum opus, 
The Interpretation of Dreams, was met with a fresh wave of accusations concerning the many 
inaccuracies of the psychoanalytic discipline. In Killing Freud: 20
th Century Culture and the 
Death of Psychoanalysis (2004), Todd Dufresne claims that no other figure made more 
mistakes concerning his fundamental principles. Combined with Catherine Meyer’s attempt to 
list these mistakes in The Black Book of Psychoanalysis (2007), it seems that Freud really had   16
fallen off of his Viennese pedestal. Josh Cohen suggests that the biggest problem with 
psychoanalysis is its dual status: it is at once over-familiar and obscure, all-too readily 
accepted and firmly rejected. On the one hand, for example, we get positive reactions as 
diverse as open acceptance (“Of course we believe in Freud”), and ironic reflexivity (“Of 
course I harbour secret incestuous desires, what’s the big deal?”). On the other hand however, 
we get negative responses ranging from the indignant (“Of course it’s all nonsense!”), to 
incredulousness (“My mother, are you sick?”) (Cohen, 2005:2). Cohen humorously points 
towards the Freud action figure as an example of this problematic compromise, for ‘Action 
Freud’ illustrates the difficulty confronting anyone attempting to ‘get at’ the real Freud. 
‘Action Freud’ is the perfect representation of the uncanniness of psychoanalysis, painting a 
picture of a discourse not unlike a popular TV show complete with catchphrases (“Tell me 
about your mother”, etc.). Does Action Freud indicate that psychoanalysis really is dead as a 
serious discourse with which to read film? 
  With Freud’s usurpation in psychotherapy, it stood to reason that criticisms of his 
French successor would at some point follow, and emerging from the ensuing backlash 
against the perceived sovereignty of Lacanian film theory emerged a new discourse with 
which to read film. The work of Lacan’s contemporary, philosopher Gilles Deleuze, took 
some time to reach many readers in the west, but is fast becoming paradigmatic in film 
studies. Furthermore, an impasse created by the death of psychoanalysis has led to a rise in 
the self-described ‘post-theory’, led by David Bordwell and Noël Carroll (1996), which seeks 
to “reconstruct film studies” and looks almost anywhere but psychoanalysis to do so. The 
post-theorists argue for an integrative ‘hybrid’ theoretical discourse, one which incorporates a 
horizontally integrated theoretical model. Alongside post-theory, two Deleuzian scholars 
shook the very foundations of film theory over the course of ten years: Steven Shaviro (1993) 
reconceptualised the fundamentals of Metz’s psychoanalytic model for spectatorship, arguing 
for the triumph of the cinematic ‘body’ over the cinematic ‘signifier’; then, more recently, 
Daniel Frampton (2006) opened these fundamentals onto new planes with his Deleuzian 
neologisms, ‘filmosophy’, ‘film-thinking’, and ‘filmind’. While Frampton is not so hostile to 
psychoanalysis (preferring to ignore it entirely), Shaviro stated that “today, the most crucial 
task for any theory of sexuality remains how to get away from Freud” (2000:67). Shaviro’s 
radical alternative to the psychoanalytic paradigm is not to establish the ‘truth’ of the 
cinematic experience and its apparatus, but to follow these images in their “seductive drift” 
away from any such truth. Shaviro’s theoretical co-ordinates are based on Deleuze’s sense 
that cinematic images are not representations, but events.  
  My claim here is not that this shift away from psychoanalysis towards Deleuze is 
proof of Freud’s death, but, rather, that it is proof of his vitality. It is the very fact of Shaviro’s 
attack on Freud and Lacan that he betrays the sense that film theory is still very much in the   17
grip of the symptom and the signifier. Are not the continued proclamations of Freud’s ‘death’ 
in film studies akin to the nervous protagonist of the horror movie standing over the ‘corpse’ 
of the antagonist? The audience, of course, knows that ‘it’ will rise again, and that, finally, a 
simple bullet in the head is never enough – it must be made to die twice. This analogy is more 
appropriate than it first seems, for the sequel proves to us that even with this second death, 
our antagonist will soon return to terrorise our beleaguered victim. The question we must ask 
post-theory (let us drop this fiction of post-‘theory’ and call it by its real name, post-
psychoanalysis) is the following: if psychoanalysis is dead, why continue to attack it? I think 
the answer to this question lies as much in the totality with which contemporary film studies 
has rejected psychoanalysis as it does in the incompleteness of the theory ushered in to 
replace it. Let us take a closer look at this new and incomplete film theory.  
  Gilles Deleuze adamantly rejected the claim that he was a ‘critic’ of ‘film theory’, 
preferring the role of ‘philosopher’ of ‘film logic’: “I was able to write on cinema, not by 
right of reflection, but when philosophical problems led me to seek answers in cinema, which 
itself then relaunched other problems” (1998:49). It is therefore a mistake to classify 
Deleuze’s work on the cinema as ‘film theory’ in the traditional sense (this is the first error of 
post-theory). Deleuze does not enter into cinematic analysis lightly, and his two volumes on 
cinema – Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (2008) and Cinema 2: The Time-Image (2009) – 
articulate a ‘logic’ of film that emphasise the ‘action-image’, ‘affection-image’, and 
‘perception-image’, ultimately teaching that cinema is not representational, nor a 
communicator simply of messages through the medium of voyeurism. Rather, Deleuze 
considered cinema to be the site of pure immanence and sensation, quite literally its own 
reality, a manifestation of pure thought (from which Frampton defines his ‘filmind’).  
  The difference between Deleuze’s two volumes on cinema could almost be mapped 
onto the book that most influenced him, that is, Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory. The 
‘movement-image’ fleshed out in volume one is almost certainly concerned more with the 
flow of matter, that is, the direct, objective, representation of time and space, which Deleuze 
links to the classical form. The ‘time-image’ however, fleshed out in volume two, is more 
concerned with the flow of memory, which is to say, the indirect, subjective flow of time and 
space, which Deleuze links to the post-classical form (anticipated by Hitchcock). But what 
does he mean by considering the cinematic image of time? Daniel Frampton writes that  
 
a basic metaphorical sequence will cause the filmgoer to think, cause them to receive a fairly 
distinct idea. A somewhat more irrational sequence will cause the filmgoer to think and 
receive (a less exact) idea, and the shock of this ‘new’ idea will cause the filmgoer to go back 
to the images, re-experience them, and see within them a belief or interpretation that caused 
the idea (2006:63-4).    18
 
Thus Deleuze does not treat cinema as an art representing our external reality but as an 
ontological practice that organises movement on the one hand, and time on the other. Deleuze 
was not just rethinking cinema, but using cinema as a means of rethinking movement, the 
image, and time in philosophy. In the second of his two volumes on cinema, Deleuze wrote 
that Alain Resnais had created a “cinema of philosophy, a cinema of thought, which is totally 
new in the history of cinema and totally alive in the history of philosophy, creating, with his 
unique collaborators, a rare marriage between philosophy and cinema” (2009c:201). Deleuze 
is interested primarily in seeing a productive encounter between philosophy and film as much 
as the subsuming of the one in the other. In much the same way, when he writes that ‘bad’ 
psychoanalysis has two ways of deceiving itself, “by believing to have discovered identical 
materials, that one can inevitably find everywhere, or by believing to have discovered 
analogous forms which create false differences” (Deleuze, 2009b:104), he is not writing 
against psychoanalysis but exploring its methodology, critiquing its fundamentals (not unlike 
Lacan). Thus contextualising Deleuze in a theory of cinema dominated by ‘bad 
psychoanalysis’ has proven somewhat difficult (in much the same way as placing Deleuze in 
the context of 20
th century philosophy has proven just as problematic, an irony not lost on 
Foucault with his joke about the century being renamed ‘Deleuzian’). Just as Lacanian film 
theory evolved out of interlocutors, so too has Deleuzian film theory emerged from thinkers 
like Shaviro and Frampton. However, what neither of these two thinkers (among others) seem 
to consider is Deleuze’s lesser-known earlier works, Repetition and Difference (1968), and 
The Logic of Sense (1969), upon which any understanding of Deleuze’s so-called 
‘filmosophy’ must surely rest. 
  Žižek is thus right to argue that there are two sides to Deleuze; a populist Deleuze and 
a hidden, secretive Deleuze. If this is true, then so too must we acknowledge the two sides to 
Lacan, for the latter’s work clearly falls into two groups: his weekly seminars conducted in 
front of audiences, and his written theoretical texts, écrits. Žižek points out that Lacan’s 
seminars and écrits relate like the discourse of the analysand and the analyst during treatment, 
and as such, the proper way to read Lacan is to “read a seminar and then go on to read the 
corresponding écrit so as to ‘get the point’ of the seminar” (Žižek, 2006a:129). This is 
because we are dealing with the temporality of ‘Nachträglichkeit’ (‘action deferred’) in the 
analytical process, in which the écrits offer precise and clear formulas that can only be 
understood against the background of the seminars (such as Seminar VII on the Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis and the corresponding écrit, ‘Kant avec Sade’). I am proposing something 
similar apropos of Deleuze’s relationship to psychoanalysis, that we must read Deleuze’s own 
dense theoretical formulations in his Repetition and Difference and Logic of Sense against the 
background of Lacanian psychoanalysis.    19
  It is because of this precise mutual need for cross-referencing that psychoanalysis 
keeps returning in essays continuing to proclaim its demise, while the ‘newborn’ Deleuzian 
film theory seems to be somewhat premature, struggling to arrive at a workable theory of the 
cinematic image. Put another way, the zombie analyst seems to be haunting this new model 
from beyond the grave, and as my earlier metaphor of the horror movie indicated, it is in the 
proliferation of versions that we need to approach this ‘haunting’. This thesis suggests that we 
should dispense with re-burying the ‘old’ psychoanalysis and prematurely adopting this ‘new’ 
filmosophy. Instead, let us see if our struggle to bury Freud is linked to Deleuze’s troubled 
birth, and, further, consider the possibility that there may be moments in which we need the 
one to read the other as analyst to analysand, and back again. I hope to show that in rejecting 
Freud altogether, post-theorists like Bordwell and Carroll have been haunted by his spectre 
ever since, not to mention the irony that their so-called ‘integrative’ models are just as guilty 
of critical and theoretical exclusionism as the discourse they are attacking as “exclusive”. 
Further, in rushing into a Deleuzian alternative, scholars like Shaviro, and to a lesser extent 
Frampton, have missed key formative moments in the development of their new theory. 
Nonetheless, I neither wish to undermine new concepts like Frampton’s ‘filmind’ and 
Shaviro’s ‘cinematic body’, nor call for the removal of Deleuze as a new voice in 
contemporary film theory. Instead, I point to Andrew Haase’s description of the pleasure of 
psychoanalysis being located in “philosophy’s refusal to crawl around in scum and shit” 
(1991:188). This thesis then, merely wishes to drag Deleuze into the shit and get him a little 
dirty.  
  By extension, I am by no means attempting to suggest that psychoanalysis is alive 
and well, for there is more to my undead zombie metaphor than meets the eye. Insofar as 
philosophy needs psychoanalysis to function as its dirty underside, it is my contention that 
psychoanalysis needs philosophy to surpass the many misreadings upon which psychoanalytic 
film criticism has thus far been founded. Consider Lacan’s own self-proclaimed “anti-
philosophy” and admittance that psychoanalysis always tends towards incoherence when left 
by itself: 
 
Psychoanalysis is distinguished by its extraordinary capacity for drifting and confusion, which 
makes its literature something that, I assure you, would not require a great deal of thought for 
it to be placed, in its entirety, under the heading of what we call literary madness (1964:240). 
 
Lacan even went so far as to describe himself as ‘psychotic’. Whatever could he have meant? 
Slavoj Žižek suggests that it is because it is not possible to integrate Lacan’s work in the field 
of the big Other (and one’s exclusion from the symbolic order always leads to psychosis). 
With this in mind, Žižek emerges as a pivotal figure in negotiating this Deleuzo-Lacanian   20
‘encounter’, as his vastly underrated Organs without Bodies (2004) has already attempted 
such a meeting between the ‘literary madness’ of Lacan and ‘filmosophy’ of Deleuze. As 
Žižek himself notes, far from adopting an impartial approach, we need to engage a properly 
partisan reading, one which relies on Lacan’s own understanding that every truth is partial. 
Žižek writes that “by means of his sectarian split, by cutting himself off from the decaying 
corpse of the International Psycho-Analytic Association, Lacan kept the Freudian teaching 
alive. Fifty years later it is up to us to do the same with Lacan” (2006a:6). In short, by 
breaking off from the bloated body of Freudian film studies with his “Return to Freud”, Lacan 
was able to open the psychoanalytic discourse up to the mathematicians, philosophers, and 
artists, etc. Žižek’s argument is that we must now sever ourselves from Lacanian film studies 
by introducing Deleuze, which is effectively his ‘Return to Lacan’ in a manner of speaking. In 
doing so, Žižek aims to avoid the danger of creating a Deleuzian school of film-thinking 
which misses Deleuze’s point, and the concomitant danger of dismissing Lacan before he 
becomes ‘undead’ as Freud.  
  In a final note, I propose that this thesis is in many ways also an encounter with 
Žižek’s own film philosophy, for while the Slovenian giant of critical theory and social 
studies is often prone to chaotic and digressive excursions into politics, science, art, social 
theory, and philosophy (to name just a few), he is continually drawn to film. Žižek has even 
made two films about psychoanalysis and philosophy in cinema: Žižek! (2005), and The 
Pervert’s Guide to Cinema (2006). From amongst his often brilliant, if somewhat magpie-
like, borrowings and intuitions on other thinkers, this thesis reveals a Žižekian discourse on 
film, one of the first such considerations of Žižek’s own ‘filmosophy’. 
   
 
Cinema on the couch: The hysteria of film historia 
 
The pull away from psychoanalysis in film studies has left us in a strange place: theorists still 
evoke Freud simply because there is, in a sense, no other language in which to discuss 
spectatorship in film (although Frampton, among others, is succeeding in rectifying this). For 
Jonathan Lear (2005), this is the precise problem with psychoanalysis in contemporary 
theory, where its theoretical terms are invoked in isolation and cut off from clinical reality. 
Lear argues that the central concepts of psychoanalysis – or, “Freud at his best” – lose their 
vitality and ultimately their efficacy when rendered out of context. However, just as Lear 
stresses the importance of returning to clinical psychoanalysis, he also calls for a stronger 
philosophical counterpart to supplement this return to clinicism to deal with its ethical 
inquiries, such that Freud’s original desire to understand the ‘master-complaint’ might be   21
better served (Lear, 2005:10). It seems as though my move towards ‘literary madness’ could 
not be more timely. 
  Josh Cohen writes that “our assimilation of his [Freud’s] vocabulary of the inner life 
coexists happily with the widespread sense that we’ve done, and are done with Freud” 
(2005:2). It is not hard to find examples of film scholars who wish to evoke the weight of 
psychoanalysis without marking themselves out as psychoanalysing. As such, their work 
almost always comes with a caveat. Krin Gabbard, for example, produces a highly interesting 
analysis of The Jazz Singer and its remakes as ‘Oedipal’ repetitions, but is decidedly unsure 
of his exact theoretical co-ordinates. “So”, Gabbard writes, “I lay a few cards on the table at 
this point and declare my commitment to a flexible model of psychoanalysis that 
acknowledges the impact of cultural change on American obsessions as they are repeatedly 
played out in popular narratives” (1998:97). While retaining the power of its terminology, 
Gabbard refuses to be drawn as to what he means by ‘Oedipus’, omitting any overt reference 
to Freud except through the myth itself and its popularisation. His ‘flexible’ model of 
psychoanalysis emerges as precisely only flexible on the grounds that he can disavow himself 
from its (rotting) discursive base. Similarly, Timothy Corrigan begins his fascinating study of 
postmodern cinema, A Cinema without Walls: Movies and Culture after Vietnam (1991), with 
a comparable caveat of ‘flexibility’, evoking the word ‘hysteria’ but with the appendage: “I 
do not, of course, pretend to be clinically precise here; I am not trying to present film history 
and texts as patients on the couch of film theory” (Corrigan, 1991:142). My question to 
Corrigan is: Why not? Is it the film history or the film theory that is so weakened as to render 
any such analysis ineffectual? Perhaps it is a bit of both. It is a shame that neither Gabbard 
nor Corrigan wishes to engage with psychoanalysis more directly, for I think an inflexible 
model of psychoanalysis, combined with clinical precision, is more important than either wish 
to fully acknowledge.  
  Nonetheless, Corrigan’s work, in spite of its reluctance to be drawn on its precise 
relation to psychoanalysis, has opened up a fascinating and disturbing perspective on 
contemporary film. Following Fredric Jameson’s argument that postmodern culture is caught 
in a deadlock between experiencing life through a pastiche aesthetic or a schizoid rush of 
nonsensical images, Corrigan rethinks film’s ability to render a contemporary history “in 
crisis”. For Jameson, we now live “in a world in which stylistic innovation is no longer 
possible” where “all that is left is to imitate dead styles, to speak through the masks and with 
voices of the styles in the imaginary museum” (1985:115). Corrigan describes this ‘alarming’ 
pathological symptom using Lacan’s observation that there is some truth in the homophony 
between ‘history’ and ‘hysteria’. Corrigan then moves to argue that this ‘historical hysteria’ in 
Hollywood cinema contains four key elements: (1) the Jamesonian nostalgia for a cinematic 
and social history that continually draws the present to a past that can neither be contained nor   22
incorporated; (2) a refiguring of audiences and their positions as regards what he calls 
‘illegible films’ which can neither be read nor understood by traditional analytical procedures; 
(3) the understanding that spectators now have a ‘dissolved view’ where genres no longer 
submit themselves to the laws of their classical Hollywood counterparts; and (4) that there is 
now a counterpoint to Hollywood’s politicisation of cinema, where American life now 
imitates Hollywood cinema. As Corrigan’s problems are all inherent to the key issues of the 
remake, I want to explore them in a little more detail, and at each point, begin to illustrate 
some of the key formulations of remaking that will become fundamental to this study. 
  Corrigan’s first point is that Hollywood is in the grip of a need for nostalgia films 
(what Jameson called ‘la mode rétro’). This concerns the sense that while social history 
informs genre (e.g. such as the influence of World War II on film noir), genre also acts as a 
social commentary on cultural history, mythologising aspects of society. Rick Altman sums 
this up in his statement that now, and “for the first time, genre theory must accommodate 
itself to genre history, rather than vice versa” (1999:4). Crucial for Corrigan however, is the 
sense that this model has become stuck on a “drive to repeat specific signifying materials, an 
obsessive drive to repeat in reaction to the resistance of cultural history” (1991:139). This is 
film ‘hystory’, where the textual ‘body’ is hystericised by a film language and historical 
placing that is radically incompatible with its environment. Corrigan is not alone in thinking 
of cinema in these terms, and perhaps we would do well to remember Daniel Frampton’s 
suggestion that “film is not of the world, film is a world (a new world)” (2006:5), such that 
this drive to repeat is not the sense of a complex film discourse struggling to repeat our 
cultural history, but, rather, of a complex film discourse struggling to repeat its own history. 
Thus our first formulation of the historical hysteria in remaking is that Hollywood cinema is 
obsessed with repeating its own history, and has a certain love affair with the idea of 
dramatising its own failure to repress, the result of which leads to ‘excessive theatricality’.  
  Paolo Cherchi Usai (2001) has observed that at the birth of cinema in 1895, just over 
forty minutes of moving images existed, and most of those minutes have been preserved for 
posterity. Fast forward to 1999, and it has been estimated that one-and-a-half-billion hours of 
moving images were produced in that year alone. As a result of this excess, Martin Scorsese 
notes that most of these images are not being preserved for posterity, but are instead being 
lost through the ‘vinegar syndrome’, which is the natural degradation of cinema prints. As 
such we now live in a culture guilty of “ignoring the loss of its own image” (Scorsese, 2001), 
something which has led Usai to state that “cinema is the art of destroying moving images” 
(2001:7). The viewer then is an unconscious (and impotent) witness to this loss, and given the 
commercial investment in the preservation of some images over others depends to a large 
extent on which of those images will sell or not, s/he is also partly responsible. Usai notes that  
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viewers of the Model Image are unaware of the crisis or catastrophe that will shatter their trust 
in its integrity. Such an idyllic state is a condition for the existence of this image. As soon as 
history comes into play, there can still be a relative degree of bliss in watching the image, yet 
sooner or later some spectators will be able to foresee the rate and patterns of its destruction 
(2001:45).  
 
Usai also considers the origin of film theory to be similarly based on the disgracing of the 
moving image. “Unlike histories of film”, he writes, “their aims are generally prescriptive; 
hence their ideological rationale. Film theory, too, would cease to exist in face of a Model 
Image” (Usai, 2001:27). This sense of the Model Image will become pivotal to our 
conception of the remake in this study, given each and every remake is engaged in a dual 
moment of self-preservation and self-effacement.  
  It is no coincidence that Corrigan dates the emergence of Hollywood’s hystericisation 
to the Vietnam War and the influx of images that flooded the US during this time (the first 
depiction of war in such gory detail). The cultural counterpart to the proliferation of these war 
images was Andy Warhol, who in 1967 emerged as a prominent figure in the Pop Art 
movement. He is perhaps most famous for his printed images of Marilyn Monroe, whose 
close-up head exaggerated the colours of her eye-shadow, hair, and lipstick. In addition to 
making a statement about Monroe’s star persona (as an ultra-feminine sex icon), Warhol’s 
endless replication of this image hystericised the work, creating a signifier of death 
(especially given the icon’s untimely demise in 1962).  
   
  
Fig. 0.2: Andy Warhol’s ‘Marilyn’ (1967)  
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According to art historian Jamie James, Warhol was famous for implying “an equivalency 
between some of the most revered works of modern art and the disposable, banal trash 
designed for and read by adolescents” (2001:114). Soon after ‘Marilyn’, Warhol began 
replicating just Monroe’s lips as partial objects, which began floating menacingly around 
Hollywood, further compartmentalising her already-decapitated head.  
 
 
Fig. 0.3: Andy Warhol, ‘Marilyn Monroe’s Lips’ (1962) 
 
Just as Warhol’s endless repetition of Monroe transformed her iconic image into a pure, 
meaningless signifier containing the stain of death, so too did the endless repetition of the 
Vietnam War transform the conflict likewise, turning public opinion. Warhol’s art points to 
the somewhat different realm of artistic repetition over ‘normal’ repetition: for example, we 
know that artists do not replicate and repeat in quite the same way as a patriot replicates a 
country’s flag (an object reproduced while its concept remains the same). Artists replicate the 
object and combine it with another element, introducing ‘disequilibrium’ into the work. Here, 
we find another formulation of historical hysteria in remaking: of the symbol of death buried 
in the work reduced to a partial, fully fetishised, object. Like the Cheshire cat in Alice in 
Wonderland we are presented here with an obscene, yet fully complementary, paradox (the 
smile-without-a-cat and the cat-without-a-smile). With Psycho’s ‘shower scene’ we get a 
striking example of Warholian cinema; an image not only connoting its original but denoting 
it as well, replacing it, as such.  
  Meaning here is thoroughly disturbed in this textual excess. Let us address this excess 
in an example from Hollywood cinema itself, and prove that it really is prevalent. The 
example I have in mind is one to which I will return throughout this thesis, one that is no less 
valid for having never been remade. The film is Martin Scorsese’s Taxi Driver (1976), a film 
which “attempts to simultaneously accept and reject the signs of a given world, to claim at   25
once its narcissism and a release into a symbolic reality” (Corrigan, 1991:142). Taxi Driver’s 
troubled protagonist, Travis Bickle (Robert De Niro), is a mohawked Vietnam-veteran taxi 
driver who tries desperately to fit into, and love within, the respectable middle class society to 
which he aspires. Yet each of the signifiers that denote his identity ‘castrate’ him also, from 
‘Vietnam vet’ to ‘Mohawk’; ‘taxi driver’ to ‘gunslinger’. Each signifier reduces down to a 
meaningless formula – not unlike Monroe’s lips – describing a separate history and culture 
resisting the previous one, and hiding behind the next. Upon its release the film caused waves 
of controversy for its depiction of violence and a crisis in masculinity, but for Corrigan, 
masculinity is not the only thing in crisis here. 
The hystericism of Taxi Driver’s relationship with its historical and cultural reality 
took a bizarre turn on March 30
th, 1981, when John Hinckley, Jr., allegedly influenced by 
Taxi Driver’s assassination plot, attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan. The 
uncanniness of this failed attempt illustrated the retroactive redetermination inherent to 
postmodern culture: history was no longer writing the movies, the movies were writing 
history. Robert Stam argues that “the point of adaptations is not to re-invent stories that 
resemble reality, but turn reality into a story” (2000:73). His point is made clear in this 
example, where life is not just imitating art as cinematic transgression, but filmic ideology 
and political historicism enter a möbius spiral of negativity, where “media fantasy creates the 
historical event” (Corrigan, 1991:202).
* Is this not a reversal of the roman à clef, whereby to 
approximate a cinematic and historical event, the viewer must first view and then review in 
order to have any hope of contextualising this fragmented moment? This is not simply a 
moment, but several fractured moments. A further formulation of historical hysteria in 
remaking then is that of the phantasmatic support of reality, where it is not that a series of 
films describes the ‘real thing’ behind the fiction, but that the façade of fiction is itself 
disguised by the real Thing. It will be argued that this Thing, akin to Usai’s ‘Model Image’, is 
the key to our understanding of the remake. 
  Starting with these initial formulations on Hollywood hystory, this thesis suggests 
that these are texts in need of psychoanalysing, and that it is in remaking that these 
‘symptoms’ are most strongly expressed – each one is a textual Travis Bickle, so to speak. 
Thus in response to Jonathan Lear’s call for a return to the clinical reality of psychoanalysis, 
this thesis does what Corrigan stops short of, and presents film history and texts as patients on 
the couch of film theory. 
                                                 
* Can the same not be said of the September 11
th attacks in 2001, that these attacks were not only 
rendered (and continually re-rendered) by the media in the days and weeks of its aftermath, but that 
Hollywood films from the 1990s, such as Independence Day (1996) and Executive Decision (1996) 
among many others, effectively pre-empted the attacks in a kind of retroactive wish-fulfilment? For 
more on this, see Slavoj Žižek’s ‘Welcome to the Desert of the Real’ (2001), and Jean Baudrillard’s 
‘L’Esprit du Terrorisme’ (2001). In film studies, this phenomenon has been explored in multiple 
studies, for example: Wheeler Winston Dixon’s Film and TV after 9/11 (2004).   26
What can “warmed-over meals” tell us about the way we eat? Classic American and 
European cinema in the microwave 
 
So where, specifically, does the remake fit in with ‘undead’ psychoanalytic film theory and 
Hollywood cinema’s film ‘hystory’? This final section of my introduction will serve not only 
as a preface to the historical and industry concepts of remaking, the theory of the remake, and 
the preliminary taxonomies that exist to categorise remakes, but it will also set up the 
fundamental questions facing cinematic repetition. As such, I hope you will permit me a little 
room to manoeuvre…  
  Let us begin where we left off, that is, with Hollywood’s historical hysteria, because 
for Corrigan at least, the remake plays a big part in this breakdown. In fact, the remake does 
not represent the traditional movement of narrative to reflect an organised history, nor does it 
represent the modernist demand to reorganise that history; rather, remakes represent “the 
more contemporary perspective of narrative as an unresolved plenitude where history fades 
into the starry images of an idyllic past or the technological nightmare of an inhuman future” 
(Corrigan, 1991:171). However, not all commentators are so forgiving, for while Corrigan is 
merely attacking the remake as fading history into oblivion (idyllic or nightmarish), many 
critics attack the remake as trashing that history altogether. Alain Resnais famously 
denounced adaptations as nothing more than “warmed over meals” (cited in Horton & 
McDougal, 1998:240), a sense echoed by Marc Savlov, who described remakes as “reheated 
depravity” (2009). I cannot help but be reminded here of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s three methods 
of food preparation: nature (‘raw’), culture (‘baked’), and the mediation between the two 
(‘boiling’). With remakes (especially in the era of the iPhone on which one can ‘watch-on-
the-go’), perhaps it is about time we added Resnais and Savlov’s fast-food analogies to Lévi-
Strauss’s semiotic triad, such that we get a new method of food preparation for the remake 
(‘microwaved’).  
  We have combined here a lack of originality and artistic integrity, coupled with brutal 
economic pragmatism. The sense that remakes are ‘cashing in’ on superior originals is 
summed up in Lester Asheim’s condemnation of the major question facing producers as being 
not “Is it art?”, but “Will it sell” (1951:292)? However, we must not forget, as Alexander 
Walker has pointed out, that things were not so different in classical Hollywood, which was 
itself “an imitative industry in which only a few creative people are tolerated at any one time. 
What is imitated is the last big success […] one man’s success the night before could be 
another man’s imitation the morning after” (cited in Forrest & Koos, 2002:139). Furthermore, 
many detractors of contemporary remaking who lament the passing of the ‘golden age’ of 
innovation seem to have forgotten that remakes were statistically greater in number in the 
classical era than in the post-classical ‘New Hollywood’ (Simonet, 1987:154). So why is the   27
contemporary remake condemned as fading history either into the “starry images of an idyllic 
past” or the “technological nightmare of an inhuman future” when, clearly, classical 
Hollywood also updated its early experimentations for new audiences and also sought to 
exploit technological advances (such as the advent of the ‘Talkies’ and Technicolor)? The 
sense that classical Hollywood was remaking to stabilise its ‘Bambi’ legs with ever-
improving storytelling procedures and sophisticated filming techniques has undeniably been 
replaced with the sense that remakes are sweeping Hollywood’s legs out from under it, 
perhaps proving Freud’s intuitions about early cinema correct.  
  Underpinning any discussion of the remake is the familiar binomial opposition, 
‘original/remake’, which gives rise to the question: what is a ‘classic’ original? In Tay 
Garnett’s Stand-In (1937) a film director previews his new film to studio bosses who perceive 
huge flaws in the production. Unperturbed, the director turns to his disappointed audience 
with a flourish and exclaims that “Great films are not made, they are remade!” (implying that 
he will fix the problems before the film gets released). However, the dominant view of 
remakes in contemporary Hollywood is that remakers take this motto of “Great films are 
remade” much too literally. James Naremore (2000) warns that remakes and adaptations are 
assigned a low status by critics because they are copies of cultural treasures, of originals that 
have become ‘classic’. Forrest and Koos point out that the dominant perception is that 
Hollywood remaking is a commercial enterprise “reflect[ing] the worst in Western capitalist 
production” (2002:3), and, with its recent remaking and assimilation of foreign originals, 
many now see Hollywood as engaging in a new form of cinematic re-colonisation.  
  So why study the remake? Once again, there is another – frequently missed – side to 
the debate, and three descriptions of remaking illustrate this. Firstly, Forrest and Koos have 
argued that while many remakes are indeed uninspired imitations of their superior selves, 
some are critically acclaimed reinterpretations of their original models, especially in classical 
Hollywood (e.g. The Maltese Falcon and Scarlet Street for two). Indeed, for Forrest and Koos 
it is this ‘superior’ remake that  
 
hinders us from adopting as a general rule the widely accepted notion that all remakes are 
parasitical and not worth any critical consideration outside a political and economic evaluation 
of Hollywood’s commercial filmmaking practices. The remake is a significant part of 
filmmaking both as an economic measure designed to keep production costs down and as an 
art form (1998:3).  
 
Secondly, I find it somewhat difficult to improve on Lucy Mazdon’s statement on the 
hybridity of the remake, in which she concludes that  
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the process of adaptation, whose very frequency shows it to be of extreme importance, leads 
to cross-fertilisation, aesthetically as one art form borrows from another, temporally as works 
from another age are adapted, spatially as cultures adapt across national boundaries, and 
culturally as works shift between location in ‘high’ and ‘popular’ cultures (2000:3). 
 
Thirdly, Carol Clover has argued that  
 
although mass media can scarcely be characterized as in any sense less self-conscious or 
analytic than criticism and theory about them, the fact that the discourse within horror cinema 
and the discourse about it diverge on some crucial points would seem to suggest that the folks 
who make horror movies and the folks who write about them are, if not hearing different 
drummers, then reading different passages of Freud (1992:168). 
  
While Clover is here describing the horror genre, we need only substitute the word ‘remake’ 
for the word ‘horror’ here for the precariousness of the remake’s status in academia to 
become apparent. So, we move in these three passages from superior elements of remaking, 
through the importance of cross-fertilisation and hybridity, to Clover’s frustration at the lack 
of attention in academia for those aspects of cinema considered to be of a ‘lowly’ status (do 
they get any lower than remakes?). 
  It is with this in mind that I wish now to suggest some ‘remake questions’ which I 
will enumerate with, where necessary, brief descriptions. These are questions every bit as 
crucial to the revival of psychoanalysis in film theory, the birth of Deleuzian film theory, and 
the working through of film hystory, as they are to remake studies. Make no mistake – these 
are the questions facing film studies today:  
 
-  Is the remake the same as a literary adaptation? Despite sharing similar 
hermeneutical issues, this thesis will primarily restrict itself to repetitions within the 
medium of film, but will explore the overlap with cross-medium adaptations where 
relevant. Adaptation theory has a long history which has historically excluded 
remakes (which seems strange, since one should surely begin with one medium 
before moving onto two), but this might all be about to change, for we need only 
substitute the words ‘remaking’ and ‘originals’ for ‘adaptation’ and ‘novels’ in Linda 
Hutcheon’s statement that “if you think adaptation can be understood by using novels 
and films alone, you’re wrong” (Hutcheon, 2006:xi), to arrive at a precise formulation 
of the complexity of cinematic remaking.  
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-  Is the remake a genre? Frequently asked but never satisfactorily answered; this will 
be one of the first questions to be explored in chapter 1.  
 
-  Why remake in the first place? This question is frequently rendered with the 
expression “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”.  
 
-  Why are some films remade while others are not? This question concerns the 
criticism aimed at the tendency for remakers to pick either ‘classic’ or ‘cult’ originals 
(one rarely hears of a remake of a film that no one saw). My case studies will address 
both aspects. 
 
-  If the original did not exist, would the remake be worth seeing? If we ignore the 
Platonic warning against any such hypothetical reasoning, this question actually 
contains more than it appears to, not least with respect to Warhol’s art. Furthermore, 
Walter Benjamin has stated that “to an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced 
becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility […] one can make any number 
of prints; to ask for the ‘authentic’ print makes no sense” (1936:218). In remaking, 
we move from the ‘then and there’ to the ‘here and now’, but should that be a move 
from the ‘there and then’ to the ‘nowhere and no-when’? Chapter 4 will engage with 
this ‘master question’. 
 
-  Why do film audiences wish to see things again? Here we have the elephant in the 
room. For Usai, there are three ‘motivations’ for reviewing films: (1) “The pleasure 
of repeating an experience of pleasure”; (2) “A desire to obtain a fuller perception of 
what has already been seen”; and (3) “A change of opinion” (2001: 99). While each 
chapter engages with this question, chapter 4 will contain a detailed analysis of 
remake audiences. 
 
  Remake spectatorship needs some further consideration before moving on, since the 
spectator will become the lynchpin of my claim to a new kind of remake theory. Anat Zanger 
begins to flesh out this masochistic position as being “the desire to have the already-known 
experience repeated […] accompanied by the presentiment that it never will be” (2006:121). 
The remake spectator knows that the second viewing of a film vis-à-vis a remake will end in 
disappointment, that the remake will rarely open them up to a fuller perception of what has 
already been seen, and that it is unlikely to change their opinion. One is tempted to invoke 
Peter Sloterdijk’s reformulation of Marx’s famous “They do not know it, but they are doing 
it” as “They know what they are doing, but still, they are doing it” to describe this ‘knowing’   30
spectator. Sloterdijk’s point is that while the Marxian subject is lost in the grip of an ideology 
that is obscure to him/her, the postmodern subject knows full well that s/he is in the grip of an 
ideological illusion, but yet, nonetheless, they continue to act as if they did not know. These 
‘as if’ reformulations will become clearer as we explore the death drive and its relation to the 
remake, but for now, let us continue to explore the remake spectator.  
  Knowledge is crucial to understanding the remake, and yet so little has been written 
on the philosophical importance of knowledge in remake models of spectatorship. Let us look 
at the two predominant models of spectatorship in theory today. The classic, predominant 
(psychoanalytic) model of spectatorship was established by Christian Metz, wherein the 
spectator engages in fetishistic disavowal; the sense that “I know very well (that the film is not 
real), but all the same (I will believe in it as if it were)”. According to Metz, film spectators 
engage in three ‘fictions’ which structure the cinematic illusion: the belief in someone who 
does believe in the film, the belief that everyone acts as if they believe in the film, and the 
general refusal of the spectator to admit that some part of them genuinely does believe in the 
filmic events (Metz, 2001:72). Metz argues that “the film is not exhibitionist. I watch it, but it 
doesn’t watch me watching it. Nevertheless, it knows that I am watching it. But it doesn’t 
want to know” (2001:94). The remake, however, draws attention to its status as a knowing-
subject, openly contradicting Metz’s description of films as ‘closed objects’ by invoking their 
former models and spectatorial relationships. If, as Metz argues, the normal cinematic 
relationship between the spectator and the silver screen is one that “will be fractured in its 
centre, and its two disjointed halves allocated to different moments in time” (2001:95), then 
for the remake, the two disjointed halves must be rerouted through third and fourth contingent 
times, each with an entirely new set of conditions – actors, director, scenes, production, etc., 
and audiences. In this way, we should acknowledge that the remake does not just add to, but 
actually rewrites Metz’s theory of spectatorship.  
  Against the classic psychoanalytic model we have the spectatorship theory of the 
Deleuzian school, especially that explored recently by Daniel Frampton, who argues that   
 
in film studies the rhetoric of the ‘camera’ has a long history of sheep-like repetitiveness. For 
those who idolised the technology and wanted a reflexive signal of their love to saunter 
through their writing, the camera offered a crucial crutch […] the filmgoer does not see a 
camera, they see a film-world (2006:50, emphasis added).  
 
The Deleuzian spectator is not passively absorbing the cinematic experience but actively co-
creating it, participating in its very construction. The ‘thinking’ of a film, which he designates 
as ‘film-thinking’, creates a ‘filmind’, a neologism he himself describes as being “not an 
‘external’ force, nor […] a mystical being or invisible other, it is ‘in’ the film itself, it is the   31
film that is steering its own (dis)course. The filmind is ‘the film itself’” (2006:7). This second 
model of spectatorship is less troubled by the remake, since for a Deleuzian all films are 
multiply activated by the spectator at every point such that there can be no definitive 
allocation of ‘moments’ in time.  
  These two very contrasting models of spectatorship will be dissected and intersected 
so that we can flesh out this masochistic remake spectator in the grip of an obsession with 
returning to a history thoroughly hystericised. While Anat Zanger suggests a preliminary 
taxonomy of the remake spectator as being dynamic as opposed to static (or variable versus 
constant), centred as opposed to periphery (or canonical versus non-canonical), and 
diachronic as opposed to synchronic (2006:122-3), I think we need to go further. Other 
taxonomies of remaking already exist as well, including Thomas Leitch’s four categories of 
remaking, which include: (1) ‘Readaptations’, whose goal is fidelity to the original work upon 
which the remake is based (a fidelity it is assumed that all other adaptations have failed to 
keep), such that it ‘best represents’ the original; (2) ‘Updates’, where a classic text is 
considered irrelevant to a modern audience and so needs remaking to contemporise its 
themes; (3) ‘Homages’, which valorise an original in danger of being ignored or forgotten, 
representing the first contradictory claim of remakes as renouncing any claim to superiority 
while acknowledging the need to remake; and (4) ‘True remakes’, which contain the second 
contradiction of remaking as they seek “not only to accommodate the original story to a new 
discourse and a new audience but to annihilate the model they are honouring – to eliminate 
any need or desire to see the film they seek to replace” (Leitch, 2002:50). This fourth kind of 
remake is the most commonly identified as a ‘remake’, one which admires its model to the 
extent that it wishes to eliminate it as a competitor in the marketplace while selling itself off 
the back of that original’s iconic status. Arguably the best taxonomic classification of 
remakes however belongs to Robert Eberwein, whose complex and structuralist-orientated 
tabulation in ‘Remakes and Cultural Studies’ (1998) is, while problematic and certainly not 
exhaustive, an excellent start for classification purposes. As this is not our goal here I will 
leave it alone, but simply cite it as proof of the growing interest in organising this new 
discourse as it unfolds. 
   
Having opened up the three prongs of this thesis – psychoanalytic and Deleuzian film theory, 
Hollywood hystory, and Hollywood remakes – I will now briefly state how the individual 
chapters will work. Chapter 1 begins with the möbius strip as a topographical figure for 
cinematic remaking, a figure explored by both Deleuze and Lacan, and one that is essential to 
this new film-thinking. I examine the Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956, 1978, 1993, and 
2007), and differentiate between cinematic ‘making’, ‘remaking’, and ‘unmaking’, a crucial 
third term in the series frequently missed in dyadic remake structures. Following this, I   32
scrutinise one of the central paradoxes of the remake, that of its dual admiration and 
annihilation of an original, a paradox contained in the common Christian sentiment “Love thy 
neighbour”. Having examined the symptom and fetish of the remake, I then move on to the 
drive of the remake via another metaphor, this time of the facehugger in Alien (1979), whose 
life-cycle closely corresponds with that of the Hollywood remake. Herein, Lacanian 
jouissance is given renewed attention to tempt it away from its current misuse in film studies. 
The final part of this chapter explores the way in which Deleuze and Lacan both demonstrate 
a reversal of Plato’s opposition between Essence and Appearance in his forms, something 
absolutely intrinsic to the remake and the concept of the original.  
  The next two chapters represent case studies that implement the ideas compressed in 
chapter one. Remake theory currently falls between two camps: American-American 
remaking, or those remakes within the same cultural tier that remake across time; and foreign-
American remaking, or those remakes outside of the same cultural tier that remake across 
space. In addition to being categorised along industry lines, they will be also be split into two 
‘undead’ metaphors to help explain this sense of the eternal return. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
first type of Hollywood remake, metaphorised in the concept of the ‘zombie’. It considers 
Gus Van Sant’s shot-for-shot ‘art’ version (1998) of Alfred Hitchcock’s original Psycho 
(1960). I examine the sense of Psycho as a film for which remaking was a necessity rather 
than directorial hubris, and locate in Van Sant’s ‘faulty reasoning’ a psychotic edge for taking 
the project on. I also look at Van Sant’s ‘queering’ of the original as realising what was in the 
original, more than the original, and analyse the ‘big mistake’ in allowing Norman Bates to 
‘come’ in the remake. Finally, I look at the shower scene as fetishistic synecdoche and the 
relation of Psycho to postmodern cinema. Alongside a cache of film references, I engage with 
Ken Russell’s Crimes of Passion (1984) as a secondary text. Chapter 3 focuses on the second 
type of Hollywood remake, metaphorised in the concept of the ‘ghost’ or ‘spirit’. It considers 
George Sluizer’s Hollywood remake, The Vanishing (1993), as a ‘commercialist/exploitation’ 
remaking of his own ‘cult’ Dutch original, Spoorloos (1988) – what is called ‘auto-remaking’. 
I examine the concept of national cinema through a reconsideration of what we mean by 
nationalism in film. I also consider the importance of knowledge in remaking, using The 
Vanishing as an example of the Lacanian ‘subject-supposed-to-know’ and the role of the 
analyst in psychoanalysis, before regarding the process of ‘Americanisation’ and, in 
particular, the inclusion of happy endings in Hollywood remakes of edgy foreign originals. 
Finally, I explore the objet petit a in remaking and the commercial opportunity for the remake 
and the importance of domestic markets. Alongside a cache of other film references, I look at 
Ole Bornedal’s Nattevagten (1994), also auto-remade as Nightwatch (1997), which shares an 
almost identical (re)production history to Spoorloos, as a secondary text.   33
  Having investigated the two types of remake in my two case studies, I identify a third 
type of remake previously unexplored. Chapter 4 then is a kind of ghost chapter which 
suggests a completely new way of reading remakes in what, after Deleuze, I call ‘irrational 
remaking’. The concepts of time and memory, I argue, have been absent from most remake 
models presented thus far, and as such, this is where the remake spectator is to be fully 
explored. I reconceptualise James Cameron’s Terminator 2 (1991) as irrationally remaking 
The Terminator (1984), in key scenes which undermine its industry category as a sequel. 
Here, the terminator itself becomes a complementary metaphor for the remake with the 
facehugger from Alien in chapter 1. I then reconsider Freud’s return of the repressed via 
Deleuze and Lacan, and rescue the concept in remake studies from its current ‘vulgar 
Freudian’ deployment. Crucial to this is the concept of the father, which has also been 
grievously ignored in remake studies. Next, the chapter proposes a key difference between 
remakes as simulacra-phantasms and copy-icons in line with Deleuze’s theory of repetition 
and difference, before moving on to what might be called a third ‘ghost’ case study in Francis 
Ford Coppola’s The Conversation (1974), which I consider as an irrational remake of Psycho. 
Thereafter, chapter 4 suggests three key rearticulations of the Lacanian theory from chapter 1: 
I rearticulate the Lacanian drive by considering the shift away from the shower scene as fetish 
to the exploding toilet as pure symptom; I rearticulate Lacanian jouissance in the remake by 
considering the foreshadowing of Hitchcock in Henri-Georges Clouzot’s Les Diaboliques 
(1955); and I rearticulate the death drive in light of Serge Daney’s observation that all 
American films are “ageless”, and the contribution of the remake to this longevity of the Idea.   
  My conclusion elaborates on what I am calling ‘The four fundamental concepts of the 
remake’, based on Lacan’s four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, which are: the 
unconscious, repetition, the transference, and the drive. I also explore three levels of 
remaking that exceed the industry category of ‘the remake’: institutional-repetition, 
spectatorial-repetition, and structural-repetition, using the example of Twelve Monkeys 
(1995) to make my point and re-evaluating the structure of the thesis itself as a möbius loop. 
Finally, I suggest that the starting point for any consideration of the remake is to be found in 
the concept of the Real father, which Lacan designates as the ‘Great Fucker’, and which I 
explore in the obscene object of death hiding in the corner of every version of a work. It is the 
same as the death skull lurking in the corner of Hans Holbein’s trompe-l’œil painting, ‘The 
Ambassadors’, which I put forward as the perfect conceptualisation of the shift in perspective 
necessary to approach the concept of remaking in cinema. In so doing, this thesis calls not for 
answers to the questions raised in this introduction, but for a fresh consideration of the 
questions themselves.   
  I am, of course, well aware of the resistances to such a questioning of the questions in 
film studies. Suffice it to recall the very fundamental resistance to film theory known to   34
anyone who has taught Film to undergraduate students, a resistance based on the perceived 
destruction of the pleasure in watching films through their close analysis and denotation. Let 
us take confidence from the theorists themselves: Christian Metz advised us to divorce 
ourselves from the “pleasure” of watching films, and in doing so, wrest the Symbolic from the 
Imaginary. Alternatively, Pierre Janet’s advice to a patient fearing that reading would get “the 
books dirty” (Janet, cited in Rodowick, 1991:135) was to do just that. If we are to get 
anywhere with remakes, we must be prepared to approach their symbolic dimension, and, 
failing that of course, get over our own fear of getting our screens dirty.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
AN ‘ENCOUNTER’: DELEUZE AND LACAN PERVERT THE REMAKE 
 
“I will show you how the whole trend of your previous education and all your habits of thought are 
inevitably bound to make you into opponents of psycho-analysis.” 
 
-  Sigmund Freud (1915) 
 
 
Opening thoughts: What is an ‘encounter’? 
 
Žižek observes that Deleuze was well known for his aversion towards debate, stating that 
when a true philosopher hears someone say “Let us debate this point a little bit!”, he or she 
should jump up and run away as fast as possible (Žižek, 2004:ix). Deleuze’s fear reflects the 
deadlock of Freud’s famous ‘talking cure’, which follows a pattern that we can perhaps all 
identify in common conversational gambits such as, “That’s enough about me, what about 
you? What do you think of me?” Self-love here, along with narcissistic attachment, gives the 
impression of a relationship to the other which is in fact just another relationship to the self 
(mediated, of course, by the analyst). Deleuze’s insistence on privacy however, extended 
beyond a simple defence mechanism. For instance, when interviewed about his esoteric 
personal life he responded:  
 
What do you know about me, given that I believe in secrecy? […] If I stick where I am, if I 
don’t travel around, like anyone else I make my inner journeys that I can only measure by my 
emotions, and express very obliquely and circuitously in what I write. […] Arguments from 
one’s own privileged experience are bad and reactionary arguments (Deleuze, 1995:11-12). 
 
The quite Kantian opposition between public and private life here seems to encapsulate 
Deleuze’s observation that “if there is nothing to see behind the curtain, it is because 
everything is visible, or rather all possible science is along the length of the curtain” 
(2009b:12). For Deleuze there is literally ‘nothing’ beneath the veil, but, rather, it is the veil 
itself which should be of interest. 
  Similar to Deleuze, Lacan was also very conscious of his public persona. Žižek tells 
the story of an attempt by Lacan’s closest friends to figure out how Lacan was in his personal, 
private life, as opposed to the public image he carefully cultivated (the master analyst 
unbearable to be around, courteously distant yet demanding to the point of cruelty, etc.).   37
Those who knew him personally tried to penetrate the hard ‘social’ mask of his exterior and 
get to the true, ‘private’, interior to ensure that he was indeed “human, like the rest of us”. 
However, they were in for a shock, since beneath Lacan’s public mask there was no warm 
personality: rather, he stuck fastidiously to the public image in private also, acting in precisely 
the same way. Žižek reads Lacan’s persona not as his assumption in private of the symbolic 
role for which he was known (over-identifying with the social bond), but that “the public 
symbolic role itself, as it were, collapsed into pathological idiosyncrasy, turned into a 
contingent personal tick” (1993:271n). For Žižek, Lacan – like Deleuze – was not simply 
hiding anything behind the veil of his public persona but, rather, the only truth existed in the 
performance of the role itself. The truth, it seems, is the fiction. 
  It is Jean-Claude Milner who points out that Lacan’s body of work contains a 
fundamental paradox, again quite Kantian in its reversal of the private into the public. Where 
one’s oral seminars are usually aimed at a small, inner circle, and one’s written texts aimed at 
the general public, “Lacan’s écrits are ‘elitist’, readable only to an inner circle, while his 
seminars are intended for a wider audience, and, as such, are much more accessible” (Žižek, 
2006a:128). Deleuze writes that it is never of interest to us to ‘psychoanalyse’ the work or its 
author, but, rather, authors should be considered as more like clinicians than patients, not of 
their own case, but, rather, the ‘case’ of civilisation. Thus, “from the perspective of Freud’s 
genius, it is not the complex which provides us with information about Oedipus and Hamlet, 
but rather Oedipus and Hamlet who provide us with information about the complex” 
(Deleuze, 2009b:273). Whereas a neurotic’s novel is merely the externalisation of symptoms 
and nothing more, the artist’s novel is, by contrast, a movement from the surface on which 
symptoms are played out to the metaphysical surface on which the pure-event stands; going 
from the cause of the symptoms to the quasi-cause of the œuvre itself. For Deleuze, the 
singular text is not enough to pose the question properly, an entire body of work is necessary, 
not in order to answer the question but in order to compose the event which makes it into a 
question (that is, to shift to the position from which the correct questions can be posed). In 
this way, “the artist is not only the patient and doctor of civilization, but is also its pervert” 
(Deleuze, 2009b:274). As Žižek suggests of Lacan then, his “seminars and écrits relate like 
the discourse of analysand and analyst during treatment” (2006a:128); that is, one must move 
between the discourse of the patient to the discourse of the analyst, from public to private, and 
back again, in order to make any sense of them. 
  In the same vein, this chapter moves back and forth, not to find the right answers to 
the remake questions, but to interrogate the subject-position of the questioner him/herself. As 
such, many of the examples I use in this chapter are not remakes, but nonetheless expose 
aspects of cinematic repetition intrinsic to remake theory. This chapter will show exactly why 
Joan Copjec is wrong when she described Žižek’s psychoanalytic work on Deleuze as his   38
going into “enemy territory”. The book Copjec was referring to is his Organs without Bodies 
(2004), a book which claims that, against the popular image of Deleuze as co-author of Anti-
Oedipus, there is ‘another Deleuze’, one “much closer to psychoanalysis and Hegel, a private 
Deleuze whose consequences are much more shattering” (Žižek, 2004:xi). The publishing 
history of Deleuze’s translation into English tells its own story here, for while Anti-Oedipus 
was translated into English in 1984, The Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition were 
not published until in 1990 and 1994 respectively. This is especially interesting given the 
original French versions appeared in 1969 and 1968, while Anti-Oedipus was not originally 
published until 1972. Thus it is clear to see how Deleuzian scholarship in Britain has been 
shaped by the canonical Deleuze as he is co-authored by Félix Guattari. Deleuze writes that 
“repetition displays identical elements which necessarily refer back to a latent subject which 
repeats itself through these elements, forming an ‘other’ repetition at the heart of the first” 
(2009a:28). Does this not point to the ultimate irony in the Freudian ‘talking cure’; that is, the 
need to continually repeat oneself? After all, is not Deleuze’s aversion to debate based on his 
concerns over who might be listening? 
  I wish to end this introduction with a quick analogy for this chapter, an analogy of the 
thesis itself, in Pascal Bonitzer’s description of the trompe-l’œil (‘trick the eye’) genre of art. 
In these works – most popular in the Baroque period, on which Deleuze wrote in The Fold 
(2006) – the painting first establishes a scene before suddenly revealing itself as “a system 
with a false bottom, which turns the representation into a ‘conceit’ and surreptitiously places 
the spectator in front of an unfathomable and terrifying reality” (Bonitzer, 2002:179). 
Bonitzer links the trompe-l’œil to the cinema of Hitchcock, arguing that while his films seem 
to disguise themselves with an aestheticised and ‘glossy’ mask hiding a deeper metaphysics, 
it is rather the case that Hitchcock’s metaphysics actually form part of the disguise. I claim 
that the remake works similarly, not that it aestheticises the genuine Idea of the original, but 
that it contains that Idea in its aestheticisation. Similar to the trompe-l’œil, we can only view 
this stain of the Idea via a shift in perspective, in which the Real might hope to be 
encountered. But how can we achieve this? Not by looking at remakes directly, for as with the 
trompe-l’œil, once lost in its illusion, we miss it. Deleuze argues that “repetition is truly that 
which disguises itself in constituting itself, that which constitutes itself only by disguising 
itself” (2009a:19); therefore, let us not got lost in the disguise, and look to its periphery, at the 
echo of its impact. I think this is the only way to approach the remake, especially given 
Deleuze and Lacan’s preference for privacy, and their aversion to debate.  
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A frog embracing a bottle of beer: From making to remaking via ‘unmaking’ 
 
If this chapter is to expose a hidden Deleuze and Lacan, it must be said to have the topology 
of the möbius band; in fact, this is also the topographical figure of the remake too. The 
möbius band illustrates how opposites converge and diverge, where one side meets the other 
without traversal. As such, this non-orientable surface subverts Euclidean space and time, and 
is represented in the perpetuity of M. C. Escher’s marching ants for whom there is no 
underside, which we can represent with the symbol for infinity, ‘∞’.  
 
 
Fig. 1.1: The möbius band in M. C. Escher’s ‘Moebius Strip II (Red Ants)’ (1963) 
 
We can discern a möbius topology in Deleuze’s thinking, particularly when he writes that “by 
sliding, one passes to the other side, since the other side is nothing but the opposite direction. 
[…] It suffices to follow it far enough, precisely enough, and superficially enough, in order to 
reverse sides and to make the right side become the left or vice versa” (2009b:12). For both 
Deleuze and Lacan, the figure of the möbius strip problematises various binary oppositions, 
including inside-outside, love-hate, signifier-signified, truth-appearance, etc., making it 
possible for one to traverse from reality to fantasy and beyond to the site of the Real.
* 
Ultimately, the möbius band formulates a model of remaking in which the original and 
remake become part of the same structural event.  
  It is with Deleuze’s structure of the möbius in mind that the problem of remaking 
should be posed in terms of ends rather than origins. These ends diverge from their 
                                                 
* For a more detailed exploration of the möbius band in Žižek’s work, go to 
http://art3idea.psu.edu/boundaries/documents/bolagrams.html on ‘Bolagrams’ (Boundary Language 
Diagrams).   40
beginnings rather than reproduce an archetype of the Other, and as such we should feel 
confident to begin at the end, a reversal in logic that is going to be the key to our overturning 
current trends in remake theory that assume the sovereignty of the original. It is also one of 
the first instances of the Deleuzian twist already inherent to psychoanalysis: a reversal of 
causality. Even in Freud’s earliest work on hysteria and repression, causality is in trouble, 
made problematic. Take the case of the patient ‘Emma’ from ‘Project for a Scientific 
Psychology’ (1895), a young woman whose hysterical symptoms included a fear of entering 
shops alone, an awkwardness concerning her appearance (especially her clothing), and the 
laughter of shop assistants. These motifs were soon discovered to be the distorted restaging of 
an earlier event where Emma was sexually violated by a shop keeper as a young child. One of 
the reasons Freud’s analysis seems odd is because he labels the repressed traumatic event (the 
earlier sexual assault as a child) as Scene II and the consciously-remembered hystericised 
event (the fear of entering shops as an adult) as Scene I. What is strange about this reversed 
chronology is not that the scenes are reversed in the first place (memories precipitating 
hysteria are typically recalled in reverse chronological order), but, rather, that Freud does not 
correct the order following his unveiling of the earlier traumatic event. Freud keeps the 
reverse order precisely because, as Josh Cohen points out, in many ways “this is the correct 
order” (2005:20). The earlier scene has no psychological reality for Emma without the later 
scene, such that it is through the repetition of the memory that the memory is itself born.  
  In this way, Deleuze is absolutely Freudian in his insistence on events or series being 
fragmented, disordered (and reordered) by the subject. Deleuze writes that “it is essential that 
the first or pregenital stage […] should not be understood as such” (2009b:267n), that the 
originary moment is dislocated. Žižek suggests that time is disordered in this way because of 
an unconscious ‘Thing’, a blockage causing hysteria, which is not an inert presence curving 
symbolic space by introducing gaps and inconsistencies, but an effect of these gaps and 
inconsistencies. For him, it is the gaps in the symbolic that create the Real (Žižek, 2006a:73), 
not the other way around. Žižek gives the example of Freud’s famous Russian patient, the 
Wolf-Man, who marked out an event from his childhood in which he witnessed parental 
coitus a tergo (sexual act in which the man penetrates the woman from behind) as a traumatic 
moment which led to later sexual perversions. However, Žižek reveals the Lacanian (and 
Deleuzian) logic of reversal here when he observes that initially there was nothing traumatic 
about this first experience in-and-of-itself; only later, when the Wolf-Man became obsessed 
with infantile sexual theories such as “Where do children come from?” did he draw out this 
memory as a traumatic scene embodying the mystery of sexuality. Unlike Freud’s case of   41
Emma
*, “the scene was traumatized, elevated into a traumatic Real, only retroactively, in 
order to help the child to cope with the impasse of his symbolic universe (his inability to find 
answers to the enigma of sexuality)” (Žižek, 2006a:73-4). Compare the example of the Wolf-
Man with Deleuze’s own example from Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of 
Lost Time), in which the hero undergoes a series of amorous experiences as a child with his 
mother, before undergoing another series of sexual encounters with Albertine. For Deleuze, 
“the pregenital series has already put into play, in a mysterious noncomprehensive or pre-
comprehensive mode, the adult model of Swann’s love for Odette” (2009b:268), such that the 
pregenital object of love is reconstructed after the adult love.  
  This paradox of reversed temporality requires repression, without it, the earlier scene 
is not Scene I or Scene II; it is no Scene at all. With the remake, the key paradox pointed out 
by Thomas Leitch is that it seeks to accommodate the original story to a new discourse and 
annihilate the model it is honouring, “to eliminate any need or desire to see the film they 
[remakes] seek to replace” (2002:50). This dual desire to honour and eliminate finds its 
apogee in two examples of the death drive at work in Hollywood remaking, which 
figuratively consume their templates in an extreme act of union so violent that cinematic 
history itself is destroyed and reborn in the process. In 1987, Hollywood producers Stanley R. 
Jaffe and Sherry Lansing employed James Dearden, the scriptwriter of a British TV thriller 
called Diversion (1980), to pen a Hollywood remake which became Fatal Attraction (1987). 
At the same time, the producers of Fatal Attraction, Paramount studios, attempted to purchase 
and destroy all known copies of Diversion on video to restrict the competition and establish 
their version as the original. Worse still is the example of George Cukor’s 1944 version of 
Thorold Dickinson’s Gaslight (1939), where the studio (MGM) remade the film after 
purchasing the rights to the negatives of the original, which they promptly destroyed, ensuring 
their version would remain definitive. Luckily they were unsuccessful, but these brutal 
moments of commercialist exploitation nonetheless confirm Lacan’s answer to the question 
“What is a father?” as being: “It is a dead one” (Lacan, 2003:343). Quite simply, there is no 
remake without a dead original, just as there is no original with a living remake. This should 
become a tautology of remaking (perhaps with the addition of the prefix ‘un’ to the word 
‘dead’). 
  The link between the paradox of reverse causality and Leitch’s paradox of the remake 
is provided by Anat Zanger, who argues that it is in remakes that we can “identify these 
chains of repetition and variations as symptoms of those areas over which the master narrative 
has lost control” (2006:23). For Zanger, remade originals contain primordial ‘unknowns’ that 
                                                 
* It is vital here that we distinguish symbolic trauma from actual traumatic experience as the two are 
not to be confused. Lacan differentiates between them using the terms ‘structural trauma’ in the case of 
the former, and ‘historical trauma’ in the case of the latter.    42
terrify and disturb cinematic history like Freud’s Wolf-Man, a disturbance that results in a 
compulsive need to remake. Freud noted that “there is at least one spot in every dream at 
which it is unplumbable – a navel, as it were, that is its point of contact with the unknown” 
(2001:186n). I claim that the remake paradoxes enumerated above provide the basis for any 
filmic understanding of Freud’s most contentious theory of the ‘death drive’ (todestrieb). The 
naïve understanding of remakes and the death drive would be that remakes represent the death 
of original thinking in Hollywood. However, this reading could not be further from the truth 
of the matter, for the death drive is not simply a drive on its own in opposition to life drives 
(Thanatos against Eros), but, rather, it is a vital component of every drive, given every drive 
pursues its own extinction, involves the subject in repetition. In film, this sense is beautifully 
rendered in David Fincher’s Fight Club (1999), where having narrowly escaped a car crash 
one of the characters, Tyler Durden (Brad Pitt), exclaims “God Damn! We just had a near-life 
experience, fellas”, a reversal of the common phrase, “near-death experience”. Here, there is 
an indication that ‘near death’ experiences actually bring about their reverse, something 
approaching real living, that is, the feeling of being alive.
* This is the meaning of Freud’s 
statement that “‘the aim of all life is death’”, that “‘inanimate things existed before living 
ones’” (2001:37-8). It is not that the aim of life is nihilistic but the opposite: life, that is, real 
life, involves going to the edge. But how can the brink of self-destruction get us closer to life?    
  Possibly the most famous of Freud’s examples of the death drive comes not from his 
couch but from his grandchild’s cot. In this example, Freud recalls a game he witnessed the 
young toddler play: first, he threw a cotton reel over the edge of his cot so that it disappeared. 
He accompanied this with the lamentation “fort”, the German word for ‘gone’. Soon after, the 
toddler pulled back the reel, greeting its reappearance with a gleeful exclamation, “da!”, the 
German word for ‘there’ (Freud, 2003:52-3). Freud interpreted this game as the child’s 
attempt to master, through repetitive re-enactment, the trauma of being separated from his 
mother. Even though this game of disappearance and return is effectively revisiting the 
trauma, in repeating it he activates himself within it. Where before he was passively helpless 
as his mother came and went, here he has control over the object’s disappearance and its 
return. In shifting from object to subject, this rudimentary game illustrates the fundamental 
activity of the death-drive as the mediation between both failure and success in the psyche. Its 
inadequacy is a part of the element of self-preservation and self-extinguishment in one all-
consuming moment of repetition. 
  Is the remake, therefore, the equivalent of Freud’s grandchild playing the game of 
fort/da in response to the original version’s ‘real’ mother, who disappears over time? Not so, 
for Lacan argues that Freud’s interpretation of his grandchild’s game of loss and return is of 
                                                 
* Something similar is explored in Joel Schumacher’s Flatliners (1990), where medical students induce 
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only secondary importance. For Lacan, the child is not objectivising his mother in the cotton 
reel, thereby becoming the master over her disappearance, but, rather, he sees the reel as a 
small detachable part of himself which, while having been discarded, still remains connected 
to his body – a bodiless organ, as Žižek would say. Thus, this partial object is designated the 
subject, the objet petit a (Lacan, 1998:63). In remake terms, this sense of self-
compartmentalisation and simultaneous fragmentation gives rise to a complex alternating 
between ‘here’ and ‘there’, the aim of which, as Lacan puts it, “is simply that of being the fort 
of a da, and the da of a fort” (1998:63), or in other words, of being what is not there, of 
finding desire at the same point at which we are born into Language. 
  It did not take us long to arrive at language, and it is here that we begin to truly break 
some new ground with the remake, for what is a remake if not the rearticulation of an 
original; a speaking-repetition, so to speak? Lacan is famous for his statement that “the 
unconscious is structured like a language” (Lacan, 1998:149), but it is here that we run up 
against another block. Josh Cohen questions whether it is possible to detect the death drive 
given “its silence and invisibility […] renders it simultaneously everything and nothing, a 
blank absence and an uncanny presence” (2005:110)? The death drive hides itself so 
insidiously in amongst the life drives that it is completely undetectable: no wonder then, that 
it took Freud so long to discover it! Perhaps Deleuze has the answer, since he describes this 
silent hidden stream within the work of art as a ‘phantasm’, whose structure is that of 
‘grammatical perspectivism’, a concept that will become paramount to this new conception of 
the remake.  
  What is grammatical perspectivism though? For Deleuze, this orientation around a 
phantasm is illustrated by a shift around an infinitive verb, such as ‘to live’, ‘to die’, etc. We 
can add to this list of infinitives some psychoanalytic equivalents in: ‘to repress’, ‘to beat’, ‘to 
seduce’, etc., and as remake theorists also: ‘to repeat’, ‘to recreate’, ‘to readapt’, etc. The leap 
is not so great from grammatical perspectivism to Freud’s famous phantasy structure 
(exemplified by the beating phantasy), where the infinitive verb emerges in-between the 
present progressive phase of “My father is beating a child (whom I hate)” and the asubjective 
phase “A child is being beaten”. In-between these two consciously remembered phases Freud 
detected an unconscious, intermediary phase linking these two statements, recovered during 
analysis: “I am being beaten by my father”, which shifts the fantasist from being the subject of 
the enunciation to being the subject of the statement. The infinitive verb, ‘to beat’, links these 
three phases via what Deleuze calls the phantasm. This phantasm is un-writable, unspeakable, 
and has to be fleshed out from between the two consciously-remembered phases via the shift 
from possessive personal subject, “My (father)”, to the impersonal object, “A (child)”, via the 
unconscious fully active subject “I (am)”. Identity here is unstable, and Deleuze calls this   44
phantasm a “disjunctive synthesis”, which goes “from the sexual pair to thought via 
castration” (2009b:251).  
  The link to the objet petit a of the child’s fort/da game will become clear with an 
example. Žižek describes an Australian beer commercial as beginning with the familiar fairy 
tale encounter between a young woman who, upon meeting an ugly frog, kisses and 
subsequently transforms him into a handsome young man. The twist comes when the man 
thirstily draws the woman to him to kiss her, and yet, rather than ending with the fantasy 
coupling, transforms the girl into a bottle of beer (which he triumphantly holds in his hand). 
Žižek is right to point out that this popular advert illustrates Lacan’s premise that “There is no 
sexual relationship” (“il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel”), because while the young woman 
transforms the frog into a handsome man full of phallic presence, he transforms her into a 
partial object, an ‘organ-without-a-body’, if you will, not unlike Freud’s grandchild. Žižek’s 
point is that there is always an unconscious third coupling that remains unspoken in any 
relationship: in this beer commercial it is the fully unconscious coupling of a frog embracing 
a bottle of beer (2006a:56). Žižek imagines a Magrittesque painting of this scene of a frog and 
a bottle of beer with the title ‘A Man and a Woman’, or ‘The Ideal Couple’. This vision is a 
staging of fantasies that are “radically desubjectivized, that cannot ever be enacted by the 
subject” (Žižek, 2006a:57), because the couple exclude themselves by having incompatible 
desires.  
  Deleuze states that it is the same as thinking of how a couple may ‘project itself’ 
(independently of children), “the way we go from the couple to the thought constructed in the 
mode of the couple” (2009b:251). The remake is similarly between two surfaces, and if we 
continue to look at it as two sides of a ‘fantasy’ (with an ‘f’), we miss the entire element 
intrinsic to ‘phantasy’ (with a ‘ph’) of the unconscious ‘third’ supporting the two. If Deleuze 
is right in saying that “the thinker of depths is a bachelor”, “the depressive thinker dreams of 
lost betrothals”, and “the thinker of surfaces is married or thinks about the ‘problem’ of the 
couple” (2009b:251), then we remake theorists must all become thinkers of surfaces, not 
depths. We must move beyond singular terms (as bachelors), dualisms (as lost betrothals), 
and look instead to the cracks in the surface (the ‘problem’ of the couple) into which we 
might fall. Remember the lesson of the Holy Grail in Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade 
(1989), where Indiana (Harrison Ford)’s girlfriend, Elsa (Alison Doody) attempts to “have her 
cake and eat it” by stealing the Grail, and is consequently swallowed by cracks which 
magically appear in the ground. As she slips away, Indiana himself becomes possessed by this 
objet a also, before his father coolly reminds him to “let it go”. This is the lesson of the death 
drive in psychoanalysis: one must follow the objet a to the ends of the earth, but God help you 
if you find it. In remake terms, we must be careful not to become preoccupied with false 
depths in searching for the ideal couple in an original and its remake, for to do this is to only   45
see the beautiful man and woman; rather, we look along the surface and see the remake frog 
embracing a remake bottle of beer. Now we are ready for an example. 
  The remake series I wish to use to explore this notion of grammatical perspectivism is 
the remakology of Invasion of the Body Snatchers, which as Dave Kajganich argues, is a film 
which seems to require remaking every 20 years or so because it articulates something about 
the “human condition” (speaking in Matthies, 2008). The series loosely follows the same 
plotline of a group of people in society who begin to suspect that their friends and neighbours 
are not who they are, that they have been assimilated or possessed by some alien ‘other’. The 
recurring phrase of the series is “My son is not my son [or father, daughter, etc.]”, because 
these emotionless neighbours – even lovers – walk, talk, and act like ‘themselves’. The aliens 
are only betrayed by some tic or inexplicable leftover of otherness (often an inhuman glint in 
the eye) which gives them away. Soon, whole communities seem to be afflicted, and the 
‘normal’ humans are in the minority, attempting to resist their own assimilation by pretending 
to be “one of them”, that is, by obeying rules such as not showing any emotion…  
  The first version – adapted from Jack Finney’s sci-fi novel Body Snatchers in 1956 – 
has undergone no less than three assimilations: in 1978, 1993, and again in 2007. Rather than 
psychoanalysing the story or narrative, which rather goes against my methodology, I wish to 
look instead at the difference and repetition of their promotional materials. Thus what follows 
is an analysis of the taglines, titles and poster art using Freud’s beating-phantasy framework 
and Žižek’s Australian beer commercial to show four separate cycles: (1) how the 1956 
version is a woman with a frog; (2) how the 1978 version is a woman with a handsome man; 
(3) how the 2007 version is the man with a bottle of beer; and (4) how the 1993 version is the 
unconscious underlying phantasmatic support of the frog embracing a bottle of beer.  
  The tagline for the original Invasion of the Body Snatchers in 1956 read: “They come 
from another world!” Alongside this tagline we should read the tagline for the first remake of 
the same name in 1978: “The seed is planted… terror grows”. Both are in the third person, 
and are anticipatory of an incoming threat. There is a strong emphasis on ‘us’, the humans, 
and ‘them’, the alien invaders. The publicity posters confirm this reading, as both share the 
markedly similar image of two groups: those foregrounded are distinctly identifiable as 
humans running desperately from the background group of nondescript, formless ‘others’ 
who bear an uncanny resemblance.  
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Fig. 1.2: Publicity posters for Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956) & Invasion of the Body Snatchers 
(1978) 
 
However, with the latest remake in 2007, The Invasion, the entire emphasis is shifted from the 
distance of other to self, to the proximity of other to self. The Invasion’s tagline read: “Do not 
trust anyone. Do not show emotion. Do not fall asleep.” Here, rather than an anticipatory 
threat of impending invasion we have the sense that we have already been invaded, and 
instead what we get are the rules for surviving this new world populated by alien beings 
(which amount to the instruction “Pretend to be like one of ‘them’”).
* The humans must not 
run or scream in this version, but learn the rules and live as if they were the other. In another 
remake however, we have yet another type of assimilation. This fourth version is simply titled 
Body Snatchers (1993), a film rarely acknowledged in the Invasion canon (hence why I list it 
fourth). However, despite its minor status, it was directed by Abel Ferrara, a New York auteur 
figure responsible for critically acclaimed independent art-house hits like Bad Lieutenant 
(1992) and The Addiction (1995), the latter of which was filmed in black-and-white. 
However, despite Body Snatchers premiering at the Cannes Film Festival and receiving 
critical admiration from the likes of Roger Ebert, who described it as “skilled and knowing, 
and deserves the highest praise you can give a horror film: It works” (1994), the film was 
                                                 
* Just like the ‘rules for surviving a horror movie’ in Wes Craven’s Scream (1996), which features such 
rules as: “Don’t answer the phone. Don’t answer the door. Don’t try to escape”, etc. These are 
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dropped like a stone, receiving only a limited theatrical release from its distributor, Warner 
Bros, and in some instances going ‘direct-to-video’. Why is this version excluded from the 
Invasion canon? The Body Snatchers tagline is perhaps the most disturbing of them all: 
“Imagine… You’re gone and someone else is living inside your body”. Here, the film enjoins 
its viewers to imagine they have already been assimilated, such that we are, and always have 
been the other. Compare the two posters (see fig. 1.3 below): is not the frozen look on The 
Invasion’s star, Nicole Kidman, that of a woman trying to fake her otherness in front of a 
crowd of alien onlookers, searching for the difference that will betray her (the AA motto 
“Fake it ‘till you make it” seems a crude but appropriate point of comparison here)? By 
contrast, the Body Snatchers image utilises the Real truth of the story: that beneath the mask 
of otherness we are already ‘other’, in the extremist sense of the word. This is the frog and the 
bottle of beer, the ultimate negation of the sexual relationship which is, here, invalidated 
(what need have we for sex when we can reproduce without it – i.e. in vitro fertilisation, etc?). 
Body Snatchers merely anticipates a world in which sex no longer performs a function. 
 
 
Fig. 1.3: Publicity posters for The Invasion (2007) & Body Snatchers (1993) 
 
  Even the titles in this series mark them out as operating in different ways: the 1978 
version repeats the title, Invasion of the Body Snatchers, whereas The Invasion in 2007 and 
Body Snatchers in 1993 each present one half of the story. Here, we have a rare titular 
example of the symbol overtaking its signification, standing in for the whole; we know even   48
with the title ‘The Invasion’ that this has a textual antecedence.
* We could even go so far as to 
say that The Invasion and Body Snatchers assimilate the different parts of the Invasion of the 
Body Snatchers films like the aliens in their stories, leading to the perverted sense that “My 
film is not my film”. Proof of the repressive nature of the Body Snatchers remake can be seen 
with a quick look at my filmography, for where the other films are listed under ‘I’ this one 
comes under ‘B’, although this title is closest to the original title of the novel, The Body 
Snatchers from 1955, which also points to the suppression of the literary source in the other 
film versions (completed with The Invasion). While the source text featured a happy ending in 
which the aliens left earth due to the level of resistance they encounter, the first two film 
versions end somewhat obliquely, neither happy nor downbeat. The Invasion contains a 
properly saccharine ‘happy ending’ where the invasion is not only stopped but reversed (that 
is, all the assimilated humans are returned to their natural states). Only Body Snatchers 
features the properly pessimistic ending contained in the Idea of the story, what Zanger 
referred to as the primordial ‘unknown’ that terrifies and disturbs the series, or what Freud 
noted as the “unplumbable” navel of the dream’s contact with the unknown. Ferrara’s version 
is the only uncompromising vision of an inhuman alien future with no subjects. Furthermore, 
it is also the only version in which the alien invasion disturbs a family that is already 
disturbed: the protagonist of Body Snatchers, Marti (Gabrielle Anwar), is already confronting 
the unknown terror of a crisis of identity, in which the overtures of late-capitalist paranoia 
play over the twentieth century breakdown of familial reciprocity. Ultimately, the film’s final 
statement holds true whether the alien life forms succeed or not: “Where you gonna go? 
Where you gonna run? Where you gonna hide? Nowhere… ‘Cause there’s no one like you 
left”; in other words: you are now the other.   
  It is only through the minor remake then that the true horror at the heart of the 
original Invasion of the Body Snatchers story comes to the fore. It creates a productive short-
circuit that could perhaps only be achieved in a low-budget movie, where darker endings are 
not as costly as they can be on the big screen in terms of audience ratings. For Žižek, short-
circuits can be productive as they illustrate the faultiness of objective reasoning, such that by 
taking a major classic (author, text, notion), and reading it through the lens of a minor one, we 
can reveal the essence of the major text, or as Lacan would say, what is in the text, more than 
itself (its ‘real’ unspeakable message). Deleuze understands a ‘minor’ text not as a text of 
lesser quality necessarily, but of one that is “marginalized, disavowed by hegemonic 
ideology, or dealing with a ‘lower’, less dignified topic” (Žižek, 2006b:ix). If the minor text is 
well chosen, such a procedure can lead to “insights which completely shatter and undermine 
                                                 
* Illustrated by over 15 examples which establish an intertextual link by replicating the first part of the 
title: ‘Invasion of the…’ with a changing object: ‘… Body Stealers’ (1969), ‘…Girl Snatchers’ (1973), 
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our common perceptions” (Žižek, 2006b:ix). As it is seemingly well-hidden in the 1990s, the 
Body Snatchers remake is undoubtedly a ‘minor’ text in the Deleuzian sense, and yet it is here 
that the death drive is most visible. 
  Another example uncannily similar to that of the Invasion of the Body Snatchers 
remakology is that of the film adaptations of Richard Matheson’s sci-fi/horror classic, I Am 
Legend (1954). In the book, one man alone survives a holocaust which sees the earth overrun 
by vampiric creatures. The book ends with the hero, Neville, glimpsing a future where 
infection is normal and he is a murderous biological deviation, such that a reversal of the old 
world (where the vampires were the murderous deviants) is fully realised. Alone, Neville ends 
his life to become the ‘legend’ to the vampiric race now inhabiting the world, the legend they 
themselves once were to humans. The adaptations of I Am Legend, of which there are 
currently three, follow the same pattern as the Invasion of the Body Snatchers films: the first, 
The Last Man on Earth (1964), included an ambiguous ending where Neville (Vincent Price) 
discovered a cure for the remaining half-infected survivors, who kill him in their ignorance. 
In the second and third versions, The Omega Man (1971), and more recently, I Am Legend 
(2007), a false ‘happy ending’ is introduced whereby Neville (Charlton Heston and Will 
Smith, respectively) finds a cure for these other humans, which they embrace. Each of these 
versions alters Neville’s relationship to the legend: in the book he is the human legend for the 
vampires as the last surviving human in a vampire world; in the first film version Neville dies 
ignominiously in the eyes of the Others, such that there can be no legend; in the other two 
versions, particularly the 2007 version, having saved the other survivors by finding a cure 
with his sacrifice, Neville destroys the vampires and becomes the human legend for humanity, 
entirely inverting the proposition. Of course, to complete the tetralogy there is a fourth 
version which is, like Body Snatchers, properly unconscious. I Am Ωmega (2007) was a 
direct-to-DVD version released in the same year as the big budget Will Smith version, 
specifically produced to capitalise on that film’s substantial marketing campaign. As such, the 
film drew huge amounts of criticism for its cynical and exploitative parasitism. The title even 
betrays its insecurity, being a portmanteau of the other two versions, I Am Legend and The 
Omega Man. I would argue that I Am Ωmega is less cynical than it might first appear, for is 
there not a sense that there is more to these TV and DVD versions than meets the eye? Do 
they not point to the brutal economic capitalism at the heart of almost every remake hoping 
somehow to assimilate a model to pass itself off as its superior other self?  
  Deleuze provides the key to these different versions in his statement that “I make, 
remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an always decentred centre, 
from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differentiates them” (2009a:xix). 
Although Deleuze is not describing film remakes here, his sense of ‘unmaking’ arising out of 
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here to the psychoanalytic triad of ‘construction’, ‘repression’, ‘reconstruction’. As with the 
unconsciously repressed third, ‘unmaking’ is not the third stage on from the previous two but 
the hidden kernel emerging from the ‘making’ and its ‘remaking’. I think the critics of I Am 
Ωmega were more bothered by the fact that this version, far from merely leeching off I Am 
Legend with its cheap production, mirrored the big-budgeted Hollywood film too closely. 
This instance of finding oneself sharing space with a neighbour whose proximity has become 
too much to handle is a problem shared by every remade text. Let us place this figure of the 
neighbour under some intense scrutiny in an attempt to uncover the reason as to why I Am 
Ωmega might have caused such a big stir. 
 
 
Love thy (evil) neighbour: on the symptom and fetish of the remake 
 
The question that permeates the Invasion films is: How do we detect which of our neighbours 
have been assimilated, and which are still human? Many other films feature a similar 
problem, and not just in the science fiction canon. Every time a character is double-crossed or 
betrayed, every time an antagonist is revealed to be the protagonist’s lover or best friend, we 
find ourselves in the territory of Lacan’s theory of the evil neighbour. Marcus Harney has 
remarked that it is no accident “that remakes are often of texts whose plot involves a 
remaking of personages, in the form of reeducation, imposture, shape-shifting, 
metamorphosis, rebirth, role-playing, etc.” (2002:81). While Harney’s observation has its 
problems (there are non-remakes that feature these themes and remakes that do not) it is 
nonetheless an observation that rings true of most remakes, and certainly of the Invasion 
series. What is it though about the concept of the neighbour that disturbs us so? Lacan 
describes Freud’s understanding of the Christian motto to “love thy neighbour” as a reflection 
on the understanding that God is dead, in that “Man tried to satisfy his need for aggression at 
the expense of his neighbor, to exploit his work without compensation, to use him sexually 
without his consent, to appropriate his goods, to humiliate him, to inflict suffering on him, to 
torture and kill him” (Freud, cited in Lacan, 1992:185). Whatever could Freud mean here, and 
why does Lacan cite this as proof that “jouissance is evil” (1992:184)? Firstly, we must ask 
the question: What is jouissance? 
  French Lacanians like to tell the following story as to why Lacan resisted the English 
translation of jouissance into ‘enjoyment’: upon his first trip to America, Lacan was one day 
confronted with a television commercial featuring the well-known motto “Enjoy Coke!” and, 
dismayed at its vulgarity, he emphatically insisted that his ‘jouir’ was not the same as this 
‘enjoy’ (Žižek, 2008c:xvii). However, Žižek writes that in many ways this is wrong, for 
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precisely is the jouir in its superego imbecility” (2008c:xvii). This refusal of popular culture 
on the part of French Lacanians fails to recognise the true status of the mass-media symbols 
of America: Coca-Cola does not just connote an American ideology, the ‘spirit of America’, 
but is the very signifier of this American spirit, its signifying representative. The link to 
Hollywood has been clearly made by Forrest and Koos, who describe the remake as an effort 
to “Coca-Cola-ize the world” (2002:29). 
  So how is jouissance – the superegoic drive to enjoy – evil? Žižek aims to rescue the 
concept of the ‘neighbour’ from its nauseating conception in TV comedies such as Friends, 
which he argues to be a false conception of neighbourly love. By contrast, Žižek’s concept of 
the ‘neighbour’ is someone who appears non-threatening and even ego-reinforcing in a 
narcissistic way, such that they are “Like me…”, yet with the qualification, “…but somehow 
different”, giving rise to the question: “What obscene secret are they hiding? Why do they 
bug me so much?” This difference, this irreconcilable aspect of the neighbour that eats away 
at us, is the Lacanian kernel/nugget he called the objet petit a. It is an alien element that 
“remains an inert, impenetrable, enigmatic presence that hystericizes me” (Žižek, 2006a:43), 
and it is both disgusting and fascinating in equal measure. This is the ‘it-Thing’ (das Ding) of 
the Coke commercial; not a pulsating, oozing monster-thing from 1950s ‘creature features’, 
but the insidious ‘Thing’ lurking inside our neighbour who looks alright on the outside, but 
inside is a whole other kettle of fish.  
  Compare Leitch’s paradox of the remake wishing to both honour and eliminate its 
original with Žižek’s deliciously devilish joke about a Slovene peasant who is told by a good 
witch that “I will do to you whatever you want, but be warned, I will do it to your neighbour 
twice!” The peasant thinks for a moment, and then replies with a cunning smile: “Take one of 
my eyes!” (2006a:36). The peasant’s answer illustrates the hidden meaning behind Lacan’s 
famous question, “Che vuoi?” (2003:345), which does not just translate to “What do you 
want?”, but also, “What’s bugging you?”, and why does this uncertainty bother me? Consider 
the common parlance “Keeping up with the Joneses”. We cannot help but hear this phrase in 
the words of Alexandre Kojève who said that the subject creates and preserves “its own 
reality by the overcoming of a reality other than its own, by the ‘transformation’ of an alien 
reality into its own reality, by the ‘assimilation,’ the ‘internalization’ of a ‘foreign,’ ‘external’ 
reality” (1980:4). Is not the trauma of modern day middle class existence to be found in the 
‘suburban thriller’ genre, which features the situation of new neighbours moving in next 
door? The genre includes such films as The ‘Burbs (1989), The Stepford Wives (1975, remade 
in 2004), Your Friends and Neighbours (1998), and Arlington Road (1999). In each example, 
the real trauma is not that the neighbours move in with their bizarre behaviour, but that the 
neighbourhood soon begins to change, such that the oddballs become the ‘Joneses’, and the 
protagonist becomes the oddball. The remake is similarly an evil neighbour who ‘looks like’   52
its original version and yet contains the imperceptible trace of difference in its repetition, an 
internalised dissemblance that bugs us. The closer the remake is to looking like the original, 
the more disconcerting its premise (with the ‘shot-for-shot’ remake topping the list), and its 
influence over other contemporary films.   
  The most common phrase concerning the neighbour is the Christian one: “Love thy 
neighbour as thyself”, which on first glance seems to work against Žižek’s version of the evil 
neighbour. However, if we look deeper, we can see that this phrase is actually to be taken 
thoroughly seriously in the context of the evil neighbour, for it is in Lacan’s concept of love 
that the traumatic dimension of the neighbour really takes off. Lacan writes that “my 
neighbour’s jouissance, his harmful, malignant jouissance, is that which poses a problem for 
my love” (1992:187), and as such, for Lacan, “jouissance is evil” (1992:184), love is 
suffering. To complement the ‘suburban thriller’ genre, we have the ‘psycho-thriller’ genre, 
where this time, a diabolical neighbour assimilates the style of the protagonist herself.
* This is 
perhaps the most uncannily terrifying neighbour narrative of them all, for as the common 
phrase “good fences make good neighbours” indicates, without a fence we find ourselves in a 
spot of bother. One such example is Single White Female (1992), which captures this sense 
perfectly when a heartbroken woman, Allie (Bridget Fonda), advertises for a new housemate, 
an advert answered by Hedy (Jennifer Jason Leigh). At first they get on fine, until Hedy 
becomes pathologically obsessed with copying Allie’s life, from wearing her perfume and 
jewellery, to trying on all of her clothes. However, the best scene of the film occurs when the 
girls go for a hair-cut together. In a truly sublime moment, Hedy descends the stairs of the 
salon with her matted brown curls cut short into a dyed-red bob, just like Allie. More than any 
other scene of bloodshed, this flash of red (seen in the mirror no less) is the one that gets to 
the heart of just why the neighbour is so terrifying.
†  
  The problem with the Christian phrase of “Love thy neighbour as thyself” is that 
finding oneself in the position of the beloved is sometimes just as violent and traumatic a 
discovery as being rejected having declared one’s love for another. Lacan explains that the 
reason love is so terrifying to receive is that it is the act of “giving away something one 
doesn’t have”, his point being that we love a certain person because they contain an 
unfathomable ‘X’, literally some ‘Thing’ (objet a) that causes this love arbitrarily, something 
approximating the sense of “Out of everyone, why choose me?”. Žižek supplements Lacan’s 
definition of love (as “giving away something one doesn’t have…”) with “…to someone who 
doesn’t want it” (2006a:44), bringing the two elements of threat implied in the suburban and 
                                                 
* ‘Herself’ specifically because the ‘suburban thriller’ and ‘psycho-thriller’ genres are split down 
gender lines for reasons I have not got time to enumerate here. 
 
† Other films with similar themes include: Black Widow (1987), Basic Instinct (1992), and The Hand 
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psycho thriller genres together. Žižek offers a starkly beautiful example of the violence of 
declaring love in Alejandro González Iñárritu’s 21 Grams (2003), in which a dying man, Paul 
(Sean Penn), declares his love for a woman, Cristina (Naomi Watts), whom he has just met. 
Shocked, she reproaches him saying: “You can’t just walk up to a woman you barely know 
and tell her you like her. You don’t know what she’s going through!” The problem is not that 
Cristina does not reciprocate Paul’s affection but the opposite. Between the lines, Cristina is 
asking: What right do you have to stir up my desire? Lacan writes that “I love you, but, 
because inexplicably I love in you something more than you – the objet petit a – I mutilate 
you” (1998:268). It seems that whoever wrote the phrase that “Imitation is the sincerest form 
of flattery”, was wrong. Perhaps “Mutilation is the sincerest form of flattery” would be more 
accurate.  
  In Hollywood cinema, this trauma at finding oneself in the position of the beloved is 
nowhere more apparent than in remaking. The remake not only moves into the original’s 
‘neighbourhood’ with its bizarre practices and behaviour (new actors and scenes, different 
endings, altered mise-en-scène, etc), and seeks to destroy that original and establish itself as 
the proprietor of this new style, but it also declares its loving intentions overtly. As with 
Cristina’s complaint of Paul’s declaration of love, the original is right to question the right of 
the remake to stir up its desire, the ‘Thing’ of its jouissance. It is not the imitation, but the 
declaration, that causes the problems here, for as Andrey Konchalovskiy has said of Psycho, 
the reason remakes cannot be considered forgeries is because they are signed (speaking in D-
J, 1999). Is there not an additional threat implied with the remake’s blatant appropriation of 
the original title that is not present in the genre film, which also steals and allegorises scenes 
and themes? Žižek questions the declarative dimension of statements, wanting to know “What 
more does this statement contain, that has caused you to make it” (2006a:19), or in remake 
parlance: Why not just remake the film as a genre picture, why signal the identity of the 
original overtly? Deleuze also notices the traumatic dimension of a loving declaration, stating 
that “If you are caught up in another person’s dream, you are lost” (cited in Žižek, 
2005a:212). For Deleuze, the type of perversion inherent to the detective is a kind of 
psychoanalytic deadlock that, studied in isolation, cannot be resolved. The declarative 
dimension to remakes in ‘speaking’ themselves into a double existence is thus a perversion 
written in the language of the cinematic unconscious.  
  The idea of being lost in another’s person’s dream (or should that be nightmare) in 
which one is both subject and pervert is brilliantly illustrated in David Lynch’s Blue Velvet 
(1986), a story about an inquisitive young man, Jeffrey (Kyle MacLachlan), who while 
daydreaming finds a severed ear in a field which leads him into a dark world just beneath the 
glossy sheen of his idyllic suburban street in small-town USA. His investigation leads him to 
Dorothy Vallens (Isabella Rossellini)’s apartment where he witnesses a dangerous   54
psychopath, Frank Booth (Dennis Hopper), who has kidnapped and mutilated Dorothy’s 
husband, engage in sadistic sexual games with her. Jeffrey’s voyeurism awakens something in 
him that both disgusts and fascinates him in equal measure. Timothy Corrigan has even 
argued that Jeffrey’s invasion of Dorothy’s apartment leaves audience members in a different, 
exotic world, but that, “as the subsequent discovery of Jeffrey reveals (voyeuristically hiding 
in the closet, watching the rape of Dorothy), those viewers become strangely at home there, 
made ‘neighbors’” (1991:71). This, for Corrigan is exemplified by the fact that “in these 
neighbourhoods there is only one nature for Jeffrey to discover, a horizontal rather than 
vertical ‘second nature’ that flattens and evacuates all human and natural depths” (1991:72). 
  Corrigan questions how the viewer is to properly receive Blue Velvet: “What is the 
proper response here? Nervous laughter? Bemused horror” (1991:76)? In one particular scene 
Jeffrey’s cover is compromised and he is confronted by Frank, who insists on calling him 
‘Neighbour’, and warns him off Dorothy, unconsciously speaking in Lacanese (a language 
David Lynch seems to be fluent in):  
 
Don’t be a good neighbour anymore to her. I’ll have to send you a love letter! Straight from 
my heart, fucker! You know what a love letter is? It’s a bullet from a fucking gun, fucker! 
You receive a love letter from me and you’re fucked forever! You understand, fuck? I’ll send 
you straight to hell, fucker! In dreams… I walk with you. In dreams…I talk to you. In dreams, 
you’re mine… all the time. Forever. 
 
Frank openly realises here the danger of the love letter, and, taking his lead, we should draw 
from this that every remake is a love letter to its original shot from a gun. There is a real 
impotency implied in this scene from Blue Velvet observable in the remake also, for while 
Frank threatens Jeffrey with wild posturing and gesticulation there is no real indication that he 
can even achieve sexual climax with Dorothy (while “Baby wants to fuck!”, ‘Daddy’ 
ultimately cannot perform). However, Jeffrey on the other hand clearly can: he is young, 
virile, and innocent, knowingly and insidiously tricking his way into Dorothy’s apartment. In 
one scene in the film Frank tells Jeffrey, “You’re like me”, following a particularly nasty 
sado-masochistic sex scene where Jeffrey beats Dorothy in a moment of pure transgressive 
becoming. It is Jeffrey who is the evil neighbour with good intentions here, not Frank; he is 
Deleuze’s perverted neighbour, one who ends up becoming the very cause of his own 
investigation. This is proven in another scene when Jeffrey’s nicer-than-nice girlfriend, Sandy 
(Laura Dern), tells him: “I can’t figure out if you’re a detective or a pervert”, to which Jeffrey 
responds: “Well, that’s for me to know and for you to find out.”  
  Corrigan’s question at the heart of Blue Velvet, as to whether we should regard it with 
“nervous laughter” or “bemused horror”, is the same as the question facing remake theorists:   55
is the remake simply an “innocent detective” hoping to probe the depths of an original with 
which it is enamoured, or is it a “guilty pervert” hoping to replace this previous version with 
its own style and aspirations to (or delusions of) grandeur? The Lacan/Lynchian answer is 
simple: Jeffrey is both innocent detective and guilty pervert, and so too is the remake. 
  However, this is not the complete picture of the neighbourly dimension of the 
remake, for alongside Lacan’s evil neighbour we have Deleuze’s good neighbour. If the 
former is a kind of symptomal exception that disturbs the surface of false appearance, then the 
good neighbour is a fetish. The idea of the symptom is that it allows us to manage our most 
traumatic experiences by repressing them. Thereafter, we are bothered by the symptom only, 
rather than the traumatic memory. The fetish, on the other hand, is the inverse of the 
symptom, where rather than repressing the traumatic experience the subject fully assumes this 
knowledge and yet displaces it onto an everyday object. Žižek observes that fetishists are not 
dreamers lost in their own private worlds, but “thoroughly ‘realists’, able to accept the way 
things effectively are – since they have their fetish to which they can cling in order to cancel 
the full impact of reality” (2008c:x). If the evil neighbour is the symptom of the remake, the 
pervert waiting to explode out of the closet and disturb the glossy sheen of cinematic 
originality, what is the remake fetish?  
  Just as the Wicked Witch of the East in The Wizard of Oz does not function without 
the Good Witch of the North, neither does our evil neighbour function without its good 
supplement. Deleuze has described this vision of the good neighbour as our “strange mirror” 
(2009b:325), a reflection of the self that the speaker hopes will reveal something hidden 
inside him/herself. One is confronted in Lacan with a choice that illustrates a dilemma: 
“Either I refrain from betraying my neighbor so as to spare my fellow man or I shelter behind 
my fellow man so as to give up my jouissance” (Lacan, 1992:190). Some choice! The 
Deleuzian good neighbour is not faced with a choice but a contradictory dual action, caught 
between holding an aggressor off with one hand while inviting them with the other. Consider 
the etymology of the word “fetish”, which, prior to Freud’s use to the term, denoted “an 
inanimate object worshipped for its supposed magical powers or because it is considered to be 
inhabited by a spirit” (Soanes and Stevenson, 2003:638). The word originated in West 
African tribal tongues and denoted on the one hand their primal fears of the undead zombie 
(‘zumbi’), and on the other, the concept of ‘cultural creation’, or ‘made by art’ (facticius, now 
‘factitious’). While the evil neighbour contains something, some je ne sais quoi that 
hystericises, African tribesman considered the double, or “good neighbour”, by contrast as 
containing a fetishising spirit that sustained them. Theirs was a neighbour in which, via a folie 
à deux, they experienced themselves in an ‘other’ whose status as having no discernible life-
force provided the ultimate reassurance against their own destruction.    56
  It is clear to see in these ‘primitive’ beliefs the seeds of Freud’s theory of narcissism, 
which he described as “a libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-
preservation” (1987:66). However, in Deleuze this lifeless uncanny double or ‘strange mirror’ 
is similarly reflected in the sense that a group’s kinship is sustained by gravitating around a 
specific object as fetish. Once this object is ignored by others it ceases to capture our own 
gaze, to fascinate us, hence this is an object linked through the gaze. Deleuze writes that  
 
the Other assures the margins and transitions in the world. He is the sweetness of contiguities 
and resemblances. He regulates the transformations of form and background and the variations 
of depth. He prevents assaults from behind. He fills the world with a benevolent murmuring. 
He makes things incline toward one another. When one complains about the meanness of 
Others, one forgets this other and even more frightening meanness – namely, the meanness of 
things were there no Other (2009b:345). 
 
However, it is important to note that, just as there is an innocent or naïve countenance to 
Žižek and Lacan’s evil neighbour, who knows not why his or her declaration of love is so 
violent, there is an evil dimension to the good neighbour also. Just as the good neighbour 
redoubles my existence, and as such reassures against my destruction, in doing so, s/he also 
poses the ultimate threat to the uniqueness of my being: at any single moment the double 
could replace me without anyone noticing.     
  A whole body of cinema is emerging with this very theme, examples of which 
include: Angel Heart (1987), The Usual Suspects (1995), Lost Highway (1997), Fight Club 
(1999), Memento (2000), The Others (2001), The Machinist (El maquinista, 2004), and 
recently, Shutter Island (2010).
* Where before, our protagonist’s neighbourhood was invaded 
by an evil foreign other, here it is the protagonist him/herself who is foreign-to-him/herself. 
One of the best examples is David Fincher’s Fight Club, which proved something of a 
landmark with its depiction of an unnamed protagonist (Edward Norton) who meets a bizarre 
soap salesman, Tyler Durden (Brad Pitt), with whom he introduces underground ‘fight clubs’ 
to a brutal American subculture seething with unchecked rage. Soon, Tyler’s behaviour 
becomes (more) erratic as he begins to assimilate the narrator’s life, until that is, the climactic 
ending reveals that the protagonist is Tyler Durden, that he himself is his own neighbour. We 
soon realise that every inconsistency and inaccuracy in the film up to that point can be 
attributed to the protagonist’s psychological inconsistencies. Thus in the context of Freud’s 
description of narcissism as denoting “the attitude of a person who treats his own body in the 
same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated” (1987:65), the narrator in 
                                                 
* The example in classical Hollywood is Harvey (1950), in which Elwood P. Dowd (James Stewart) 
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Fight Club created his evil ‘neighbour’ to relieve the pressure of being alone (in the strictest 
Deleuzian sense). 
  The link to remaking here is paramount to our consideration of the cinematic ‘other’. 
While one aspect of the remake is akin to Žižek’s evil neighbour who looks, sounds, and acts 
like the original while containing some nugget of hystericising difference, the other aspect is 
this sense of the good neighbour as a self-willed creation reassuring against the original’s 
destruction (and containing the seeds of that destruction). The concept of disguise is 
fundamental here, for the remake must meticulously conceal its identity from itself by 
creating linguistic ramparts around its newly constructed world. The good neighbour is akin 
to what Deleuze calls the “dark precursor”, a figure who is invisible and imperceptible, and 
not unlike the death drive itself (2009a:119-120). Žižek describes this dark precursor as a kind 
of “‘vanishing mediator’, a mechanism for mediating the two series […] a point of passage 
between the two” (2004a:112). Tyler Durden is the vanishing mediator in Fight Club, helping 
the narrator to rebuild his life while at the same time threatening to take control of it and 
smash it to pieces. The vanishing mediator appears in every example of a ‘good neighbour’ 
film: The Usual Suspects (1995) features a protagonist, Verbal Kint (Kevin Spacey), whose 
flawed account of the events surrounding a major crime scene eventually reveals him as its 
grand orchestrator (vanishing mediator – ‘Keyser Soze’). Memento (2000) charted the search 
of an amnesiac detective, Leonard (Guy Pearce), for his wife’s murderer that revealed him as 
the very figure he had been searching for (vanishing mediator – ‘John G.’).
* In each case the 
vanishing mediator is nothing more than a zero element extrinsic to the narrative that is 
merely produced in order to resolve some deadlock, leading the protagonist into resolution 
whereupon the mediator disappears (these are then, in a sense, elaborate Hitchcockian 
MacGuffins, par excellence).  
  How does this vanishing mediator operate in remakes? If we take a closer look, the 
majority of these films revolve around a mysterious and indecipherable phrase, one that 
instigates the investigation. For example, David Lynch’s underappreciated masterpiece, Lost 
Highway (1997), revolves around the phrase “Dick Laurent is dead”. The film begins with 
Fred Madison (Bill Pullman) staring into a mirror before he is disturbed by his intercom. 
When he pushes the receiver down, he hears a mysterious voice pronounce the meaningless 
phrase, “Dick Laurent is dead”. However, when he goes to investigate the street is empty and 
a police siren fades into the background. Then, after a series of mind-bending events featuring 
Fred’s double, Pete (Balthazar Getty), the film culminates in Fred actually murdering a 
                                                 
* We can add other vanishing mediators to these: ‘Johnny Favorite’ in Angel Heart, ‘The Army of the 
Twelve Monkeys’ in Twelve Monkeys (1995), ‘Rollo Tomasi’ in L.A. Confidential (1997), ‘The 
Mystery Man’ in Lost Highway, ‘Ivan’ in The Machinist (El maquinista), and most recently, ‘patient 
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gangster named Dick Laurent (Robert Loggia) before arriving back at his own house and 
‘repeating’ the phrase “Dick Laurent is dead” before fleeing from the police. The narrative of 
Lost Highway, as with each of the ‘good neighbour’ films, begins and ends at the same point 
in time and space. Rather than the usual ‘character arc’ of a protagonist’s journey from one 
point in space and time to another, these narratives go nowhere in the normal Euclidean sense, 
but rather travel through the protagonist’s own change in perspective. Where Blue Velvet’s 
Jeffrey literally travels into a severed ear in a field, triggering his investigation of Dorothy’s 
apartment, Lost Highway’s Fred travels only in his psyche. Žižek writes that this film contains 
the structure of the möbius loop, and is the precise journey of the patient during analysis:  
 
At the beginning, the patient is troubled by some obscure, indecipherable, but insistent 
message (the symptom) which, as it were, bombards him from the outside, and then, at the 
conclusion of the treatment, the patient is able to assume this message as his own, to 
pronounce it in the first person singular (2002a:18). 
 
These films are based on the impossible notion of the protagonist encountering himself via 
the Deleuzian dark precursor. In a sense then, the ‘good neighbour’ represents the analyst, 
whose role is to facilitate the subject/patient in – not learning any new knowledge, per se – 
but, rather, identifying with the knowledge they already ‘knew’, but did not know that they 
knew.
* In this way, Lynch’s sustained allusions to The Wizard of Oz across his films (from 
‘Dorothy’ in Blue Velvet to Wild at Heart’s homage) each rethink the idée fixe that “There’s 
no place like home”. In Lynch, it is not that the subject is alienated from his home, but that 
homeliness is itself revealed to be alien. The goal of the Lynchian protagonist is not to return 
to the safety of the home, but identify with, and accept, the uncanniness (Freud’s 
unheimlichkeit) at the very heart of the home itself. In many ways, the message of these films 
is “Welcome home”, but not in the sense of “Home is where the heart is”, but the Lacanian 
sense of “Home is where the heart is not”.  
  The sense is the same as that contained in Lacan’s translation of Freud’s statement, 
“Wo es war, soll ich werden”, which is often translated as: “Where the id was, so the ego shall 
be”. However, for Lacan, a more accurate translation is: “Where the subject was must I 
become” (2003:141-2), and he does not stop here, for his ultimate version contains a 
directive: “There where it was, it is my duty that I should come into being” (2003:142, 
emphasis added). The rephrasing of this statement with the added element of ‘duty’ is the link 
to the Delphic injunction, ‘Know thyself!’, which is the challenge put to every Hollywood 
remake. Harold Bloom offers his own translation of Freud’s Wo es war in relation to 
                                                 
* Another classical Hollywood equivalent is the meaningless phrase “Rosebud” in Orson Welles’s early 
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adaptation, which he writes as “Where it, the precursor’s poem, is there let my poem be” 
(1997:80). All we need do is insert the word ‘film’ for ‘poem’ and we have an accurate 
approximation of the remake process. However, rather than ask if the remake can pass for the 
original by virtue of its similitude, we should be asking if the original can stand up to its own 
value (or ‘event’) in contemporary culture. The question is: can the remake pass for itself to 
new audiences?  
  In Žižek’s example of Ernst Lubitsch’s World War II comedy, To Be or Not to Be 
(1942), a troupe of actors in Nazi-occupied Warsaw use their abilities to disguise themselves 
to trick the occupying troops. As part of an intricate plot, one of the Polish actors 
impersonates a notorious Gestapo butcher by exaggerating his features (laughing excessively, 
gesticulating wildly, etc.). His act pays off however when the real Gestapo butcher turns up 
and behaves in exactly the same way, acting as if he were his own caricature. This amounts to 
him looking like himself, and the point is not simply the degree to which the actor managed to 
pull off the impersonation, but the extent to which the predicate itself is determined through 
the symbolic network of its own symbolisation (the exaggerated laugh and wild 
gesticulation). In Invasion of the Body Snatchers one scene in particular seems to resonate 
with this misrecognition when the protagonist, Miles (Kevin McCarthy), enquires as to how a 
patient’s uncle Ira is not her uncle Ira. The patient answers: “That’s just it; there is no 
difference you can actually see. He looks, sounds, acts, and remembers like Ira”, to which 
Miles simply responds: “Then he is your uncle Ira.” Žižek cites an almost identical line of 
dialogue from one of the Marx brothers’ films wherein Groucho, having been introduced to a 
stranger, remarks: “Say, you remind me of Emmanuel Ravelli”. “But I am Emmanuel 
Ravelli”, the stranger replies, to which Groucho responds: “Then no wonder you look like 
him!” For Žižek, “we must first let ourselves be caught in a trap, become the victim of an 
optical illusion in order to reach the turning point at which, all of a sudden, the entire 
perspective shifts and we discover that we are already ‘on the other side’, on another surface” 
(2005a:32). In going ‘through the mill’, so to speak, that is through the dialectical process, the 
thing becomes what it is (after all, we can easily imagine a ‘remake mill’ which rephrases 
Groucho: “Say, that Psycho remake reminds me of the original Psycho”; “But it is the original 
Psycho”; “Then no wonder it looks like the original Psycho!”, and so forth…). Our 
experience of first-year Film students confirms this when, having watched a classic 
Hollywood film for the first time, such as Casablanca or On the Waterfront, featuring such 
lines as Humphrey Bogart’s “Of all the gin joints in all the towns in all the world, she walks 
into mine”, and Marlon Brando’s “I could’ve been a contender”, they behave like Groucho 
and exclaim: “No wonder that line sounded familiar!” 
  This particular understanding of repetition is inherent to Žižek’s formulation of the 
Lacanian disguise. Žižek’s point is that it is not just the double that is disguised, but the   60
original also, for pure appearance is at its most radical the ultimate disguise (the sense 
contained in the phrase “Hiding in plain sight”). This is exactly what Lacan is aiming to show 
with the example of a competition in ancient Greece between two painters, Zeuxis and 
Parrhasios, who contrived to see who could paint a more convincing illusion. Zeuxis painted a 
picture of grapes so realistic that hungry birds attempted to eat them, but Parrhasios won the 
competition by painting a curtain on the wall of his room. When Zeuxis came to see his 
rival’s attempt, he asked him to “Please draw the curtain and show me what you painted” 
(Lacan, 1998:103). Zeuxis’s illusion was so convincing that it was mistaken for the ‘real 
thing’, but it is Parrhasios’s painting that is appearance redoubled, for the answer to the 
question: “What is behind the curtain?”, is simply: “Nothing” (in the most literal sense), 
which is the same answer to the question: “What is behind the disguise of the remake”: 
Nothing; a void.  
 
 
The libido as pure life: Zombies and ghosts in the (remake) machine  
 
John Patterson criticises the adaptation when he writes that “there is no more wretched or 
ephemeral an endeavour than the adaptation of a great novel to celluloid” (2007). If we take a 
bit of theoretical licence here and apply the same formula to the remake (that is, that there is 
no more wretched or ephemeral an endeavour then the remake of a great film), we can discern 
two metaphors which I would like to put forward to represent two kinds of remake. The first 
metaphor is contained in the sense of ‘wretched’ remaking, for which I suggest the zombie, a 
soulless body. The second metaphor is contained in the sense of ‘ephemeral’ remaking, for 
which I suggest the ghost or spectre, a bodiless soul. Patterson even draws the link himself 
when he writes that adaptations are an “unconquerable strain of bibliographic herpes […] so 
atrocious it’s likely to reanimate the corpse of the writer and have them shuffling zombie-like 
toward Beverly Hills with vengeance in mind” (2007). There is an undeniable sense of 
insistence here, thus we should think of this sexually transmitted disease in terms of the 
psychoanalytic notion of the drive. Where post-theorists call for film scholars to think outside 
of the Lacanian box, I think perhaps we should look inside the box. Let us begin then with the 
zombie. 
  For Lacan, the identity of the other is always a concern; we can never ask him/her, 
because “he lacks everything needed to know the answer, since if this subject ‘I’ was dead, he 
would not […] know it. He does not know, therefore, that I am alive. How, therefore, will ‘I’ 
prove to myself that I am” (2003: 350)? In this sentence we move from the evil to the good 
neighbour in one remove: our musing on the status of the other ultimately leads to a musing   61
on the status of our-self. This densely philosophical turn of phrase can be unpacked in Daniel 
C. Dennett’s description of the philosopher’s notion of a zombie: 
 
[A] zombie is or would be a human being who exhibits perfectly natural, alert, loquacious, 
vivacious, behaviour but is in fact not conscious at all, but rather some sort of automaton. The 
whole point of the philosopher’s notion of zombie is that you can’t tell a zombie from a 
normal person by examining external behaviour. Since that is all we ever get to see of our 
friends and neighbors, some of your best friends may be zombies (cited in Žižek, 2004:135).   
  
For Žižek, the philosopher’s zombie is, like the assimilated neighbour in Invasion of the Body 
Snatchers, indistinguishable from other people. We can point to countless filmic examples in 
which this impossibility of differentiation is at the core of a narrative, from Ridley Scott’s 
Blade Runner (1982) to Steven Spielberg’s Artificial Intelligence: A.I. (2001). In both, 
anyone is potentially a philosopher’s zombie. Ultimately however, as these films attest, the 
core of Dennett’s anxiety in the philosopher’s zombie is not that the other is an automaton 
but, rather, that the ‘human’ characters are.  
  The link between Dennett’s ‘philosopher’s zombie’ and the zombie of popular fiction 
is provided by Žižek via Kant’s distinction between negative and indefinite judgement, where 
a positive statement has both a negative opposite, and a ‘third’ intermediary statement. For 
instance, Žižek plays around with the responses to the positive statement “The soul is mortal”, 
to which “we can either deny a predicate (‘the soul is not mortal’), or affirm a non-predicate 
(‘the soul is non-mortal’)” (2006a:46). The difference is exactly the same as that known by 
the horror aficionado between “He/she is alive”, “He/she is dead”, and “It is undead”. The 
shift in personal pronoun from ‘He/she’ to impersonal ‘It’ opens up a third position beyond 
the simple alive-dead binomial, once again returning to Deleuze’s sense of grammatical 
perspectivism. The ‘undead’ are neither alive nor dead, but, as illustrated by George A. 
Romero’s zombie classic Night of the Living Dead (1968), somewhere in between. Along 
with our Deleuzian differentiation between ‘making’, ‘remaking’ and ‘unmaking’, this 
affirmation of a non-predicate brings to mind Freud’s differentiation between the different 
levels of consciousness between the ‘conscious’, ‘pre-conscious’, and ‘unconscious’. In 
particular, the zombie metaphor relates to Lacan’s description of the analyst, who at a specific 
point in an analysis with a patient must intervene in the dialectical inadequacy (the point of 
deadlock) by pretending he or she is dead, or as Lacan puts it, “by cadaverizing his position” 
(2003:154). In this moment, the analyst is in the same position as the undead; between two 
states that restores the balance of the analysis.  
  The first place to start with zombie film theory is Steven Shaviro, who starts off with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s statement that zombies are “the only modern myth” (1983:335), and it   62
is here that Shaviro seems to take his cue as he describes the zombie’s characteristics. Note 
how similar this description of the zombie is to the descriptions of the remake from our 
introduction, not to mention Žižek’s concept of the evil neighbour:  
 
[Zombies] continue to participate in human, social rituals and processes – but only just enough 
to drain them of their power and meaning. For instance, they preserve the marks of social 
function and self-projection in the clothes they wear, which identify them as businessman, 
housewife, nun, Hare Krishna disciple, and so on. But this becomes one of the films’ running 
jokes: despite such signs of difference, they all act in exactly the same way. The zombies are 
devoid of personality, yet they continue to allude to personal identity. They are driven by a 
sort of vestigial memory, but one that has become impersonal and indefinite, a vague 
solicitation to aimless movement (Shaviro, 2000:85-6). 
 
Given Thomas Leitch has described remakes as “old stories incarnated in a new discourse” 
(2002:53), this description of Hollywood zombies could almost be a review of a Hollywood 
remake. It is the discourse, not the content, which alters between the living and the dead, for 
these zombies have a residual and yet all-too substantial half-life, one which reproduces itself 
as a body which becomes all appearance and no depth. The zombie loses its personality but 
retains the basic marks of social consciousness (signifiers alluding to prior substance). This is 
a precise description of Lacan’s sense of the failed second death, where the biological body 
has died but the socio-symbolic body remains. It is the registers themselves that have become 
defunct here (or as Fredric Jameson would say, the profiles), stripped of their usual meaning.  
  Shaviro writes that zombies are “empty shells of life that scandalously continue to 
function in the absence of any rationale and of any interiority” (2000:86). William Goss 
repeats this almost verbatim apropos of the difference between the original and remake of 
The Day the Earth Stood Still (2008), of which he writes that while the original “had 
sincerity, the remake is an empty shell of a story” (2008). It is here that the vague contours of 
the zombie counterpart, the ghost, appear, for in any example of a ghost story there is the 
distinction between body and spirit as empty shell and subject, recalling the sense that we are 
not our body, but, rather, we ‘have’ our body, it is our possession. If the remake can be said to 
work similarly – that is, with the spirit of an original possessing a new textual ‘vessel’ – then 
three central questions arise: (1) is the death of the substitute/remake a signifier of the triumph 
of life over death, or the inhabitation of life by death? (2) Does the presence of the remake 
signify that the corpse of the original has been resurrected, or has the living body of the   63
remake been turned into a corpse? (3) Is the first (original) dead version alive or is the 
(remade) living version dead by virtue of repetition?
*  
  One filmic example (out of many) that deals with these questions is Tobe Hooper’s 
Poltergeist (1982), a possession masterpiece that features a house haunted by spirits angered 
by the desecration of an ancient burial site on which the house was built. Any psychoanalyst 
watching Poltergeist is likely to be reminded of Freud’s suggestion that his discovery of the 
unconscious has deprived our ego of ruling in its own house. In fact, Freud argued that not 
only does the ego (law-abiding home-owner) not rule, dealing as it does with the unconscious 
‘squatter’ claiming rights on the home, but even the land on which the home is built is owned 
by another (the id), and made using the squatter’s materials.
† Indeed, the film’s tagline and 
memorable line, “They’re here”, should be subject to the proper Lacanian qualification: it is 
not that the spirits suddenly arrive unexpectedly on the family’s ‘property’, but that the 
family’s property always-already belonged to the spirits. Is this not the message of Alejandro 
Amenábar’s The Others (2001), a film in which a family seemingly terrorised by undead 
‘others’, turn out to be themselves dead, and the others living? This is the precise meaning 
behind Lacan’s analysis of the Freudian dream of the father who does not know he is dead 
(1998:57-9), that when one awakens from a terrifying dream, sometimes the only function of 
the awakening is to continue dreaming, that is, to avoid the Real of the dream (1998:60).  
  Deleuze notes something similar, stating that there is always a split in repetition 
between the one who dies and the other, who “never succeeds in, or finishes, dying” 
(2009b:255). Žižek argues that this is the real meaning behind the phrase ‘memento mori’ 
(often translated as “Remember you must die”), which should actually be read as “Don’t 
forget to die!” (2008a:148).
‡ For readers more familiar with cartoons than horror films, the 
same knowledge applies here also. When, for example, Wile E. Coyote is chasing Road 
Runner and runs off a precipice without realising, he continues to run in mid air for a few 
moments until, realising he is going nowhere, he looks down; then and only then (often with a 
resigned shrug) does he begin to fall. For Žižek, these cartoons illustrate the fact that it is as if 
the Real has “forgotten its knowledge” (2008a:148). Once Coyote remembers he must follow 
the laws of nature he does indeed fall, and in remakes the self-conscious and absolute 
adherence to the symbol of the original has the same self-reflexivity. Žižek describes this as 
                                                 
* These questions are adapted to the remake from Elizabeth Bronfen’s interrogation of the ‘second 
death’ in psychoanalysis (1992:329). 
 
† Life seemed to imitate art on the set of Poltergeist with reported tensions between director Hooper 
and a very ‘hands-on’ producer, Steven Spielberg. Some contend that Spielberg directed much of the 
film himself (after all, his auteurial mark is evident in the film’s direction). In some ways, possession is 
even evident in the production notes. 
 
‡ Chris Nolan’s film, Memento (2000), inverts this logic as: “Don’t forget to kill!”    64
that which “reintroduces the dimension of DEATH into organic life” (2004a:120), which is 
also a traversal of points in time. Again, the link to Deleuze is clear, particularly in his 
analysis of Alain Resnais’s L'amour à mort (1984), of which he writes there are two deaths, a 
‘clinical’ one from which the hero returns and a ‘definitive’ one from which he cannot. 
“Between the two”, writes Deleuze, “in the in-between, it is as if zombies peopled the brain-
world for a moment […] beings who have passed through a death, who are born from it, and 
go on towards another death, perhaps the same one” (2009c:200-1). Finally, Deleuze writes 
that this philosopher-zombie is one who has returned from the dead “and who returns to the 
dead in full consciousness […] Hence zombies sing a song, but it is that of life” (2009c:201). 
In each of these examples from Poltergeist to The Others, the sense is that the dead do not 
know they are dead, such that self and other are radically reversed. True knowledge can only 
be attained from a return to life, such that a shift in subject-position can come into effect. In 
much the same way the remake reintroduces death into the organic life of the original source 
that ‘owns’ its story. It is with Deleuze’s remarks on Resnais’s philosophical zombie that his 
earlier statement that “reflections, echoes, doubles and souls do not belong to the domain of 
resemblance or equivalence. […] If exchange is the criterion of generality, theft and gift are 
those of repetition” (2009a:1), can be understood. The original is an ‘empty shell’ as much as 
the remake, yet another vessel inhabiting a pre-ontological excess awaiting symbolic 
reinscription, and the remake marks the point at which that inscription is attempted.  
  The key term from Deleuze’s many neologisms that Žižek is most interested in 
exploring is his term “body without organs”, which despite many commentators linking 
primarily to Anti-Oedipus, actually appears as early as Repetition and Difference, and is 
thoroughly explored in Logic of Sense. For Žižek, the term resonates far beyond the common 
understanding of its use to denote the idea of the empty shell eviscerated of its contents, to be 
contrasted with Lacan’s insistence upon the primacy of the signifier and the partial object. 
Žižek argues that the only real way to conceive of Deleuze’s body without organs is to see it 
as the evacuated vessel of Lacan’s ‘organs without a body’. Rather than seeing the process as 
ending with the body being flushed of its contents and transformed into a radical producing 
machine, Žižek is interested in what happens to those contents once they are pushed out, and 
the indelible trace they left behind on the body that expelled them. If the metaphor of the 
zombie is the Deleuzian body without organs, a ‘pound of flesh’ with no consciousness, then 
the metaphor of the ghost is the Žižekian organ without a body, the ghost in the machine.  
  The link to remaking can be found in Lacan’s mirror stage, in which the subject gets 
caught up in the lure of spatial identification and the ensuing internal thrust precipitates from 
‘insufficiency’ to ‘anticipation’, moving them into ‘reality’ (Umwelt). This change from 
organism to reality is what establishes the two body-images of the “I-ideal” and the “Ideal-I”: 
one fragmented and the other a form of totality which takes on “the armour of an alienating   65
identity” (Lacan, 2003:5). According to Lacan, the fragmented body (I-ideal) “appears in the 
form of disjointed limbs, or of those organs represented in exoscopy, growing wings and 
taking up arms for intestinal persecutions” (2003:5); effectively, they are bodiless organs. 
David Cronenberg’s remake of The Fly (1986) exemplifies Lacan’s mirror stage perfectly, 
particularly the scene where, having accidentally spliced his DNA with that of a common 
house-fly, Seth Brundle (Jeff Goldblum) looks into his bathroom mirror and peels off parts of 
his body which are slowly rotting off. And where do these body parts end up? In the 
bathroom cabinet behind the mirror of course, where bits and pieces of the ‘BrundleFly’ are 
stored like exhibits.
*  
  Timothy Corrigan describes Hollywood hysteria as “various versions of 
‘disembodiment’” (1992:175-6), and examples of this disembodiment occur in almost any 
film when an iconic ‘scene’ which exceeds its textuality is ‘detached’, and ultimately 
becomes a synecdoche for the rest of the film. Consider the following iconic ‘scenes’, 
‘sequences’, and even ‘shots’ which contain signification even without the film title 
appendages: the “chest-burst scene” (Alien), the “shower scene” (Psycho), the “Odessa steps 
sequence” (Battleship Potemkin), the “crotch shot” (Basic Instinct), and so forth. These are 
not films that are on the whole remade, but are themselves eclipsed by their iconic moments 
which themselves spin off into microcosmic-remakings in other films, commercials, cartoons, 
and parodies. Darren Aronofsky was so mesmerised by one such ‘fetish scene’, that he 
decided to spend a significant part of his meagre budget for Requiem for a Dream (2000) on 
buying the remake rights to the Japanese anime thriller, Perfect Blue (1998), just to remake 
one single overhead shot of a woman screaming underwater in a bathtub. This is the 
cinematic organ without a body par excellence, an organ that functions of its own volition, 
remaking itself anew even across different cultures.  
  This is why when Thomas Elsaesser (2001) establishes Psycho as a commodity 
through the fetishisation of the “shower scene”, he is right to make a distinction between the 
film’s ‘text’ and the film’s ‘event’. Anat Zanger (2006) does likewise, suggesting that 
Psycho’s event takes place solely around the shower scene, such that the first half builds up to 
it and the second half attempts to deal with it. Metonymically, the entirety of Psycho is 
evoked through this one scene, leading Kenneth Marc Harris (1992) to suggest that the film is 
‘externalised’ through the scene’s fetishisation. Ritualistic repetition and obsessive 
fetishisation in popular culture have lead to the extraction of the text from its socio-historic 
place and time. However, the Lacanian views of Elsaesser, Zanger, and Harris do not take 
into account the Deleuzian twist that we do not repeat because we repress, but, rather, we 
repress because we repeat. Thus Žižek’s thesis is not that we should reject Deleuze’s body 
                                                 
* The scene was remade in Eli Roth’s Cabin Fever (2002) in a particularly squeamish scene involving a 
character having a shave...   66
without organs in favour of the Lacanian organs without bodies, but, on the contrary, that we 
should supplement the one with the other in möbius homology, provoking the contradiction. 
  What Elsaesser, Zanger and Harris miss out on is the question of what happens to the 
body/text left behind, a crucial point for any remake theorist dealing with an original whose 
organs have literally been evacuated into such ‘fetish scenes’. The question becomes: What 
happens to Psycho when it is eviscerated of the shower scene? The relationship of the 
autonomous partial object to the body it leaves behind has been explored in many films, 
primarily in two main versions separated across gender lines: (1) we have the “speaking 
vagina” narrative, whose examples include Pussy Talk (1975), Chatterbox (1977), and to an 
extent, recent comic-horror, Teeth (2007). In each example, these sexual organs are frequently 
an (often violent) embarrassment to their subjects, speaking the ‘vagina-truth’ of the subject’s 
unconscious (in an inversion of the common phrase, “Men only think with their dicks”, here 
we have the phrase “Women only talk with the vaginas”). (2) In addition, we have the 
‘possessed hand’ narrative, which originated in Robert Wiene’s The Hands of Orlac (Orlacs 
Hände, 1924), a film twice remade (Mad Love, 1935 and The Hands of Orlac, 1960), and the 
inspiration for a host of other films, including The Beast with Five Fingers (1949), Hands of a 
Stranger (1962), and The Hand (1981). More recently, the theme has appeared in Jim 
Carrey’s physical comedies, Liar Liar (1997), and Me, Myself and Irene (2000). Most 
memorably perhaps though is a scene from Fight Club in which the narrator’s hand is 
suddenly possessed, causing him to violently punch himself in the face. In each example, the 
expelled partial organ returns to attack it, to prove that it can function with its own autonomy. 
However, the fact remains that these autonomous organs are attached to the bodies to which 
they belong, and as such are dependent on them as much as the unfortunate protagonist is 
often dependent on the outburst of her/his autonomous organ to become socially functioning.  
  I have one last example of the body-less organ, in yet another film that while not 
having been remade as such, nonetheless provides us with perhaps the best example of 
cinematic remaking. In particular, it is the alien ‘facehugger’ (which looks both vaginal and 
hand-like) which is of interest here. The film follows the crew on a mining ship in deep space 
after they intercept a foreign beacon and land on an unidentified planet (later designated as 
LV4-26) to investigate. In what appears to be an alien vessel, one of the members of the 
exploration team, Kane (John Hurt), discovers a chamber filled with eggs. Upon investigating 
one such egg, he is attacked by the creature as it wraps itself around his face, rendering him 
comatose. In an effort to release Kane, one of the crew decides to cut the thing off, 
whereupon it bleeds acid which eats through the ship’s floors one by one. Soon after, the 
creature disappears and Kane feels fine, but unfortunately for him and the crew, it left 
something in his chest, something determined to get out…  
   67
 
Fig. 1.4: The remake cycle: from the unfathomable Thing through interspecies rape… 
 
…to the analysis of the ‘perceived’ death of the Thing to the birth of the New  
 
  Both Deleuze and Lacan seem to anticipate the facehugger from Alien many years 
before it is even released with an almost uncanny precision. Deleuze writes that what he calls 
‘covered’ repetition is akin to “the abandoned snake skin, the envelope emptied of what it 
implicates, the epidermis which lives and dies only from its own soul or latent content” 
(Deleuze, 2009a:361). For Deleuze, this type of repetition is the second, ‘clothed’ repetition, 
which masks a ‘bare’ repetition of its cause, concealed at its base. However, Žižek (2006a:61) 
has pointed out an even closer approximation of the facehugger from Alien in Lacan’s 
description of the objet petit a as a ‘lamella’, a description that predates the film by ten years: 
 
Whenever the membranes of the egg in which the foetus emerges on its way to becoming a 
new-born are broken, imagine for a moment that something flies off [...]  
  The lamella is something extra-flat […] it is, like the amoeba in relation to sexed 
beings, immortal – because it survives any division, and scissiparous intervention. And it can 
run around.  
  Well! This is not very reassuring. But suppose it comes and envelops your face while 
you are quietly asleep…  
  I can’t see how we would not join battle with a being capable of these properties […] 
It is the libido, qua pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, or irrepressible life, life that 
has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible life (Lacan, 1998:197-8).   68
 
Lacan’s description of the lamella here is the perfect description of the alien facehugger, for 
Hollywood remakes do not simply repeat aspects of an original with which we can draw 
similarities. There is an external repetition that echoes a secret internal repetition (or 
vibration) within the singular. Our mistake is to assume that the original is without its own 
libidinal charge – far from it. A better assumption (for we must always assume in the 
unconscious) is that even before the remake, repetition exists in the original, repetition that 
the remake acknowledges and feeds off. Thus the remake does not add a second or a third 
time to the first original time, but continues the first time to the ‘n
th power’: remakes do not 
repeat their originals, but, rather, the originals repeat all the remakes in advance. Does not 
Lacan state something similar apropos the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz (the non-representative-
representative) when he writes that repetition is the unfolding within a subject of a whole 
series of “a, a`, a``, etc.” (1998:221)? Lacan also states that “whenever a new term is 
introduced, one always runs the risk of letting one or several of the others slip between one’s 
fingers” (1998:226) – can we not see exactly this occurring in Alien, where each new version 
of the ‘Thing’ escapes the crew’s grasp due to the fact that they do not consider the alien as a 
series in time? Furthermore, each alien birth is based on the impregnated host (in Alien
3 a dog 
is the host so the alien born resembles a dog).  
  This sense of the non-representative-representative has also been described by Anat 
Zanger, who argues that many remade films comprise a history of attempts to deny their 
problematic aspects, while at the same time retaining an “inner core” of the story to be 
“smuggled” in. The language of Alien continues here, as Zanger explains that this core is the 
representation of a primordial unknown, a “terrifying, disturbing hole which culture has to 
clarify” (2006:128). Ultimately, the original version contains this destructive element which, 
like one of Hegel’s subjects, is “gripped and shattered by something intrinsic to their own 
being” (Hegel, cited in Butler, 2000:xi). Does not the alien life cycle in figure 1.4 correspond 
exactly with the life cycle of the Hollywood remake? It is pure life, the libido in its absolute 
traumatic intensity, and the link to the zombie is clear in Žižek’s observation of the paradox 
of being undead, which is that “the place of the living dead is not somewhere between the 
dead and the living: precisely as dead, they are in a way ‘more alive than life itself’, having 
access to the life substance prior to its symbolic mortification” (2008c:131). It is here that we 
must be careful not to confuse the remake with Colin McArthur’s description of genre as “a 
constantly growing amoeba, assimilating stages of its own development” (1972:8). Rather, we 
would do better to consider the multiplicity of cells in remaking as properly cancerous. In this 
way, we can conclude philosophically (rather than speciously), that the remake really is the 
cancer of Hollywood cinema.  
   69
Looking inside the wheelbarrow: Reversing Plato with the cinematic ‘imitator’ 
 
As with the crew in Alien, the problem with the remake is ultimately the subject’s relationship 
to knowledge: how can we know what this primordial Thing buried in the original is? When 
Kane is released by the facehugger he believes all is well; that is, until he sits down to a meal 
with the rest of the crew. This is a knowledge that cannot be known, and yet it demands to 
speak (and be heard). The problem we have in interpreting this unconscious speech is well 
known to the psychoanalyst, as Lacan writes that “I speak without knowing it. I speak with 
my body and I do so unbeknownst to myself. Thus I always say more than I know (plus que je 
n’en sais)” (1999:119). This leads Lacan to conclude that there is “no such thing as a 
metalanguage” (1999:118), and one of the best examples of this is to be found in the bizarre 
speech of the Man from Another Place (Michael J. Anderson) in David Lynch’s Twin Peaks. 
The key to unlocking the dwarf’s alien language is to realise that it is neither ‘gobbledy-
gook’, nor simply ‘in reverse’, but, rather, that the actor had to speak his lines in reverse 
which when also played in reverse created an other-worldly ‘inside-out’ dialect (via a double-
reversal). The subtitles Lynch gives us to understand this ‘mirror speech’ act like the big 
Other, who translates for us what the (literal) little other is saying. We might call this ‘folded 
speech’, for we are not simply witnessing the transformation of an inside into an outside here, 
but, rather, the contamination of the two. This is how Deleuze’s statement that “what always 
matters is folding, unfolding, refolding” (2006:158) should be understood: we are here in Jean 
Baudrillard’s world of the doppelgänger, a world “without mirrors or projection or utopias as 
a means of reflection”, a world in which “we can no longer move ‘through the mirror’ to the 
other side, as we could during the golden age of transcendence” (1991:312). Why not? Why 
does Lynch have the dwarf speak in this specific way rather than simply reverse his speech?  
  The Thing which contaminates two opposing terms is what Deleuze calls ‘the 
phantasm’. I want to take the step of linking this phantasm to the Lacanian sense of the death 
drive. Deleuze exemplifies this phantasm in Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, which also 
features a proposition that when extracted, suspends its affirmation and negation, for 
example: “The smile without a cat” or “The flame without a candle”. These two paradoxes 
form “the two terms of an alternative: one or the other” (Deleuze, 2009b:38), and it is 
precisely this ‘or’ that Deleuze argues we need to reject if we are to make any headway with 
complex repetition. Like the cat-less smile in Alice in Wonderland or the speech of the Man 
from another Place, remakes go in two directions at once, ever existing in a subdivided double 
direction. As such, they defy this either/or formula. Meaning, according to Deleuze, is 
cancelled out when one opts for one or the other, so against the formula for “good sense” 
Deleuze proposes another formula for “logical sense”, the formula of the paradox, wherein 
“both are found in either” (2009b:91). Deleuze states that it is necessary for us to “relate the   70
event twice, since both are always at the same time, since they are two simultaneous faces of 
one and the same surface, whose inside and outside, their ‘insistence’ and ‘extra-being’, past 
and future, are in an always reversible continuity” (2009b:40-1). While the cat fades, the 
smile remains, but without the statement “the cat fades”, the smile loses its impact. This is 
why it is so wrong to claim that the dwarf’s speech in Twin Peaks is either forwards or 
backwards: it is organically forwards and mechanically backwards at the same time, and 
therein resides its uncanny impact.   
  The Lacanian side to this sense of a subject fading and remaining in one gesture is 
contained in his term ‘aphanisis’ (fading, disappearance), which he describes as the fading of 
the subject, or his/her division from which the dialectic of desire arises. Lacan’s aphanisis 
literally means the ‘fading’ of the subject in the face of what he calls ‘extimacy’ (‘extimité’ – 
the combination of ‘exterior’ and ‘intimacy’), whereby a subject’s most intimate thoughts are 
rendered transparent. This is seen in the sense that the very fiction in which one is lost has 
become suddenly strange, contained in the statement that “The story I tell myself and others 
about myself no longer makes any sense to me…” Essentially, Lacan’s aphanisis occurs 
when a subject is faced with the terrifying possibility of reaching their goal, such that they 
must disappear to avoid this possibility. What we have here is the articulation of the ‘remake 
paradox’: how can the text, like the smile-without-a-cat, be divided into two places at once? 
Remember our discussion of the organ-without-a-body, in which fetish scenes proliferate 
outside of their textual base. The common phrase that sums up this contradictory state of 
affairs is “To have one’s cake and eat it”, and in the unconscious we can do just that (have the 
cake I have just eaten – not another cake that looks the same, but that exact same cake I have 
just consumed). Does the remake not also attempt to have its cake and eat it? There is a 
phenomenological impossibility in the idea of watching a film for the first time twice, and yet 
the unconscious remainder left over from the original in this Deleuzian phantasm offers us 
this very possibility in a new version. Freud writes that dreams enjoy the privilege of being 
“exempt from mutual contradiction” (2001:186), such that when two conflicting impulses 
appear simultaneously, they do not cancel each other out but combine to form a compromise 
(the two methods of compromise are ‘condensation’ and ‘displacement’). Via metaphor and 
metonymy, the genre film condenses and displaces in a similar way, but the remake does not, 
it repeats the life substance itself, bypassing these procedures. It is, in many ways, folded 
speech not unlike the dwarf in Twin Peaks; organically forward but mechanically in reverse. 
  The problem is that we cannot simply play a game of ‘spot the difference’ as some 
remake theorists do, for how can we know definitively if the ‘cake’ we have is the same cake 
we just ate, especially if it looks and tastes the same and contradicts good and common sense 
(we should link this to the zombie that looks like its former self). Lacan writes that 
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what Freud recognises as desire, is…the alteration of the need that it signals itself, it is in so 
far as what is fundamental is masked, articulated into something which transforms it, which 
transforms it into what (2004:2)? 
 
This final question has no simple answer since we can never know what it is transformed into, 
for as we have already seen, the disguise merely conceals yet another disguise behind it. Is 
this not the same problem identified by Plato, who continually warned of the distinction 
between ‘essence’ and ‘appearance’, ‘Idea’ and ‘image’, and ‘original’ and ‘copy’? However, 
the problem is different for Deleuze, who insists that these propositions are not equivocal. 
The distinction wavers between two kinds of images:  
 
Copies are secondary processors. They are well-founded pretenders, guaranteed by 
resemblance; simulacra are like false pretenders, built upon a dissimilarity, implying an 
essential perversion or a deviation (2009b:294). 
 
It is in this sense that Deleuze divides image-idols into two categories: on the one hand there 
are ‘copies-icons’, and on the other hand there are ‘simulacra-phantasms’. The latter, 
according to Deleuze, should be repressed and submerged, “preventing them from climbing to 
the surface, and ‘insinuating themselves’ everywhere” (2009b:294); Žižek likens this to the 
Hegelian triumph of the ‘spirit’ over the ‘letter’. Deleuze takes God’s creation of man as an 
example: originally, man was a copy of God, resembling Him in His image; through sin 
however, man lost the resemblance to God while retaining the image of god, hence becoming 
simulacra and forsaking moral existence in favour of aesthetic existence (Deleuze, 
2009b:295). Remakes can therefore either remain faithful to the letter of the original, its 
aesthetic image (the simulacra-phantasm), or remain faithful to the spirit of the original, its 
resemblance, its inner Idea (the copy-icon). Most remakes, it can be seen, clearly fall into the 
former category as commercialist simulacra forsaking the essence of the original in order to 
market themselves off the back of the appearance of the original.  
  In cinema studies we have the great duo of the ‘producer’ of the film (that is, the 
writer, director, actors, etc., with the text as the construct) and the ‘user’ of the film (that is, 
the audience, with the ‘text’ as the product). However, Deleuze reminds us of the great 
Platonic trinity of “the user”, “the producer”, and “the imitator” (2009b:295, emphasis 
added). Is there not a serious omission in the cinematic version of this Platonic trio?
 The 
problem with the cinematic ‘user’ (or audience/viewer) is that the simulacrum he or she is 
encountering implies huge dimensions of depth and distance to understand, which they 
ultimately cannot master (recall Zanger’s statement about the master-narrative losing control). 
The ultimate aim of Platonism is to bring about the triumph of icons over simulacra, yet how   72
can this happen in cinema studies if the role of the ‘imitator’ – or ‘repeater’ – is continually 
under-explored? ‘Genre studies’ is perhaps the closest we get to this third aspect of filmic 
reality, but if this is the case then it is certainly high time that ‘remake studies’ established 
itself as going beyond genre criticism in fleshing out the philosophical implications of a 
cinematic realm of the ‘imitator’. 
  First and foremost, we must dispel with this myth that repetition not only resists new 
and original forms but actively suppresses them. Žižek points out something striking of 
repetition, that “far from being opposed to the emergence of the New, the proper Deleuzian 
paradox is that something truly New can only emerge through repetition” (2004a:12). For 
Žižek the opposite holds just as true, in that only old things come out of change. Lacan also 
stated, in response to Søren Kierkegaard, that “repetition demands the new” (1998:61). Thus 
it is not that the cinematic ‘imitator’ is devoid of new ideas, but that in order to truly create a 
new idea we must return to the source, what is in the original more than itself. An 
unavoidable consequence of repetition is that the original is always altered in the process, 
creating a Kierkegaardian ‘inverted memory’ affecting all versions of the story. Remakes 
then, affect the content of the old stories on which they are based as much as they affect the 
discourse used to remake. Let us take an example from classic Hollywood. 
  Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) follows a private investigator, ‘Scottie’ (James Stewart), 
who after suffering from vertigo following a traumatic death he inadvertently caused, decides 
to “take it easy” by taking a job offered to him by a wealthy old acquaintance. The job seems 
simple at first: follow this man’s wife, Madeleine (Kim Novak), and report back on her 
behaviour. However, Scottie’s assignment is complicated after he falls deeply in love with 
Madeleine, and is further traumatised when she then throws herself off a bell tower, leaving 
him helpless to reach her because of his vertigo. After emerging from a deep hysterical 
depression, Scottie meets a ‘dead ringer’ for Madeleine in Judy Barton (Novak again). They 
fall in love, but Scottie becomes obsessed with dressing and styling Judy in the fashion of 
Madeleine. However, something is wrong – the essence (in Lacanese, the objet petit a) of 
Madeleine is missing, and the twist in the film comes when we realise that Scottie has been 
fooled: Judy was always Madeleine, dressing as her from the beginning in an elaborate 
scheme to con Scottie into believing that Judy was Madeleine, the real version of whom was 
actually murdered up on the bell tower by her husband. Žižek argues that the murderous fury 
that seizes Scottie at the film’s climax is the fury of the deceived Platonist who realises that 
the original he wanted to remake into a perfect copy is already a copy. For Žižek, the shock 
here is not that the original turns out to be just another copy (something Plato continually 
warned of) but that of a deeper deception, that “(what we took to be) the copy turns out to be 
the original” (2004a:157). The film concludes with Scottie eventually forgiving a penitent 
Judy up the same bell tower as before, when a shadowy figure emerges and frightens Judy   73
into toppling to her death. The figure is revealed to be the Mother Superior, and Scottie is left 
once more in the grip of a hysterical breakdown (here we get a succinct image of the 
memento mori – the reminder to die).   
  Can we not see the shadowy figure of the Mother Superior as the appearance of the 
Deleuzian phantasm, the stain of the Real of Judy’s deception? The simulacrum is not a 
degraded copy, but, rather, “harbours a positive power which denies the original and the 
copy, the model and the reproduction” (Deleuze 2009b:299). Gone are the old Platonic 
distinctions between Essence and Appearance, or Model and Copy; what we now have to 
consider is the Nietzschean sense of the ‘Twilight of the Idols’, where at least two divergent 
series are internalised in the simulacrum such that neither can be designated original nor copy, 
a state where the image ceases to be secondary to the ‘original’ model. This, according to 
Deleuze, is the true meaning of Nietzsche’s phrase “to reverse Platonism”, which he regards 
as the ultimate task of contemporary philosophy, for “behind each cave [there is] another that 
opens still more deeply, and beyond each surface a subterranean world yet more vast, more 
strange” (Nietzsche, cited in Deleuze, 2009b:300). Deleuze comments on this Nietzschean 
sense when he writes that 
 
the artificial is always a copy of a copy, which should be pushed to the point where it changes 
its nature and is reversed into the simulacrum (the moment of Pop Art) […] For there is a vast 
difference between destroying in order to conserve and perpetuate the established order of 
representations, models, and copies, and destroying the models and copies in order to institute 
the chaos which creates, making the simulacra function and raising a phantasm – the most 
innocent of all destructions” (2009b:303). 
 
And what more innocent a destructor is there than this Mother Superior from Vertigo?
* At one 
of the first screenings of a film in Russia in 1896, Maxim Gorky famously stated that film is 
“not life but its shadow, it is not motion but its soundless spectre” (cited in Frampton, 
2006:1). The point is not to try and observe this soundless spectre in the remake but, rather, 
shift our perspective in the fashion of Vertigo such that the either/or dialectic becomes a 
both/and one; such that the remake is not viewed as the partial smile to the original’s absent 
cat, but as the transition from the one to the other in time. 
  There are, according to Deleuze, three paradoxical and complimentary requirements 
of this process of flux between ‘text’ and ‘event’ that we can use in remake theory:  
 
1.  It must give repetition an original and positive power. 
                                                 
* This ‘phantasm’ pervades each of Hitchcock’s films around the end of classical Hollywood, 
including: the nun in Vertigo (1958), the avian creatures in The Birds (1963), and of course, the 
shadowy mother figure in Psycho (1960).   74
2.  The power must be autonomous and disguising. 
3.  And it must have an immanent meaning in which terror is closely combined with the 
movement of selection and freedom (2009a:21-2).  
 
Packed in these three paradoxical criteria for repetition is the same paradoxical drive in every 
remake between ever-lasting life, liberation, and faithfulness on the one hand, and brutal 
destruction, enchainment, and transgression on the other. It is a violent example of 
Hollywood’s economic drive enchained to the desperate pleas of a crumbling historicity. With 
this destruction we have the birth of an event characteristic of language to “take back into 
itself the frozen scene, to make a ‘spiritual’ event out of it, or rather an advent of ‘spirits’” 
(Deleuze, 2009b:329). Deleuze’s turn of phrase here suggests that it is only through repetition 
that the multiple can be authenticated, only through repetition that frozen scenes like the 
‘shower’ or ‘chestburster’ scenes can become spiritual events. 
  Let us consider one more example before we disturb the curtain and look a bit deeper 
into (or should that be ‘across’?) these Deleuzian folds in my two case studies. Slavoj Žižek 
(2006) tells of an old joke about a factory worker suspected of stealing. Every evening after 
work a security guard inspects the worker’s wheelbarrow as he leaves the factory, but alas, 
the wheelbarrow is always empty. Eventually the security guard get wise: the worker was 
stealing wheelbarrows. For Žižek this joke reflects Lacan’s entire philosophy regarding 
communication and interaction, namely that we “should not forget to include in the content of 
an act of communication the act itself, since the meaning of each act of communication is also 
to reflexively assert that it is an act of communication” (2006a:21). The unconscious is not 
hidden in the wheelbarrow, it is the wheelbarrow; cinematic repetition is not hidden in the 
remake (in the similarities and differences), it is the remake (the act itself as process). The 
hapless security guard in Žižek’s joke is like many remake theorists in contemporary film 
studies who miss the message contained in the wheelbarrow itself.  
  It is no coincidence that remake theory has thus far utilised a language of repetition 
(of “theft”, “taking-without-consent”, and “borrowing”, etc.), and not of the language of genre 
(“exchange”, “substitution”, “allusion”, “allegorisation”, etc.). We must acknowledge Jean-
Luc Godard here, who claimed, “I don’t invent: I steal” (cited in Horton & McDougal, 
1998:1). Given Godard was famous for paying homage to classical Hollywood cinema, I 
think Thomas Leitch is correct when he writes that the homage is in many ways the most 
brutal form of commercialist remaking, for while it purports to reify its original it secretly 
acts to feed off it like one of Shaviro’s zombies. As we will see in the next chapter on Psycho, 
the homage is perhaps the most dangerous neighbour of them all; that goes double for one 
that is ‘shot-for-shot’. When Leitch states that “the most faithful homage would be a re-
release [of the original]” (2002:47), we should add that the most faithful genre film would be   75
a remake, for it is only in remaking that a filmmaker admires its original so much that it is 
willing to sacrifice it to the phantasm. Thus my challenge to genre critics is for them to please 
acknowledge the fact that they too are stealing wheelbarrows. 
  What could be more Lacanian than that?  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CASE STUDY I: PSYCHO AND THE ‘SCENE’ FETISH 
 
Zombie – noun a corpse said to be revived by witchcraft. 
-  informal a person who is or appears lifeless, apathetic, or completely unresponsive to their 
surroundings.   
-  DERIVATIVES zombielike adjective. 
-  ORIGIN early 19
th cent.: of West African origin; compare with /Kikongo zumbi ‘fetish’ 
-  Zombify /’z￿mb￿f￿￿/ – verb (zombifies, zombifying, zombified) [with obj.] [unu. as adj. 
zombified] informal deprive of energy or vitality (OED) 
 
 
Opening thoughts: Raiders of the lost art in 2005 
 
“Si vous êtes pris dans le rêve de l’autre, vous êtes foutu” (“If you are caught up in another person’s 
dream, you are lost”) 
 
-  Gilles Deleuze 
 
For cinema historians, the so-called ‘noughties’ might as well be renamed ‘the decade of the 
horror remake’, with almost its entire horror genre output a rejuvenation of earlier slasher or 
zombie genre fare. One only need look at appendix a. for proof of the prolificacy of horror 
remakes in Hollywood during this period. However, the most controversial of horror remakes 
is to be found in the 1990s, with Gus Van Sant’s 1998 shot-for-shot remake of Alfred 
Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960). Van Sant was reportedly so keen to stick to Hitchcock’s original 
blueprint that during filming he screened the original Psycho on a monitor as a guide to shot-
length, pacing, camera positioning, etc. He took this mandate to the extent that when he 
occasionally spotted a mistake (such as a door opening without a key) he remade that mistake 
in his own version also. Shot-for-shot remakes are not common, but in 2005 (something of a 
peak-year for the remake), two appeared at once: (1) an act of CGI remaking for the fan-boy 
generation, a remake so close to its original that it incorporated the original scenery using 
digital effects; (2) an act of DIY remaking for the video generation, a remake by a group of 
school children that took sixteen years to emerge.  
  While Hollywood was busying itself with remakes of 1980s horrors, digital effects 
wizard David Lee Fisher was busy delving somewhat deeper into the horror archive. Indeed, 
Fisher’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (2005) is the re-aestheticisation of Robert Weine’s 
German classic, Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari (1920), widely regarded as the first horror   77
movie. Like Van Sant’s Psycho, Fisher’s remake was panned not only because he chose a 
‘sacred’ horror classic as the object of reanimation, but also because he also remade it shot-
for-shot. As a remake of a black-and-white tinted silent film, Fisher’s remake sought to revive 
the aesthetic of the original. As such, he shot the remake against a green-screen with the 
original 35mm backdrops of the original artwork scanned in behind modern actors playing the 
original parts. However, while sticking fastidiously to the visual of the original, Fisher 
updated one element that was to be his downfall: where Van Sant’s Psycho was attacked for 
bringing colour to a black-and-white film, Fisher’s Caligari was attacked for bringing sound 
to a silent one. Indeed, Emmet R. Sweeney rightly comments that most of the interest in this 
“ill-advised remake […] lies in the production notes” (2006). There are, however, some good 
points about the film: in the original, much of the terror hinged on the two-dimensionality of 
the backdrop, especially in the famous scene where the somnambulist Cesare (Conrad Veidt) 
slides along a white wall with expressionist angles and jarring black-and-white tones. In 
Fisher’s remake this scene is redoubled as it is clear that the new Cesare (Doug Jones) is 
incapable of interacting with the digital background, reducing it to a proper virtual dreamland.  
  Rewind twenty-three years to 1982, when three amateur film directors from 
Mississippi – Chris Strompolis, Eric Zala, and Jayson Lam – began shooting a shot-for-shot 
remake of Indiana Jones and the Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981). They were twelve years old. 
It took seven years to make (from 1982-1989), and was shelved and forgotten until 2003 
when discovered by Eli Roth and made famous by Harry Knowles on Ain’t-It-Cool News. 
Spielberg himself is said to have acclaimed the production, titled Raiders of the Lost Ark: The 
Adaptation (1989), and it received rave reviews following the world premiere on May 5
th 
2005, at the Anthology Film Archives. Jim Windolf argues that we watch Raiders of the Lost 
Ark: The Adaptation “with a double perspective, partly rooting for Indiana Jones to beat the 
Nazis, and partly rooting for the kids on-screen to pull off each film-making feat” (2004).  
 
 
Fig. 2.1: Raiding Hollywood history: Raiders of the Lost Ark: The Adaptation (1989) and Raiders of 
the Lost Ark (1981)   78
 
While this chapter is to focus on Van Sant’s multi-million dollar remake of Psycho, the spirit 
of the chapter belongs to any attempt to recreate shot-for-shot, including another 1998 version 
of Psycho called Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho by Kirstin Bianchi and Richard Ferrando (1998), 
a 17-minute black and white homage, not to mention the countless ‘Youtube’ remakes of the 
shower scene. What cannot be denied is that directors all over the world (young and old, 
experienced and inexperienced) are replicating old classics and intervening between the 
dualisms of story/narrative and technicality/discourse. They circumvent copyrights and legal 
barriers with their shot-for-shot guerrilla art aesthetic.
* This chapter is dedicated to these 
young raiders of the lost art; boys (now grown men) who over the course of 23 years created 
one of the most patient and inspiring remakes of all time. Ultimately, the lesson of 
Strompolis, Zala, and Lam’s Indiana Jones and the Raiders of the Lost Ark: The Adaptation is 
that the zombie remake is not always motivated by commercial gain. Sometimes, the film just 
returns.  
 
 
A “twice-only film”: From Hitchcock to Van Sant… and back again 
 
“To me, ‘remake’ meant to remake it, y’know, it didn’t mean to change it around because then it 
wouldn’t be a remake.” 
 
-  Gus Van Sant (speaking in D-J, 1999) 
 
Why use Psycho for a case study? Has it not been used (and abused) in academia enough? 
The same criticism has been levelled at Žižek for his repeated use of the same examples, and I 
think his reply is appropriate here. For the Platonic-idealist, examples never perfectly render 
what they are supposed to exemplify, and as such they should not be taken too literally. For 
the materialist however, there is always more in the example than in what it exemplifies, and 
as such it threatens to undermine the whole argument since it gives body to the repressed 
content buried deep inside the ‘notion’. Žižek writes that 
 
this is why the idealist approach always demands a multitude of examples – since no single 
example is fully fitting, one has to enumerate them to indicate the transcendent wealth of the 
                                                 
* Michel Gondry’s Be Kind Rewind (2008) is in many ways a film about such an approach to remaking: 
in this film, a worker in a video rental store, Mike (Mos Def), is faced with a dilemma after his clumsy 
and paranoid friend, Jerry (Jack Black), accidentally wipes all of the tapes in the store. The two friends 
resolve to remake all of the films themselves, from Ghostbusters to Rush Hour 2, which soon become 
cult comedy viewings among the locals.   79
Idea they exemplify, the Idea being the fixed point of reference of the floating examples. A 
materialist, on the contrary, tends to repeat one and the same example, to return to it 
obsessively […] each time providing a new interpretation (2008c:xi-xii). 
 
This is why I keep returning to the same secondary examples in Taxi Driver, the cinema of 
David Lynch, Memento, etc. and is also why Psycho and Spoorloos are listed as case studies 
and not examples. Far from positing a Platonic-idealist approach to a multitude of examples 
as each partially explaining an idea, my case studies represent the Idea itself. Such case 
studies are what Žižek calls universal singulars, for it is the ‘singular’ of Psycho that remains 
the same in all symbolic universes, the insistent symptom which demands to be explored by 
continually changing notions, like moths around a flame; fly too close though, and like the 
moth you can get burned… 
  Gus Van Sant’s remake of Psycho was one such moth, but it was by no means the 
first. Even Hitchcock was intrigued enough by the effect of Psycho on audiences that he 
asked the Stanford Research Institute to satisfy his curiosity as to the precise locus of its 
disturbing content. However, as Linda Williams notes, “When he found out they wanted 
US$75 000 to do the research, he told them that he was not that curious” (2000:353). It is the 
proposal of this chapter that the satisfaction of Hitchcock’s curiosity need not cost so much, 
provided we utilise the Deleuzian and Lacanian remake models we have been thus far 
fleshing out. Like a good materialist, I hope to provide a reading of Psycho that provides 
several interpretations around what is possibly one of the most mystifying ‘universal 
singulars’ in the history of film. I present this analysis as an alternative to the ‘blow-by-blow’ 
method of remake analysis favoured by theorists such as Thomas Leitch, whose ‘101 Ways to 
Tell Hitchcock’s Psycho from Gus Van Sant’s’ (2000) simply plays an elaborate game of 
‘spot-the-difference’ not uncommon in analyses of shot-for-shot remakes.  
  Both Alfred Hitchcock and Gus Van Sant’s Psychos (1960 and 1998) begin with a 
famous bird’s-eye-view crane-shot which pans across the Phoenix skyline until, almost 
arbitrarily, it settles on a particular window of a hotel, and enters. Inside, Marion Crane (Janet 
Leigh and Anne Heche) and her lover Sam Loomis (John Gavin and Viggo Mortensen) are 
getting dressed in the aftermath of illicit sex, discussing their financial problems. Shortly 
after, Marion steals a significant amount of money ($40,000 and $400,000) from her boss in 
an attempt to start a new life with Sam, but while on the run she is forced to seek refuge at the 
Bates Motel, home to one Norman Bates (Anthony Perkins and Vince Vaughn) and his 
mysterious mother. Having acquainted themselves in amongst Bates’s weird collection of 
taxidermy, Marion leaves Norman to take a shower, and the rest, as they say, is film 
‘hystory’. Following Marion’s death the film shifts gears into a whodunit mystery involving a 
private detective, Arbogast (Martin Balsam and William H. Macy), who is also killed at the   80
hands of the mysterious ‘mother’ figure. Also embroiled in the hunt for Marion is her sister, 
Lila Crane (Vera Miles and Julianne Moore), and Sam, who finally discover that it was 
Norman who dressed as his mother – herself taxidermied for posterity – to commit the 
murders in a state of psychological imbalance, for which he is eventually incarcerated.
*  
  That Psycho announces itself in 1960 as “a new – and altogether different – screen 
excitement!!!”, is somewhat ironic given it has gone on to be continually remade in one form 
or another ever since. It has become as ingrained in our culture as Bram Stoker’s Dracula, 
and is so deeply embedded that it seems we have forgotten a time when showers ever were 
‘safe’, or a time when the name ‘Norman Bates’ had no meaning. This ‘new’ and ‘altogether 
different’ film has become etched linguistically and semantically via its induction into 
American mythology, smuggling its own repressed secrets into each new version. Dracula is 
in fact a good comparison, for Ira Konigsberg has argued that the figure of Dracula exceeds 
Stoker’s original representation in much the same way as Bates does with Hitchcock’s. 
Furthermore, Konigsberg suggests that the original Dracula is somehow disavowed from its 
historicity, in much the same way as Psycho’s shower scene is from its own. Konigsberg also 
stresses the importance of contemporary audiences’ insatiable thirst to see this legendary 
monstrosity rearticulated time and again, to the extent that “if Bram Stoker had not invented 
him, Dracula would have existed anyway” (1998:250). Can we not rewrite this statement as 
“if Hitchcock had not filmed him, Norman Bates would have existed anyway”. After all, 
Konigsberg is wrong here: Bram Stoker did not create Dracula, but merely gave the myth 
form in 1897, which as Deleuze argued freezes the scene and makes a spiritual event out of its 
being. This sense is echoed by Alain Badiou, who has written that “it is vain to suppose that 
we can invent anything at all – and all truth is invention – if nothing happens, if ‘nothing 
takes place but the place’” (cited in Hallward, 2003:107). For him, every radical departure in 
the field of culture has its origin at one point, and it is here that truth happens. The original 
Psycho also establishes the ‘event’ of Psycho beyond its textual being; it freezes the shower 
scene, as it were, as the truth of its being. 
  When Gus Van Sant remade Psycho in 1998, he was in some ways addressing this 
sense, not that his version is the difference between the original and the remake, but, rather, 
between the original and itself. The distance that separates the remake from its original is 
exposed in all its arbitrariness, and via a möbius switch, the part and the whole collide. Did 
the same thing not happen in the reception for the original movie? Despite being released to 
unprecedented commercial acclaim, smashing box office records and altering the way 
                                                 
* I have deliberately presented this synopsis of the Psychos in tandem so that when we come to analyse 
the key scenes in some detail, the limitations of this compare-and-contrast style can be seen.    81
audiences could see films,
* Hitchcock’s Psycho was heavily criticised by many reviewers 
(especially in England). However, over time (as the film became canonised in cinematic 
repetitions), those same critics re-reviewed the film, and all revised their opinions: Bosley 
Crowther of the New York Times originally described Psycho as falling “quite flat”, and a 
“blot on an honorable career” (1960), but later listed it in his top ten list of 1960 films (Leigh, 
1995:105-6); Time magazine switched their opinion from “Hitchcock bears down too heavily 
in this one” (Time, 1960), to “superlative” and “masterly” (Leigh, 1995:106). This example of 
‘remade criticism’ reflects Walter Benjamin’s statement that “the technique of reproduction 
[…] substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence [… and] it reactivates the object 
reproduced” (1936:215). It seems that the first remake of Psycho took place in the review 
columns, proving perhaps that the original was undead from the very beginning. 
  If William Rothman’s claim that Psycho participates in “a medium of taxidermy” 
(2001:39) renders it a film concerned with the appearance of death, then Gus Van Sant is a 
taxidermist director, par excellence. There is an effective redoubling going on in Van Sant’s 
Psycho as he is not only recreating Hitchcock’s most ‘undead’ work, but he is also recreating 
Hitchcock himself in shooting the film shot-for-shot. To Freud’s ‘zombie analyst’ it seems we 
must now add the ‘zombie director’. It could be said that Hitchcock has an obsession with 
taxidermy, since he used the motif in The Man Who Knew Too Much (1956) before Norman’s 
birds in Psycho (and even those birds seem to reanimate themselves in The Birds in 1963). It 
should be no surprise to us that The Man Who Knew Too Much is an auto-remake and that 
The Birds is to be remade by Dennis Iliadis.  
  Hitchcock’s obsession with taxidermy also reflects the sense that he was a director 
who, as Stuart McDougal observes, “was continuously and obsessively remaking his own 
work” (1998:52), leading McDougal to describe him as ‘the director who knew too much’.
† 
He often remade a single shot or a transition between shots and even remade his own casts, 
frequently re-recruiting actors like James Stewart and Vera Miles, who was under contract 
with the director. Stephen Rebello points out that on first glance it seems curious that neither 
Perkins nor Leigh were summoned for an encore (1991:190). However, when the sheer 
impact of Psycho is taken into account, perhaps it is not so curious after all, as Janet Leigh 
                                                 
* Upon its release, signs greeted patrons at cinemas establishing that “It is required that you see Psycho 
from the very beginning”, thus altering the previous viewing habits of the public, and exhibition 
practices of cinemas. 
 
† It is interesting to compare McDougal’s description of Hitchcock as a director obsessed with 
remaking himself to Marcus Nispel, a director who is fast gaining a reputation as a ‘remake director’. 
All of Nispel’s films are remakes or adaptations: two are based on famous slashers – The Texas 
Chainsaw Massacre (2003) and Friday the 13
th (2009), one on Frankenstein (2004) (TV); another is 
his remake of a Norwegian original, Pathfinder (2007), and his forthcoming remakes Conan (2010, of 
Conan the Barbarian [1982]) and The Last Voyage of Demeter (2011, based on Dracula). Rather than 
remaking himself however, Nispel is carving out a career remaking others.    82
herself acknowledges: “I would have loved to have worked for him again. But I understand 
why not. Marion was a one-time role. She made such an imprint that Hitchcock could not 
bring her back to life. And Psycho was a once-only film” (cited in Rebello, 1991:190). The 
film’s dialogue even seems to anticipate its own status as a singularity, where in the scene 
when Norman says to Marion the famous line “We all go a little mad sometimes. Haven’t 
you?”, Marion replies “Yes, sometimes just one time can be enough.”  
  How can Psycho be a ‘once-only film’ if it has been continually remade, time and 
again? Rebello notes that Hitchcock found Psycho a tough act to follow, and suddenly found 
himself in a newly changed Hollywood which contained a dearth of good writers and a legion 
of other directors all hoping to “do a Hitchcock”, as it became known. Following the success 
of Psycho, Rebello notes that Hitchcock was plagued by the question: “Is this too much like 
Psycho” (1991:191)? Clearly the film had already become a cinematic event to which the 
director was tied. Thus it is not simply that Psycho was a ‘once-only film’, but that every film 
he looked to make thereafter was to be measured against it. With Gus Van Sant however, the 
question is not so much, “Is this too much like Psycho?”, but, “Is it enough like it?” 
  Whatever pressure Hitchcock felt on his reputation following Psycho, Van Sant must 
have felt double before his new version. Perhaps it is the sense of having to ‘live up to’ 
Hitchcock that led to Van Sant’s complex reasoning for taking the project on, a reasoning that 
reveals an inner logic almost as self-contradictory as Norman Bates himself. At first, Van 
Sant defended his intention to remake Hitchcock by stating that his version of Psycho was to 
“[hold] up a mirror to the original film […] sort of its schizophrenic twin” (Van Sant, cited in 
Verevis, 2006:72). However, Psycho’s schizophrenic twin already existed in Douglas 
Gordon’s video installation, 24-Hour Psycho (1993), which presented the entirety of Psycho 
slowed-down to just a few frames-per-second. In the background, the film was reflected in a 
large mirror positioned on the opposite wall, effectively reflecting the film back at itself and 
throwing the illusion of space into chiastic and psychological instability. However, while 
Gordon is literally reflecting Psycho, his reasoning is as follows, that the work is 
 
more like an act of affiliation... it wasn’t a straightforward case of abduction. The original 
work is a masterpiece in its own right, and I’ve always loved to watch it. [...] I wanted to 
maintain the authorship of Hitchcock so that when an audience would see my 24 Hour Psycho 
they would think much more about Hitchcock and much less, or not at all, about me (2008). 
 
Gordon is adamant that he not be regarded as “abducting” Psycho or Hitchcock, and like 
every good psychoanalyst we should quote Žižek and ask: “What more does this statement 
contain, that has caused you to make it” (2006a:19)? Just as Van Sant seems to want to reflect 
the schizophrenia of Norman Bates within the textuality of the remake, so Gordon seems to   83
want to reflect the crime scene of Marion’s murder itself within the textuality of his. This 
process of ‘meta-textual traversal’ led Daniel Frampton to argue that Gordon’s artistic project 
works by “revealing the expressionism of the [original] film; showing the workings of that 
style, that thinking” (2006:207). Each scene is performed as a version of Psycho in itself, a 
microcosmic metonymic which illustrates that actual production and reception must, 
following Deleuze, be considered as complimentary to the virtual re-production and re-
reception that follows.  
  For Van Sant however, no such complementarity existed, and his complex reasoning 
behind his Psycho remake is anything but balanced. In fact, it goes through three highly 
conflicting stages. (1) His first statement insists on a remake that would keep “intact [an] 
undeniable classic […] part tribute to Hitchcock, part new introduction for younger 
audiences, part bold experiment” (cited in Verevis, 2006:71). Here, we can see some of the 
different remake ideologies crashing together already, from directorial hubris to slavish 
homage through re-adaptation and updating. (2) Van Sant’s second reason for remaking 
Psycho paints a somewhat different picture:  
 
You can’t copy a film. If I hold a camera, it’s different than if Irving Penn holds it. Even if it’s 
in the same place, it will magically take on his character. Which was part of the experiment. 
Our Psycho showed that you can’t really appropriate. Or you can appropriate, but it’s not 
going to be the same thing (1998). 
 
This view points out the paradox of attempting to step into Hitchcock’s shoes. In addition to 
slightly contradicting his first reasoning, it also contradicts an earlier statement by Van Sant, 
that his ‘art’ should be anonymous, made “for the people […] without the hindrance of my 
own style” (1998). Jeffrey M. Anderson does not criticise the Psycho remake, but Van Sant 
himself, or rather his reputation, stating that “if a fourth-rate hack had tried it, it would have 
been laughed at, or ignored, out of existence” (2008). The problem here is that Van Sant is 
not a fourth-rate hack, but a reputable director with a real flair for the visual and technical 
aspects of filmmaking. Thus the implicit fear in Anderson’s desperate pleas against remaking 
Hitchcock are not born from a fear of him being butchered by a ‘fourth-rate hack’, but of him 
being successfully reproduced by an auteur with his/her own visual style which might corrupt 
the work. (3) This brings me to my third and final quote from Van Sant, an indignant response 
to a question by an interviewer who asked him “Why remake Psycho?”, to which he 
answered, “[Because] no one else would” (1998). However, Van Sant later qualifies this 
statement on his website by phrasing his answer slightly differently as, “So no one else would 
have to” (2008). Both answers seem cautionary and claim the burden of responsibility. There 
is a hubris here that belies a sense of need, a sense that the project was inevitably going to   84
happen. The message here is clear: in the case of the first version of this third quote, Van Sant 
stepped in to remake Psycho because no other director would dare touch it; in the case of the 
second version, it is the project itself that demands to be made and Van Sant recognises the 
burden of responsibility – in taking on this burden himself he prevents the ‘fourth-rate hacks’ 
from messing it up. Van Sant begins here by transforming the project of remaking Psycho 
into a burden to be shouldered, and then shifting that burden onto himself. In short, while 
many critics claimed the project to be “redundant and unnecessary” (Berardinelli, 1998), Van 
Sant is claiming the opposite, that the project is unavoidable and essential, and that it is his 
‘duty’ to pull it off. There are echoes here of Lacan’s reworking of Freud’s Wo es war, soll 
ich werden, such that Van Sant is saying: There where the original Psycho was, it is my duty 
that this remake should come into being.  
  We can clearly discern in Van Sant’s contradictory reasoning the three stages of 
Freud’s Oedipus complex: (1) Between the mother and son there is the affirmation of the 
unrestricted sexuality of the primal father (Hitchcock tribute/new audiences); (2) then, in a 
jealous rage the father is killed or repressed by his son (although a shot-for-shot remake, this 
is always going to be a Van Sant film since Hitchcock cannot be behind the camera); (3) and 
finally, the father returns in the form of a totem or law forbidding patricide (Van Sant’s 
insistence on the Historical Necessity of the project, and his doing it to ensure it is not 
‘hacked’ up by someone else). Implicit here is the vital pathological phenomena described by 
Freud as the “miscarriage of repression, of irruption” (Freud, 1911:171), and it is with Freud 
in mind then that we should read Van Sant’s desire to hold up a mirror to the original film as 
a ‘schizophrenic twin’ with utter seriousness: he is not simply using the schizophrenic 
mirroring allegorically, nor is he hystericising the original; rather, he is holding a mirror up to 
the hysteria already implicit in the original. This is a failure to repress.  
  Van Sant’s ‘mirror’ here needs to be read with the full weight of Lacan’s mirror 
stage, for we can also discern Lacan’s three orders of the Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic in 
this tripartite reasoning: from the raw and unformed ‘Real’ with the collection of almost 
incoherent parts (“part this, part that, part another”) of the first reasoning; via the mirroring of 
the ‘Imaginary’ ideal-other (“If I hold a camera, it’s different than if Irving Penn holds it”, or 
to be more precise, Hitchcock) of the second; to the definitive, inescapability of the Law in 
the ‘Symbolic’ order (“I must do it [because no one else would] / [so no one else would have 
to]”); in the third. J. Hoberman’s comment about Van Sant’s Psycho is that “the response for 
anyone familiar with the original Psycho is likely to be restricted to a narrow range between 
briefly enjoyable déjà vu and mild disappointment” (Hoberman, 1998). Here, Hoberman 
succinctly hits the nail on the head as to why this film is so important. The disappointment 
felt is precisely that of the Lacanian child on entering the mirror stage and learning, tragically, 
that the unity he or she had experienced until that moment has been abruptly cut short by the   85
intrusion of language and the symbolic order, into which this shot-for-shot version drags the 
original, kicking and screaming. The brief enjoyment in the sense of déjà vu has, in film 
history terms, come to an abrupt end here, for the shot-for-shot remake takes Psycho out of 
the realm of the pure symbolic event, and returns it, in a möbius relation, to its origins in 
1960s being.  
  We can learn more about Van Sant’s three-part reasoning by looking at what Freud 
called ‘faulty reasoning’ in the joke about the borrowed kettle, which for him illustrates the 
structure of the unconscious. A man returns a borrowed kettle to the lender with a hole in it, 
but when confronted, replies with three reasons as to his innocence in the matter: (1) The man 
argues that he never borrowed the kettle in the first place; (2) that it had a hole in it already 
when he borrowed it; and (3) that he had given it back undamaged and without a hole 
(2001:204-5). The ineptitude of his reasoning is comic insofar as the man makes no attempt to 
conceal or compensate for its faultiness despite the mutual exclusivity of his arguments. 
Rather, it displays multiple strands of thought (each one perfectly valid on its own) in open 
contradiction. One can fully imagine the kettle borrower in this joke demanding to have his 
cake and eat it. According to Josh Cohen, the reason why Freud’s jokes are always unfunny is 
that they dance the same fine line between reality and disavowal as that of the psychotic. For 
Cohen, “this may explain why […] spoken properly, [the joke] can insinuate an eerie break in 
the audience’s laughter. It may conversely explain why ‘mad people’, against our better 
judgement, tempt us to nervous laughter” (2005:55). Just as Freud’s unfunny jokes cause us 
to shift somewhat uncomfortably, psychosis can often make us want to laugh.  
  One of the best cinematic examples of the kettle joke’s faulty reasoning as comic 
lunacy can be seen in John Landis’s The Blues Brothers (1980), where illogical rationalising 
momentarily subverts logical sense. In one scene, Jake (John Belushi) is caught in a lie by his 
homicidal fiancée. In a last ditch attempt to reason with her, Jake exclaims that it was not his 
fault, to which she replies: “You miserable slug, you think you can talk your way out of this? 
You betrayed me.” Jake’s response is legendary:  
 
No I didn’t, honestly. I ran out of gas, I had a flat tyre, I didn’t have enough money for cab 
fare, my tux didn’t come back from the cleaners, an old friend came in from out-of-town, 
someone stole my car, there was an earthquake, a terrible flood, locusts! It wasn’t my fault I 
swear to God!!  
 
Rather than shooting him, Jake’s estranged fiancée smiles and embraces him, clearly 
overwhelmed by his response. Josh Cohen explains that the borrowed kettle joke illustrates 
that where the lender sees the situation from the point of view of external reality 
(consciousness) and thus sees an ‘either-or’ situation, the borrower speaks from the point of   86
view of psychical reality (unconsciousness) and knows only a ‘both-and’ situation. When 
faulty reasoning is provided, the result is precisely ‘nothing’, the terms negate one another 
and we are left with a terrifying abyss. First, the lender denies the act of borrowing the kettle, 
then his responsibility for its condition, and finally he denies the condition itself. In much the 
same way, Van Sant denies the act of remaking, his responsibility for its failure, and then the 
condition of failure itself. 
  When Anderson notes of the Psycho remake that if a fourth-rate hack had tried it, it 
would have been laughed at, or ignored, out of existence, we should simply remove the ‘if’, 
for Hitchcock has been ‘hacked up’ like one of his leading ladies almost continuously. The 
etymology of the word ‘hack’ shows that it has many modern meanings. It originated from 
‘hackney’, a horse let out for hire, and thus became a derogatory way to describe a mediocre 
writer-for-hire. In technology, the word ‘hack’ refers to the reconfiguration of a computer 
system to function in way not intended by its designer. Finally, and perhaps more generally, it 
originates in the German word ‘hacken’, meaning someone who makes furniture with an axe 
(to “hack to pieces”), implying a lack of finesse. The link between ‘hacking’ and the undead 
is to be found in Oliver Goldsmith’s epitaph on Edward Purdon, who knew well what the life 
of a ‘hack’ was: 
 
Here lies poor Ned Purdon, from misery freed, 
Who long was a bookseller’s hack:  
He led such a damnable life in this world,  
I don’t think he’ll wish to come back (1774). 
 
Perhaps we should take Goldsmith’s epitaph as that of the cinematic remaker also. Van Sant’s 
‘faulty kettle’ rationale is based on the idea that the slasher genre killed the ‘master of 
suspense’, not by ‘Doing a Hitchcock’ but by doing too many, by reducing him to a standard 
formula (what Lacan calls a sinthome). A quick glance at appendix b. illustrates that no less 
than 19 acknowledged Hitchcock remakes exist to date, and this is a number that you can 
multiply with the countless unofficial remakes, and the numerous remakes to come. 
Ultimately, Van Sant’s remake illustrates that in laughing at or ignoring out of existence the 
butchering of Hitchcock we deny the ‘undead-ness’ of the zombie director. In showing the 
‘nothingness’ that subsists in remaking, Van Sant shows that what Hitchcock remakers really 
need to worry about is preventing his Deleuzian ‘eternal return’, by leaving him to the 
simulacra-phantasms. In a strange way, Van Sant’s Psycho might be a somewhat uneasy 
bedfellow of I Am Ωmega from chapter 1 – both causing equal distress in critical circles. 
Perhaps we should read the practice of ‘Doing a Hitchcock’ in its proper remake light, as 
“Doing Hitchcock in!”   87
 
Would the real Psycho please come out? Abducting Hitchcock with the queering camera 
 
Harold Bloom (1997) describes the Oedipal pressure of authors who live in the shadow of 
their influences as the ‘anxiety of influence’, whereby these authors paradoxically select a 
role-model both to imitate and compete with. The result leaves the newcomer with the wish to 
triumph over (although as a result of) his/her precursor and Bloom uses the term ‘clinamen’ to 
explain the alteration necessary to accomplish this. Specifically, this clinamen is the effect of 
the later author ‘swerving’ to correct his or her precursor, suggesting that the earlier work was 
correct up to a certain point but then went wrong somewhere (that is, it should have swerved 
in the direction the new version takes it). Both Deleuze and Lacan are interested in the 
concept of clinamen, the former in the element of “chance” affecting plurality (Deleuze, 
2009b:307), and the latter in the element of “inclination” affecting our relationship to nothing 
(or to put it more accurately, not-nothing, 1998:63-4). Thus, clinamen, or the swerving 
through time of the repeated work, involves both plurality and the (not) nothingness of the 
repetition.  
  For Bloom, the anxiety of influence comes out of a complex act of strong misreading. 
It is not that this misreading occurs because of the anxiety of finding oneself in the shadow of 
one’s influence, but, rather, it is the cause of the anxiety. The idea that an author or director 
carries with them the spectre of his or her precursor is not particularly new, but Bloom has 
considered the problem in a unique way, writing that  
 
in ways that need not be doctrinal, strong poems are always omens of resurrection. The dead 
may or may not return, but their voice comes alive, paradoxically never by mere imitation, but 
in the agonistic misprison performed upon a powerful forerunner by only the most gifted of 
their successors (1997:xxiv, emphasis added). 
 
As Bloom suggests, while the dead may or may not return the voice of the voiceless 
nonetheless comes alive, and only in the most gifted of successors (so not in fourth-rate 
hacks). The issue of authenticity and theft is much more prevalent in the remaking of Psycho 
than in any of the other remakes churned out by Hollywood. Here it is the very talent of Van 
Sant as a ‘visionary’ director that deepens this anxiety of influence, not the talent of 
Hitchcock. After all, are we not all subjected to, and by-products of, our social imprimaturs? 
  The complement to Bloom’s consideration of influence is that of ‘intention’. Daniel 
Frampton considers intention of vital importance in understanding that films are not created in 
a void, which is paramount to our understanding of the Deleuzian filmind. This is 
significantly affected when we consider Bloom’s anxiety of influence on the redoubled   88
anxiety of remaking: not only does the remaker have the pressure of the original director and 
legions of fans affecting his or her intention for a work, but there is added pressure in the fact 
that the film is being explicitly acknowledged as such. This is to be contrasted with a genre 
director who disavows his or her sources while all the same implicitly acknowledging them 
through codified signs (allegory, allusion, generality, etc). The problem arises when we show 
that there are unconscious, disavowed elements intrinsic to remaking also, that a work is 
never fully conscious or intentional.  
  For those film directors who experience Bloom’s anxiety of influence, Hitchcock 
seems to be the cinematic equivalent to Shakespeare. One director noted for his Hitchcock 
homages is Brian De Palma, who said that “dealing with Hitchcock is like dealing with Bach 
– he wrote every tune that was ever done. Hitchcock thought up practically every cinematic 
idea that has been used and probably will be used in this form” (cited in Rebello, 1991:192). 
De Palma’s anxiety over Hitchcock’s influence is clearly an aspect of what Bloom calls 
‘Apophrades’ (when the dead return to re-inhabit their old houses). This is where a later 
director, already burdened by an imagined solitude that is almost solipsistic, holds his or her 
own work so open to a previous version that it is almost as though we were back in the later 
author’s “flooded apprenticeship”, before his or her own unique “strength” begins to assert 
itself (Bloom, 1997:14-6). Given Douglas Gordon’s statement that his 24-Hour Psycho is an 
“affiliation” rather than a “case of abduction”, Van Sant’s remake becomes the directorial 
equivalent of the killer from The Silence of the Lambs (1991), Buffalo Bill (Ted Levine), 
who, sitting in wait with duct tape stretched out, is preparing for the kidnapping of something 
big… 
For Frampton, films do not need implied authors or implicit narrators in order to 
adequately function in telling their stories. There is instead a more abstract notion of 
‘narration’ which functions perfectly well, one intrinsic to the filmind. William Rothman has 
argued for an authorial theory of narrative (to be kept distinct from ‘auteur theory’). He writes 
that “Hitchcock’s structures are expressions of his unwillingness or inability ever to forsake 
his mark, ever to absorb himself unconditionally in the destinies of his characters, ever to 
leave his own story untold” (Rothman, cited in Frampton, 2006:29). Thus Psycho contains 
other internal repetitions in the form of Hitchcock’s own “murderous camera” (Frampton, 
2006:28), which shapes his film. For example, according to Stephen Rebello, Hitchcock was 
only half joking when he told the press, “If I made Cinderella, the audience would be looking 
for a corpse to turn up in the coach” (cited in Rebello, 1998), an obvious nod to this 
murderous camera. David Bordwell also describes Hitchcock’s authorial mark, commenting 
that one type of meaning audiences construct from his films is the “repressed or 
symptomatic” one, an unconscious or involuntary meaning whereby,  
   89
taken as individual expression, symptomatic meaning may be treated as the consequence of 
the artist’s obsessions (for example, Psycho as a worked-over fantasy of Hitchcock’s). Taken 
as part of a social dynamic, it may be traced to economic, political, or ideological processes 
(for example, Psycho as concealing the male fear of woman’s sexuality) (1989:9). 
 
On the one hand, we get a Psycho personal to Hitchcock, and on the other, we get a Psycho 
similar to David J. Skal’s description of Bram Stoker’s Dracula as “a lightning rod for 
prevailing social anxieties” (2008), an objective text representing societal unease. Either way, 
there is a sense that the anxiety of influence in Van Sant’s remaking is massively complicated 
by the differentiation between Hitchcock’s authorial stamp and his own. While Hitchcock 
reproduced in each of his films a ‘murderous camera’ as Frampton puts it, there is an 
undeniable mark reproduced in each of Van Sant’s films also, and the Psycho remake is no 
exception: we might call this a ‘queering camera’.  
  One need only glance at Van Sant’s work to note that his sexual politics are self 
evident (he is openly homosexual), from My Own Private Idaho (1991) to his most recent 
film, Milk (2008). But how is he able to ‘queer’ a film he is remaking shot-for-shot? Michael 
Koresky notes that while Hitchcock’s Norman Bates has changed from androgynous 
automaton to frustrated (heterosexual) man in Van Sant’s version, seemingly every other 
character is given some form of homosexual ‘baggage’. This includes his choice of casting for 
the roles, given Anne Heche’s public persona as an ‘out’ actress (in 1998 at least) and the 
intimations of Lila’s lesbianism, which Julianne Moore (an actress famous for feisty, 
dominating roles) reportedly kept in mind. In addition, the opening shot of the film depicts 
Viggo Mortensen as the sexual object: he is sweaty, bronzed and partially nude, not to 
mention shot from behind and clearly the object of the gaze (as opposed to Heche). Another 
particularly striking example is Heche’s Marion, for in the original Leigh was a hyper-
sexualised turn-on for all of the male (and lesbian) audience members, with a hitherto unseen 
bra-and-slip shot in the opening scene. Leigh was a huge publicity draw for the film, and 
while there is a blurred shot of her breasts in the shower scene, audiences were left gagging 
for more (and punished forthwith by her sudden murder). However, with Heche, a nude shot 
is handled with near indifference compared to Mortensen’s nudity. Furthermore, the 
aforementioned blurred shot of Leigh’s breast in the original is absent in the remake. In its 
place is Heche’s hand reaching up, which for Koresky rightly points to the conclusion that 
Van Sant had “little visual affection for the boyish Heche” (2008). We can already see the 
Žižekian evil neighbour creeping in here. 
  However, not forgetting Deleuze’s good neighbour, we must remember the important 
point that a whole section of Hitchcock studies is devoted to the exploration of the 
homosexual undertones implicit in Psycho, including Robert Samuels’s Hitchcock’s Bi-  90
Textuality: Lacan, Feminisms, and Queer Theory (1998), Theodore Price’s Hitchcock and 
Homosexuality (1992), and Richard Dyer’s ‘Queer Noir’, in The Culture of Queers (2002), 
among others. As Koresky notes, “the perceived redundancy of queering Psycho is thus neatly 
inverted” (2008), such that for all the academic papers spent scrutinising the original for 
homosexual references, finally they got what they wanted. The overt sexual politics in Van 
Sant’s Psycho remake thus contain something of Lacan’s sense that subjectivity is often too 
great to carry over from one work to another, such that the paradox of their simultaneity 
always overcomes the signifier and ultimately gives over to excess. Žižek argues that 
“authentic fidelity is the fidelity to the void itself – to the very act of loss, of abandoning or 
erasing the object” (2004a:13). This erasure actually results in a stabilising effect, so in 
swerving (clinamen) from Hitchcock’s blueprint Van Sant betrays the Letter of the original, 
and yet is faithful to its Spirit in fleshing out the ‘unspeakable’ elements buried therein. It is 
along these same lines that Žižek imagines a hypothetical remake of Gilda (1964) which 
updates its sexual politics. In Žižek’s fantasy version, Johnny (Glenn Ford) and Ballin 
(George Macready) form the homosexual libidinal axis of the film based around the Lacanian 
notion of the son’s relationship with the ‘anal father’. In Žižek’s version, the femme fatale of 
the piece, Gilda (Rita Hayworth), is not the surplus figure attempting to derail the normal 
relationship but the normalising figure attempting to rescue the heterosexual bond from the 
grip of the anal father. For Žižek, the title of the famous song by Gilda should be changed 
from “Put the Blame on Mame”, to “Put the Blame on the Anal Father”! (2008c:164n). 
  The suggestion here is that by deviating from the Hegelian Letter of the original, we 
remain faithful to the Hegelian Spirit of the original, and this is how Deleuze attacks 
historicist ‘contextualisation’. One often hears from historians that the only way to understand 
a work of art is to know its context, its historicity. However, the Deleuzian counterclaim is 
that too much historical context obfuscates the work ‘in itself’, in its fashion. On the contrary, 
Deleuze argues that we should analyse the art of the work as a means for providing the 
context in which to understand a given historical situation. Thus when Maitland McDonagh 
reviews Van Sant’s Psycho she unwittingly hits the Deleuzian nail on the head when she 
writes that “Van Sant’s film feels as dated as Hitchcock’s, and Hitchcock’s has the better 
excuse” (1998). Van Sant’s remake does appear dated while at the same time its sexual 
politics feel bang up to date. Žižek argues that the popular notion of Hegel’s thesis-antithesis-
synthesis is of the resolution of a deadlock (between thesis and antithesis) from the outside 
which reconciles two opposing terms. Against this, Žižek argues that Hegel’s synthesis is 
actually based on the fact that the synthesis always-already exists in the thesis, which only an 
antithetical shift in perspective can reveal.  
  It is in this way that Ebert is right to describe Van Sant’s Psycho remake as an 
invaluable cinematic experiment which demonstrated the pointlessness of remaking shot-for-  91
shot, since “genius apparently resides between or beneath the shots” (2004). Ebert’s rhetoric 
here is almost word for word the same as Deleuze’s when he argues that “if repetition is 
possible, it would appear only between or beneath the two generalities of perfection and 
integration” (Deleuze, 2009a:5). Ebert is only wrong in stating that this type of remaking is 
pointless, for in shedding new light on those ‘genius’ aspects of Psycho that have fallen 
between, or reside beneath the shots of the original, Van Sant has succeeded in the act of 
clinamen (swerving, or should that be queering?) and stayed true in this sense to the Spirit or 
Idea contained in the original, more than itself. Hollywood mogul Samuel Goldwyn used to 
say, “Let’s have some new clichés!”, and with his queering camera, Van Sant has produced 
just that.  
 
 
Master-Bates “gets off” in the remake: Seeing into the guts of the machine 
 
Timothy Corrigan argues that the remake marks a flattening of space and time, such that its 
very repetition reduces (or fully dismisses) any need for narrative motivation and 
naturalisation. Instead, he writes that the remake comprises a string of self-sustaining action 
sequences that are merely better animated through technological perfectionism. The shared 
narrative between an original and its remaking eliminates any need to construct a story, and as 
such the characters in remakes are less fully formed than their originals. For Corrigan, these 
characters become shoes into which remake actors must step, flattened and two-dimensional 
‘roles’ much closer to a ‘cartoon discourse’, where  
 
the representationally reduced image of the characters replaces questions of motivation (any 
attempt to explain why Batman, Superman, or Roger Rabbit do what they do is clearly an 
imported after-thought), while the episodic logic (from day to day) follows the paralogical 
leaps of separated performative frames (1991:169).  
 
Apart from the idea of Norman Bates as a cartoon seeming somewhat ridiculous (not to 
mention disturbing), there is a serious point here, as each new sequel further caricaturises 
Norman. The Psycho sequels even follow the same formula: Norman begins as a reformed 
character who is once more tempted to commit murder after a troubled young woman arrives 
at his newly-renovated motel stirring up his darkest repressed fantasies. Can we not imagine a 
weekly TV series with the same concept? Each week, a ‘reformed’ Norman Bates is released 
from prison after serving time for the previous week’s murder of a guest starlet. Then, having 
cleaned the motel after the previous week’s carnage, Norman is tempted once more by a 
young woman in trouble, etc., etc. We can even imagine a whole host of catchphrases from   92
“We all go a little mad sometimes” prior to the weekly shower scene, to Norman stumbling 
into the bathroom’s bloody mess exclaiming “What the hell...? Oh, mother, not again!”
*  
  One of the most fascinating elements of the Psycho remake is that many of the 
unforced changes made by Van Sant to the original concern Norman’s character. Michael 
Koresky notes that “Anthony Perkins’s introverted self-loathing becomes Vince Vaughn’s 
calculated performativity, stork-like shapelessness now absurdly buff and brawny” (2008). 
While most of the characters are ‘queered’, Norman is overtly ‘heterosexualised’ in the 
remake. We should think of Vince Vaughn as Anthony Perkins’s mirror double, his Žižekian 
‘neighbour’ – the same, but different. Also, Van Sant has Norman respond to Lila’s flirtation 
like a dirty old man, awkwardly gurning and smirking his way through each scene. It seems 
as if Van Sant is disinterested in this hyper-sexualised Norman, who far from retaining the 
androgyny of his predecessor, is “very distinctly a frustrated man” (Koresky, 2008). One 
scene in particular, known as the ‘masturbation scene’ (possibly the most criticised of the 
entire film), verifies this reading.  
  The famous scene in the original occurs when Norman silently spies on Marion as she 
undresses for her ill-fated shower, his frustration and impotence building to anticlimax. In the 
remake however, Norman begins to pleasure himself, and before long achieves the climax 
Perkins’s Norman never could. It is a mistake however to simply dismiss Norman’s climax as 
yet another example of the ‘cartoon discourse’, for there is more going on here. Roger Ebert 
sums up the critics’ main concern when he states that the inclusion of a masturbation scene is 
“the most dramatic difference” between it and the original, which is “appropriate, because this 
new ‘Psycho’ evokes the real thing in an attempt to re-create remembered passion” (1998). In 
many ways, Ebert is completely wrong in his condemnation of this scene, and in other ways, 
he is absolutely right, and here is why. Firstly, while misplaced, Ebert’s criticism is correct 
from the point of view that there is indeed a shift from Norman being in the ‘scene’, to 
Norman’s exit from the ‘scene’. The key difference is exemplified by Lacan’s argument that 
when Freud’s German term ‘Agieren’ is translated as ‘passage à l’acte’ (passage to the act) in 
French the meaning of the original is obscured. For Lacan, Freud’s Agieren is better 
translated as ‘acting out’, which involves a subject who is addressing a message to the big 
Other, but who still remains in the ‘scene’. The ‘passage à l’acte’ on the other hand is an 
(often violent) exit from the scene altogether, such that the Other is not only excluded from 
the scene, but from ‘discourse’ itself (marking an entrance into the Real). We can differentiate 
between these two terms by viewing Travis Bickle’s two main acts of violence in Taxi Driver: 
                                                 
* There was in fact an attempt to create a TV series based on Psycho called Bates Motel (1987), but it 
was not optioned and was turned instead into a TV movie. In a further redoubling, after Anthony 
Perkins declined to appear in the pilot, Norman Bates was played by Kurt Paul, Perkins’s stunt double 
in the sequels.   93
the first is the attempted assassination of the presidential candidate, in which he ‘acts out’ a 
message to the middle class ‘big Other’ to relieve the pressure of hysterical neurosis. 
However, having been thwarted in his assassination attempt, Bickle’s impotence removes him 
from the very discourse of ‘class’. He thus exits the scene altogether when he shoots up the 
brothel, which is a message addressed to no-one, an exit from, and passage out of hysteria and 
into psychosis, his passage à l’acte. In this second act, Travis identifies with the pure objet a, 
resulting in his attempted suicide at the end. Is it any wonder that Travis is bemused at the 
reaction to his actions in the press? For him he is neither hero nor villain; his violence is not 
mediated but is, like Norman’s, a pure transgression.  
  Therein resides the true difference between the original and remade shower scenes in 
Psycho. In the original, it is Norman’s passage à l’acte borne out of the failure to act out the 
fantasies stirred up by Marion. If you remember from chapter 1, we had Cristina in 21 Grams 
complaining about the fact that Paul has ‘stirred up’ her desire and turned her on; well, 
Norman it seems complains with a knife. In the remake however, the inclusion of a 
masturbation scene negates this failure by turning it into a success (resulting in orgasm, which 
is also a failure for Lacan, but one mediated by the presence of the big Other). Thus while 
1960 Norman does (in a psychotic sense at least) have the right to complain about his arousal, 
1998 Norman does not. Against Ebert’s reading, Michael Koresky argues that the 
masturbation scene “goes a long way to re-establishing a more virile masculinity to the 
character, as well as localizing his sexual urges on the derobing of a woman (it’s difficult to 
imagine Perkins’s formless eunuch having the ability to manipulate that part of his anatomy at 
all)” (2008). Like Ebert however, Koresky is also partly right and partly wrong at the same 
time. While Ebert is right in regarding it as a mistake, but gives the wrong reasons, Koresky is 
wrong in regarding it as a good update to the character, but gives the right reasons. If Norman 
were capable of getting an erection, let alone stimulating it, he would effectively have 
registered his message with the big Other, and there would be no need for the murderous 
passage à l’acte. The fact that Norman masturbates and murders Marion in the remake 
betrays the staging of the phantasmatic scene, for the scene of the phantasy is like the stage in 
a play; framed by an arch, curtains, etc., with the ‘real’ space beyond. Norman tearing 
through the fabric of the shower curtain is the equivalent of tearing through the curtain in a 
theatre – of an actor running amok through the audience. This is why Norman’s Brechtian 
passage à l’acte is so shocking, and why Van Sant should not have included the masturbation 
scene: not because he attempts to recreate ‘remembered passion’, but because he neglects to 
recreate ‘forgotten failure’. There is no remembered passion, only the shocking events which 
unfold thereafter in the shower scene proper. In short, the psychoanalytic answer is that when 
the phallus is undermined, everyone suffers and in Koresky’s description of the “formless 
Eunuch”, the phallus is undermined. Thus if we reverse Ebert, the scene is correctly rendered:   94
“the masturbation scene is inappropriate, because this new ‘Psycho’ evokes the unreal thing 
in an attempt to re-create forgotten failure”.
* 
  One often hears critics ask: What would the original director think of this remake? 
Perhaps it was this question that influenced Van Sant’s decision on how to treat Hitchcock’s 
cameo appearance from the 1960 Psycho. In the original, Hitchcock’s cameo is very near the 
start of the film at Marion’s workplace, where in the background outside the director can 
clearly be seen, wearing a Stetson. In the remake, Van Sant repeats Hitchcock’s cameo but 
splits the figure in two, such that he himself is in the scene with Hitchcock.  
 
 
Fig. 2.2: Hitchcock’s cameo in Psycho (1960)… 
 
…and zombie cameo #1 in the Psycho remake (1998) 
 
In the DVD commentary, Van Sant suggested that he is being scolded by Hitchcock in this 
scene for his directorial shortcomings. All of the critics who claimed Hitchcock would be 
‘turning in his grave’ at the thought of a shot-for-shot remake of Psycho are thus proven 
                                                 
* On a side note, it is fascinating that Koresky makes the (possibly deliberate) error in labelling 
“Perkins” and not “Norman” as the “formless eunuch” in the above quote. This alters Corrigan’s view 
of remade characters as shoes waiting to be filled by new actors, suggesting that in many ways the role 
of Norman Bates always belonged to and consumed Anthony Perkins (at least in a symbolic sense).    95
wrong: he is in fact helping to direct it! One can only wonder as to what the undead director 
had to say, but we can be sure that Van Sant’s taxidermist reanimation of Hitchcock enters the 
realm of the Žižekian undead, confirming Hitchcock’s status as the zombie director, par 
excellence. Has there ever been a starker realisation of Bloom’s anxiety of influence in 
cinematic history? 
  The significance of Hitchcock’s cameo in the Psycho remake is redoubled when we 
consider that Žižek argued the cameo in the original to have been the ultimate cause of the 
unfortunate events leading to Marion’s death: 
 
For a brief moment, we see him [Hitchcock] through the window pane standing on the 
pavement; then, seconds later, the millionaire enters the office from the very place occupied 
by Hitchcock, he wears the same Stetson – he is thus a kind of stand-in for Hitchcock, sent by 
him into the film to lead Marion into temptation and thus propel the story in the desired 
direction (1992:219).
*   
 
We can supplement Žižek’s reading of the original cameo here with the remake extension: 
that he is himself an additional vanishing mediator, a Deleuzian dark precursor of the filmind. 
The doubled cameo is almost like a glitch in the system, as though some kind of déjà vu has 
rendered an intrusion of the real (as happens in the sci-fi film The Matrix, where déjà vu 
signals that the machines have changed some crucial part of our reality).  
  Towards the end of Hitchcock’s career his cameos were always included at the very 
beginning because audiences would otherwise sit and wait to spot the famous director rather 
than focus on the story, although it never stopped him from doing one. In fact, it seems that 
even death could not stop the master of suspense from making a cameo, and Van Sant’s 
Psycho is not the only film to feature one such appearance by the deceased director. In Psycho 
II (1983), three years after his death, Hitchcock briefly appeared in the very first scene of 
Norman’s mother’s room. Before they turn the lights on, Alfred Hitchcock’s famous portly 
silhouette can be seen, almost hidden in amongst the mise-en-scène on the wall to the far 
right.  
 
                                                 
* François Truffaut has pointed out something similar in The Man Who Knew Too Much, that the 
cymbalist who ultimately marks the moment at which the assassination is to take place is also a ‘dead 
ringer’ for the director (1983:231)…   96
 
Fig. 2.3: Zombie cameo #2 (bottom right) in Psycho II 
 
This cinematographic stain of Hitchcock emerging like the phantom of the Mother Superior 
from Vertigo gives the effect of the director watching over each new version of the film, like 
Bloom’s sense of Apophrades (when the dead return to inhabit their old houses). This is one 
of the best illustrations of why this thesis is not simply separated into two distinct parts: there 
is a spectral aspect to the zombie metaphor, just as much as there is a zombie aspect to the 
ghost metaphor, something that will become clearer as this thesis progresses. Žižek uses the 
example of Alberto Cavalcanti’s, Dead of Night (1945) to illustrate the idea of a subject being 
taken over by the object. The film features a ventriloquist’s dummy that gradually begins to 
control the ventriloquist such that he must strangle the dummy to free himself from its grip. 
However, while convalescing from his ordeal in hospital, the ventriloquist opens his mouth, 
and in a moment of terror, speaks in the high-pitched voice of the dummy. Here, the 
ventriloquist has made the transition from subjective ‘I’ to subjectivised object, ‘a’ (partial 
autonomous object, or organ without a body). Does not the final scene of Psycho revisit this 
uncanny moment when Norman thinks with the high-pitched voice of mother? As Pascal 
Bonitzer argues, Norman’s mother’s voice “has entered the son, [and] tears him apart and 
possesses him in a murderous fashion” (1992:179). One need only recall that, as Žižek points 
out, the only way to get rid of the partial object is to become that object, to pronounce it as the 
first person ‘I’.  
  One such object is the shower curtain itself, which changes in between the two 
versions, leading Koresky to ask the question: “Why retain the original dialogue and recreate 
camera moves, yet replace the film’s essential props” (2008)? In the original, the curtain is 
plain, whereas in the remake it is patterned with a prismatic effect and made from a different 
fabric. Here, as with the inclusion of a masturbation scene and a cameo, we should conclude 
that the different shower curtain signifies that Van Sant is a director incapable of leaving 
things alone. I like to think of Gus Van Sant in the same way as Christian Metz likes to think 
of the cinephile who also likes to analyse films:    97
 
I shall let the words on these pages come from the person who likes to see these films in 
quotation marks, who likes to savour them as dated allusions (like a wine whose charm lies 
partly in our knowing its vintage), accepting the ambivalent coexistence of this anachronistic 
affection with the sadism of the connoisseur who wants to break open the toy and see into the 
guts of the machine (1982:92-3). 
 
Gus Van Sant is the ultimate example of Metz’s wine connoisseur, a schizoid figure who at 
once wishes to savour the vintage of Hitchcock’s Psycho, hoping to collect and preserve it for 
generations to come, while at the very same time wishing to smash it open and fiddle with the 
parts, adding his own queering mechanisms. This is absolutely to be aligned with Leitch’s 
remake paradox about the remake simultaneously honouring and eliminating the model on 
which it is based. Van Sant is both faithful husband and adulterous lover in one disavowing 
subject of repetition. Freud was right when he remarked that the normal person is not only 
more immoral than he/she thinks, but more moral than they suspect. We can quite easily 
imagine Hitchcock chiding Van Sant in his zombie cameo, accusing him of needlessly 
changing elements of the original, and Van Sant replying in the same way that Marion replies 
to Norman after she offends him by suggesting he put his mother in an institution, saying “I 
tried to mean well”. We can also imagine Hitchcock replying as Norman replies, that “People 
always mean well. They cluck their thick tongues, and shake their heads and suggest, oh, so 
very delicately.” Ultimately, Van Sant, like Marion, has good intentions, but as Lacan once 
wrote: “people with good intentions – they’re much worse than the ones with bad intentions” 
(1973:64). Lacan’s comment here is echoed by Deleuze, who writes that people with “good 
intentions are inevitably punished” (2009b:233). In the case of Van Sant, perhaps they were 
both right, but Van Sant should simply be pleased that Žižek is not in charge here, for in 
quoting from Brecht’s poem, ‘The Interrogation of the Good’, he makes a suggestion as to 
what should be done with the ‘well-intentioned man’:  
 
Step forward: we hear  
That you are a good man. […]  
This is why we shall  
Now put you in front of a wall. But in consideration of your merits and good qualities  
We shall put you in front of a good wall and shoot you  
With a good bullet from a good gun and bury you  
With a good shovel in the good earth (Brecht, cited in Žižek, 2008:33).  
 
Hitchcock, it seems, was an avid reader of Brechtian verse. 
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Cleaning up after Norman: the shower scene as fetish 
 
It is a mistake to think that Van Sant has only filmed Hitchcock’s shower scene once. In fact, 
he first filmed the shower scene, shot-for-shot, in 1979 for the Our Lady of Laughter theatre 
group as part of the Rabies! show. The show featured a mock commercial for shampoo, and 
perfectly replicated the shower scene up until the slow zoom out of ‘Marion’s’ dead eye, 
where sitting next to her lifeless body was a bottle of shampoo over which a voice-over 
stated: “New Psycho shampoo: It takes care of dandruff, and then some.” This commercial 
proves what Anat Zanger has argued, which is that Psycho ‘participates’ “in a pleasurable 
game of repetition which has contributed to turning the film into a fetish” (2006:16). Zanger 
suggests that we deal with this pleasurable game on two levels: (1) she proposes to examine 
the “dynamics of repetition (and pleasure)”, and (2) a fetishistic return to the film’s “central 
element”, the shower scene (2006:16), just as Van Sant has. On the surface of things, Zanger 
is right, and while this entire chapter is devoted to the first level, it might seem on first 
reflection that this short section will deal with the second. However, Zanger is mistaken if she 
thinks we can separate these two levels, for the one always contaminates the other. Just as the 
shower scene is an inseparable part of Psycho’s dynamics of repetition (it has lurked behind 
every corner of this chapter thus far, even in Van Sant’s history as an early filmmaker), so too 
are the dynamics of repetition inseparable from the shower scene. This is not, therefore, going 
to be the n
th analysis of the shower scene. In fact, I want to purposefully avoid an analysis of 
the shower scene in both the original and remake, and head straight into an examination of the 
shower scene in other versions, including the first two Psycho sequels and Brian De Palma’s 
homage, Dressed to Kill (1980). In doing so, I hope to avoid the standard scene-by-scene, 
shot-for-shot, stab-by-stab analysis that has been done a thousand times already, steer clear of 
the detailing of Hitchcock’s use of editing to convey the panic and disorientation of the scene, 
and ultimately move into an alternative analysis that reads Zanger’s two levels of Psycho-
analysis together.  
  First and foremost, let us return to taglines, for each and every one of the Psycho 
sequels has, at some point in its marketing, featured the line: “Just when you thought it was 
safe to go back into the shower!”, which itself paraphrases the tagline, “Just when you 
thought it was safe to go back in the water…”, from the first Jaws sequel (1978). From the 
very beginning then, the shower scene is already a part coinciding with the whole, a 
synecdochic extension of its own place in the body of the narrative. In scientific terminology 
the shower scene works like fractals, which are particles that infinitely tessellate into new 
forms that constitute macrocosmic versions of their component parts. The implication in the 
repeated tagline from each of the films is that the scene is reset after each film, reinforcing my 
point about the possibility of a ‘Norman Bates show’ television series beginning with the   99
cleaning of the bathroom. Put simply, our reproach to the Psycho sequels’ tagline is that, as 
with ‘the water’ following the original Jaws, no one ever thinks it is safe to go back in the 
shower; showers have not been, and probably never will be safe again.  
  To illustrate this, I want to draw attention to the fact that the sequels, Richard 
Franklin’s Psycho II (1983) and Anthony Perkins’s own Psycho III (1986), contain not one, 
but three shower scenes. These scenes not only tell us something unique about the fetishism 
of the shower scene and the ‘fractal universe’ of Psycho, but they can also be mapped onto 
one another in three ‘times’. First of all, let us recall the similar ‘pattern’ of each sequel: in 
each version, a supposedly ‘reformed’ Norman Bates works at a local café while attempting 
to renovate the motel for reopening. A beautiful and hysterical young woman with short 
blonde hair arrives to stay, and soon enough the deep rumblings of mother awaken in Norman 
some repressed desires…  
  Shower scene 1: The first shower scene in both of the sequels is the original shower 
scene from Hitchcock’s Psycho. Indeed, the very first scene of Psycho II begins in black-and-
white, with Herrmann’s original score, and, startlingly, Janet Leigh taking a shower. Did I 
miss something? Has Leigh reprised her role from 1960, 22 years later? Of course not, and 
seconds later the film reveals that it is in fact a replay of the original film. It is not a ‘scene 
within a scene’, but an actual revisit to the original moment itself. This direct replaying of the 
original shower scene mediates between the sense that we need reminding of the brutality of 
the scene, and the sense that we have never left that bathroom, that we are still stuck there. 
Once the scene is over, the title sequence starts and the film slickly moves from Hitchcock’s 
black and white to Franklin’s colour. In Psycho III, the original shower scene is also directly 
replayed near the beginning, this time with even more artistic flair. While daydreaming in a 
local café, Norman is distracted by a beautiful blonde with short hair, who drops her suitcase 
and reaches down to collect it. The film suddenly jump cuts to Hitchcock’s black-and-white 
original as Norman’s view of the young girl reaching her hand down to the floor is inter-cut 
with Marion’s murder, followed by a shot of the new girl lying in Marion’s ‘death pose’, 
before the shot slowly moves back into colour. This scene is a scene-within-a-scene, and is 
presented as a sudden jump into Norman’s conscious imaginings.
*  
 
                                                 
* Both films obtained the right to the original footage as they shared the same production company, 
Universal.    100
 
Fig. 2.4: The ‘death pose’: A new shower scene for Psycho III 
 
  Shower scene 2: The second shower scene in both sequels is really a faux scene, 
which thoroughly inverts our expectations. In Psycho II, the film remakes the moments 
leading up to Marion’s death from the original: a beautiful woman, Mary (Meg Tilly), 
deliberately turns Norman on and then gets undressed for a shower. A newly-reformed 
Norman Bates anxiously peeps in on her through a hole in the wall, but just as the scene is 
supposed to take a violent turn, Mary steps out of the shower very much alive and dries 
herself off. In Psycho III the faux shower scene comes much closer to the real thing, but with 
yet another twist in the tale. This time we see Norman actually don his mother’s wig and 
dress and creep into the bathroom, carving knife at the ready. The audience is absolutely 
sutured to Norman/mother’s point-of-view here (unlike the original which was tied to 
Marion), and this time the shower curtain conceals the female object herself. However, when 
the curtain is pulled away, the shock is Norman’s: the girl is already lying in a pool of blood 
in the aftermath of an attempted suicide. A further twist sees Norman save the girl’s life by 
taking her to a hospital (having, we assume, changed at some point out of his mother’s 
clothes).  
  Shower scene 3: In Psycho II, the third shower scene is an inversion of the faux shot 
where, having survived a shower in the Bates motel (no mean feat), Mary suspects that 
something is up and that Norman may be up to his old tricks. She attempts to play him at his 
own game when she finds his peep-hole in the bathroom, and looks to spy on him as Norman 
did in the original. However, instead of becoming the subject and gazing at Norman in his 
mother’s room, Mary’s gaze is violently reflected back by another eye looking in from the 
other side, shattering her Peeping Tom illusion of privacy. In Psycho III, shower scene 
number three is a shot-for-shot replica of the original shower scene except that it takes place 
in a phone booth where, having escaped death once already, a partying teenager is violently 
stabbed to death.  
  The reason each of these scenes should be construed as partaking in the realm of the 
‘shower scene’ as fetish is that they participate in the codified images that rendered the 
original scene, the Lacanian ‘sinthoms’ that are here rearticulated and destabilised. The key to 
unlocking the significance of the ‘three times’ of the shower scenes in these sequels however,   101
lies in Brian De Palma’s Hitchcock homage, Dressed to Kill (1980), which also has three 
shower scenes. The first shower scene opens the film, when sexually frustrated housewife 
Kate Miller (Angie Dickinson) takes a shower as her husband shaves. The camera moves into 
the shower and we get several steamy shots of Kate washing and arousing herself. She looks 
to her husband, longing for him to join in, but he ignores her. Suddenly, she is groped from 
behind by a fully clothed mystery man who materialises in the shower, and while she pleads 
with her husband for help he merely looks on dispassionately. The scene ends with Kate 
waking up beside her docile husband, clearly frightened and aroused in equal measure by her 
dangerous and hyper-sexual fantasy dream. The second shower scene is shot-for-shot with the 
original Psycho shower scene, but transports the scene to an elevator. As with the shower 
scene in the original Psycho it occurs about mid-way through, kills off the film’s star, and 
features a feminine killer shrouded in shadow with a carving knife. The third and final shower 
scene occurs after the revelation that, as per Psycho, it is the timid Doctor Robert Elliot 
(Michael Caine) who is revealed as the Bates-esque murderer with a ‘mother’ personality 
(Bobbi). Soon after, his attempted victim Liz Blake (Nancy Allen), traumatised by her 
experience, takes a shower. Although Elliot has been locked up in an asylum (as per Psycho), 
Liz is attacked by him just before the credits roll, with no satisfying conclusion about the 
reality or otherwise of the scene (did she dream it as Kate did in the beginning, or is this one 
real?).  
  How do the three shower scenes in Dressed to Kill relate to the three in the Psycho 
sequels? They relate on their differing levels of reality along the Lacanian triad of the Real-
Symbolic-Imaginary: the first ‘time’ in each of the films is the Real scene, which in the 
Psycho sequels is the original shower scene, and in Dressed to Kill is the scene in which Liz 
is attacked in the final scene of the film. This scene is utterly ambiguous like the unconscious, 
a product of phantasy and the ultimate representation of the filmind as objet petit a. The 
second ‘time’ of the shower scene in each of these films is the Imaginary scene, which in 
Psycho II is the scene where Mary looks through the peephole only to have the gaze reflected 
back at her, in Psycho III is the shot-for-shot scene when the partying teen is murdered in the 
phone booth, and in Dressed to Kill is the shot-for-shot scene when Angie is murdered in the 
elevator. The scene is unambiguous and represents the Lacanian mirror stage where the 
original is reflected back onto itself via homage. In each of these ‘scenes’ we get the restaging 
or inversion of the original shower scene as iconic moment. Finally, the third ‘time’ of the 
shower scene is the Symbolic scene, which in Psycho II is the scene when Mary emerges 
alive from her shower, in Psycho III is the scene when Norman encounters the girl following 
her attempted suicide, and in Dressed to Kill is the opening dream sequence in which Angie 
fantasises about being raped and possibly killed by a stranger in the shower. This scene is the 
warning, a fantasy sequence illustrating the dangers of “getting what we wish for”, wherein   102
both the fantasist and the audience are reproached by the big Other for their dirty fantasies. 
The key Lacanian term here is the restoration of the nom-du-père (name-of-the-father), a 
symbolic intervention in the dialectic between child and mother.  
 
Version  ‘Time’  Scene 
  Real time 1  Original scene from Psycho 
Psycho II  Imaginary time 2  Reflected gaze 
  Symbolic time 3  Mary alive from shower 
  Real time 1  Original scene from Psycho 
Psycho III  Imaginary time 2  Teen murder phone booth 
  Symbolic time 3  Suicide attempt 
  Real time 1  Liz attacked in final scene 
Dressed to Kill  Imaginary time 2  Angie’s elevator murder 
  Symbolic time 3  Angie’s dream in opening scene 
Fig. 2.5: Shower scene tabulation for Psycho’s II, III, and Dressed to Kill 
 
The ‘Real’ shower scene is always going to be the dislocated core of another place, just as the 
‘Imaginary’ scene is going to be a representation of the original seen through the looking 
glass (to recall Lewis Carroll). The ‘Symbolic’ shower scene is a Freudian totem, a 
representational warning prohibiting the very desire which gives rise to it (mapping these 
three ‘times’ onto the three ‘times’ of the Oedipal conflict is not hard to imagine).  
  How can this new understanding of the three shower scenes help us read Van Sant’s 
remake? Constantine Verevis argues that while Van Sant’s version of Psycho might well 
follow the original in narrative and form,  
 
each of the aforementioned other revisions of Psycho suggests that the ‘original’ text is never 
fixed or singular and that Van Sant’s Psycho remake differs textually (from this larger circuit 
of remakings) not in kind but only in degree (2006:74). 
 
Zanger is almost showing her Deleuzian sympathies here, for this sense of Psycho shifting by 
degrees but not in kind is a precise rendering of his ‘grammatical perspectivism’. Ultimately, 
we should conclude that Van Sant also produces three shower scenes, except they are all 
included in the one single scene, not despite being shot-for-shot, but because it is shot-for-
shot. How can there be three shower scenes in a shot-for-shot remake of an original which 
had just one? The first ‘Real’ shower scene is, like the Psycho sequels, the direct replay of the 
original (the elements that achieved shot-for-shot assimilability), which while textually 
different, nonetheless replicates the Hegelian Letter of the original. The second ‘Imaginary’ 
shower scene is to be found in the aspects of the original which are unavoidably enhanced,   103
inflected or extended, including: Anne Heche, colour, Marion’s pupils dilating (an effect 
Hitchcock could not achieve in the original), the digital effects of blood from the stab 
wounds, and the newly prismatic curtain. Finally, the third ‘Symbolic’ shower scene is 
located in the new shots Van Sant inserts into his updated version, including: a masked nude 
woman and storm clouds, totems or warnings replicating the Hegelian Spirit of the original.  
  It is this fragmentation at the heart of the new shower scene that accounts for the 
uncanniness of Van Sant’s use of colour. Despite this being a colour version of Psycho, at 
times it looks as though some aspects are drained of colour, while at other times the colours 
are vivid and over-saturated. Jean Baudrillard wrote that we have to “put in place ‘decentred’ 
situations, models of simulation, and then to strive to give them the colours of the real, the 
banal, the lived” (1991:311). In Van Sant’s Psycho, there is nothing banal about the colours 
of the real. Hence, while the blinding whites and sterile greys of the sky recall Hitchcock’s 
black-and-white photography, the dizzying intensity of the blood in the shower scene, 
Marion’s neon orange and lime green bras, and her nail varnish all seem to somehow pierce 
through to the Real of the original’s black-and-white. 
 
 
Fig. 2.6: Marion in the remade shower scene: like a dream, all of the colours are drained except for the 
deep colouring of her nail varnish. Also notice the newly prismatic shower curtain. 
 
Michael Koresky observes that colour has completely altered the universe of Psycho with “the 
Bates Motel neon sign no longer just a beckoning, glowing light in the dark but now a bright, 
lime-green danger sign; chocolate syrup swirling down the gray bathtub’s drain makes way 
for strawberry sauce, emblazoned against austere white” (2008). In a way, the paradoxical 
intensity of Marion’s colouring in the Psycho remake, set against the subdued background 
colours acts as a presentiment that she will be killed, and sets up the separate levels of reality   104
over which this death is to be played.
* She is at once ghostly pale and yet her nail varnish, 
bras, etc. glow like the newly-coded danger sign of the Bates Motel. It is interesting that 
Perkins originally suggested that Psycho III be shot in black-and-white, but thankfully 
Universal opposed it. If he had gotten his wish perhaps this entire mediation between the old 
and new, the conscious and the unconscious, would have been lost.
  
  I have three very short final observations to make elsewhere in the Psycho remake, 
each of which reflect the shower scene. Firstly, there is the anomaly (disguised as an in-joke) 
of the new “Bates Motel” sign, which now reads: “Air conditioned. Clean rooms. Newly 
renovated. Color TV.” The in-joke plays on the 10-minute clean-up scene following the 
shower murder, and resonates even further with those familiar with the sequels, for in each 
sequel Norman begins the film actually renovating the motel. On first glance, the added irony 
in the remake is that there is nothing to renovate yet, it is only in the (dirty) minds of the 
audiences that there is any cleaning to be done. Thus it is not the hotel that has been 
renovated, but the textual edifice itself. 
  My second observation requires some imagination. Let us picture for a second that 
for the remake, Van Sant had to decide between a Lacanian shower murder scene and a 
Deleuzian shower murder scene. How would Norman’s approach to cleaning these bathrooms 
differ? For the Deleuzian scene, the bathroom should not need cleaning since Norman already 
cleaned it in the original, evacuating the ‘organs’ and purging the body/scene of any 
incriminatory marks of the crime. For the Lacanian scene, the bathroom would still need 
cleaning even after Norman had cleaned it, because the evacuated organ would remain as an 
autonomous partial object (like the arterial spray in a Tarantino-style shower scene, it would 
be impossible to clean every drop of blood). One can extend this to other discourses as well: 
for example, we can easily imagine a Derridean murder scene, which, having been evacuated 
of its bloody insides still leaves a trace or remainder in the very différance at the heart of the 
scene’s cleavage through the cinematic fabric. Like a Fontana canvas, Derrida’s bathroom 
murder scene would carve up the discourse of the object, ever mindful of its passage through 
the act. Quite simply, a Derridean crime scene would look clean, but would contain the trace 
of its crime hidden in the act itself. Perhaps the original scene is Derridean then, since as 
Žižek has meticulously observed:  
 
While watching this scene recently, I caught myself nervously noticing that the bathroom was 
not properly cleaned – two small stains on the side of the bathtub remained! I almost wanted 
to shout, Hey, it’s not yet over, finish the job properly! (2008c:239). 
 
                                                 
* Is not the same technique used by Spielberg in Schindler’s List (1993) with the famous ‘Girl in the 
Red Coat’?   105
Such a simple procedure of imagining the trace of the partial object can highlight the 
differences between Deleuze and Lacan: while Deleuze’s evacuated bathroom is spotless even 
before cleaning has taken place (like so many Hollywood horror films hoping to achieve a 
rating certificate that would maximise their audience), Lacan’s would be filthy no matter how 
hard Norman scrubs and wipes. Van Sant’s remake is a renovation that seeks to wipe clean – 
not the bloodstains – but the very stain of the original act itself, its historicity, by restaging a 
murder that has not only yet to happen, but is already etched into the memory of cinema 
history. Van Sant’s film exposes the fragility of Psycho’s historical hysteria and reveals the 
obscene and indestructible objet a of jouissance that continues to envelope new forms and 
impregnate them like the facehugger from chapter 1. For Van Sant, the shower scene is both 
Lacanian and Deleuzian (perhaps with a Derridean twist).   
  My third, and final observation is of the last image of Psycho III, which offers us the 
clearest vision of Lacan’s objet petit a yet. It also proves that the shower scene exceeds the 
50-or-so quick cuts between the flushing toilet and Norman racing down from his house. In 
both Psycho II and III, Norman ends the film losing his mother’s corpse (in the first sequel it 
is taken away and in the second he destroys it himself). At the end of Psycho II Norman 
murders again, this time his ‘real’ mother, and begins once over the taxidermist process of 
preserving her. In Psycho III however, Norman is arrested for his crimes and seems to have 
lost his mother’s corpse once and for all after he literally rends it limb from limb (“I’ll be 
free… I’ll finally be free”, he cries). However, in a brilliantly unnerving moment (the best of 
the film), as Norman sits in the back of a police car on his way to jail, the camera pans down 
to reveal him stroking the severed hand of his mother, a Žižekian fetish organ-without-a-
body, par excellence. In the original script, this scene did not exist but was added at the 
behest of the studio after they deemed the original conclusion to be anticlimactic (so the final 
shot is itself an attachment of sorts). As well as being one of the starkest images of Norman’s 
investment in his mother, it is also perhaps one of the most sublime, succinct images of the 
‘Real’ shower scene yet.  
 
 
The only way to say “We all go a little mad sometimes” in a postmodern world: 
Recasting Norman Bates as big Other 
 
One of Hitchcock’s favourite quotes was reportedly Oscar Wilde’s “Each man kills the thing 
he loves”. In the image of Norman stroking his mother’s hand at the end of Psycho III, it 
seems the reverse of this is also true. François Truffaut once pointed out that when he 
considered Hitchcock’s style, “it was impossible not to see that the love scenes were filmed 
like murder scenes, and the murder scenes like love scenes… It occurred to me that in   106
Hitchcock’s cinema… to make love and to die are one and the same” (1974). Here is the 
clearest indication of Hitchcock’s interplay between sex and death, between ‘la petite mort’ 
(‘the little death’ following orgasm) and ‘la grande mort’ (‘the big death’), something Van 
Sant clearly did not understand in his inclusion of the masturbation scene. Besides Hitchcock, 
postmodernity has also taken a stab at love, and it is Umberto Eco who reveals that there is 
only one way left to say “I love you” in a postmodern world: 
 
I think of the postmodern attitude as that of a man who loves a very cultivated woman and 
knows he cannot say to her, ‘I love you madly’, because he knows that she knows (and that 
she knows he knows) that these words have already been written by Barbara Cartland. Still, 
there is a solution. He can say, ‘As Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly’. At this 
point, having avoided false innocence, having said clearly that it is no longer possible to speak 
innocently, he will nevertheless have said what he wanted to say to the woman: that he loves 
her, but he loves her in an age of lost innocence (1984:67-8). 
 
In Wes Craven’s Scream we get the psychotic equivalent to “As Barbara Cartland would put 
it, I love you madly” when Bates alumni, Billy Loomis (Skeet Ulrich), tells one of his 
victims, “We all go a little mad sometimes, Anthony Perkins, Psycho”. Two things are 
significant here: (1) Billy is being more than simply self-reflexive in appending the famous 
quote with its source, “Anthony Perkins, Psycho”. Rather, the referential nature of the quote 
is hyper-reflexive where, in acknowledging the source, he too has avoided false innocence 
and nonetheless said what he wanted to say to the woman: that he wants to kill her, but kill 
her in an age of lost innocence. (2) It is also significant that Billy references “Anthony 
Perkins” and not Norman Bates (like Michael Koresky – see p.94n). In this hyperreal 
postmodern reference system, textual precedence is almost inconsequential: it is para-textual 
precedence (that is, the effect of Psycho on the slasher canon and cinematic history), that is 
being referenced here.  
  This film hystory coda perverts the cinematic fabric and places Anthony Perkins 
himself into a kind of psychotic collusion with Norman Bates, into which Billy means to tap. 
At another point in Scream, Billy says “You hear that Stu? I think she wants a motive. Well I 
don’t really believe in motives Sid, I mean did Norman Bates have a motive?” Once more, the 
logic of senselessness turns on its own head: Billy’s motive in Scream is Norman Bates’s 
motivelessness in the original Psycho. To put this into Hegelese, Billy’s motive is the need to 
become the instrument of a historical, objective need to explain the unexplained, to give form 
to that which is without form, and to speak of what cannot be spoken. Billy is here an 
instrument of what Lacan called Historical Necessity, or the subject’s becoming an instrument 
of the big Other’s Will, and as such, he shifts the blame onto Norman Bates as his influence   107
(one is tempted to recall John Hinckley Jr. and Taxi Driver here). Just as Eco’s postmodern 
man is confronted with the dilemma of announcing his love to the other in an age of lost 
innocence, Billy is confronted with the dilemma of announcing his intention to kill the other 
in an age of lost culpability.  
  Ken Russell’s neo-noir gem, Crimes of Passion (1984), completely reconceptualises 
the role of Norman Bates beyond the old clichés and perfectly encapsulates this position of 
Historical Necessity and the supreme will of the big Other. Anthony Perkins brings all his 
‘Norman Bates’ baggage to a film that introduces us to a family man (Bruce Davison) whose 
marriage is failing and who finds solace in a mysterious prostitute, China Blue (Kathleen 
Turner). Perkins plays a disturbed preacher, Reverend Shayne, who decides to save China 
Blue from her life of sin, but clearly has difficulties reconciling his own sexual desire for her. 
However, while this seems to contain the same (although slightly seedier) sexual politics of 
Psycho, it is in fact markedly different on the important point of perversion. The key to 
understanding the dialectic of desire in this film is the appearance of Perkins as a psychotic 
preacher in a scene-stealing performance clearly negotiating between the modes of Lacanian 
‘desire’ and ‘drive’. In Psycho, Norman’s impotency prior to the shower scene ‘forecloses’ 
the desire of the other, and he is thus incapable of identifying with the nom-du-père (Name-
of-the-Father) so crucial in avoiding psychotic disturbance (leading to his passage à l’acte). 
In Crimes of Passion however, Perkins’s preacher is fully submitted to the nom-du-père 
(represented here as God Himself), and is now in the role of the pervert whose 
instrumentation is the will of the big Other (that is, God’s Will). Rather than exiting the 
Freudian scene in the passage à l’acte, the preacher is fully within the ‘other scene’, acting 
out his dirty fantasies under the guise of spiritual salvation. This is illustrated in the final 
scene of Crimes of Passion, where Perkins recreates his own cross-dressing finale from 
Psycho as the preacher. However, whereas Norman’s cross-dressing cannot be assumed by an 
agent since it is an impotent act in the ‘Real’, the preacher’s cross-dressing is clearly rooted in 
the Symbolic order.  
  In this cross-dressing finale, the preacher attacks China Blue with a distinctly phallic 
vibrator/crucifix capable of a double penetration both sexually and fatally, a precursor of the 
horrific phallic extension used to punish the sin of ‘Lust’ in David Fincher’s Se7en (1995). 
These phallic symbols are not merely representations of the coincidence of sex and death, but 
are also the symbolic equivalent of the nom-du-père, the vengeful, sadistic part of the 
superego that imposes its condemning judgement on the subject for their transgressions (is 
this not the perfect description of Se7en’s ‘John Doe’?). Lacan wrote that 
 
Strictly speaking, [perversion] is an inverted effect of the phantasy. It is the subject who 
determines himself as object, in his encounter with the division of subjectivity […] It is in so   108
far as the subject makes himself the object of another will that the sado-masochistic drive not 
only closes up, but constitutes itself […] the sadist himself occupies the place of the object, 
but without knowing it, to the benefit of another, for whose jouissance he exercises his action 
as sadistic pervert (1998:185). 
 
Is this not what happens in Crimes of Passion? The difference between Psycho and Crimes of 
Passion ultimately resides in the small quantum of knowledge that keeps Norman and the 
preacher apart as assimilable entities: the preacher knows of his possession of the symbolic 
phallus (nom-du-père), and, as Lacan poses perversion as a problem of ‘knowledge’ (savoir), 
he should be considered the ultimate pervert. Norman however, is no pervert, for he has 
passed from perversion to subversion; he does not know he is ‘mother’, hence his reaction to 
the murder scene (“Mother, what have you done?!”). He is, rather, caught up by the 
knowledge that does not know itself. We should conclude that Norman is the only true psycho 
here, whereas both Billy and the preacher are perverts, twisting Anthony Perkins’s 
historic/hysteric role of Norman Bates into a deus ex machina.  
  All remakes are instrumentations of another’s Will or jouissance (enjoyment), 
without exception. The relevance of this revelation should completely alter the way we 
consider Norman in the remake, for when Vince Vaughn winks and sneers with a ‘knowing’ 
nod he instrumentalises the Will of the big Other also – not of the original Norman Bates, but 
of Anthony Perkins. When Billy is revealed as one of the killers in Scream, his girlfriend 
screams in astonishment: “You sick fucks, you’ve seen one too many movies!” Billy, 
however, responds: “Now Sid, don’t you blame the movies: movies don’t create psychos, 
movies make psychos more creative!” In the Psycho remake, every hyper-textual wink and 
nod, the new Bates motel sign, altered dialogue, etc., is a coda to ‘the movies’, and on the 
level of perversion they are wholly appropriate. They designate a crucial knowledge that 
denies the position of the subject who has exited the scene, acting out a Hitchcockian 
paradigm as perversion. As Žižek puts it, “the sadistic pervert answers the question ‘How can 
the subject be guilty when he merely realizes an objective, externally imposed, necessity?’ by 
subjectively assuming this objective necessity, by finding enjoyment in what is imposed on 
him” (2006a:105-6). Fully subjected to the paternal law, Perkins as the preacher is finally able 
to enjoy in the same way that Vaughn’s Norman can in the masturbation scene, while 
enjoyment is thoroughly denied to Anthony Perkins in the original Psycho.   
  The Psycho remake and Crimes of Passion both work on this dual level, explicitly 
‘knowing’ (and knowing that their audience knows also), and this self-reflexive (or dual-
regressive) knowing is integral to both filminds. Against the traumatised and psychotic 
filmind of the original Psycho, we should posit these filminds as fundamentally perverted like 
their subjects. J. Hoberman observes that Van Sant’s Psycho is “less hyperreal than perversely   109
fastidious” (1998), acknowledging its perversity. Raymond Durgnat is also right in observing 
that “for first-time viewers, Mrs Bates kills Marion; for second-time viewers, Mrs Norman 
Bates kills Marion” (2002:124), such that while the shower scene is one event, it has two 
story points running in parallel, illustrating the distinction between story-time and discourse-
time pointed out by Seymour Chatman (1980). For the ‘first time’ audiences in 1960, the 
story point was largely right, but wrong in its essentials (audiences ‘got’ enough to interpret 
the rest incorrectly), whereas for second time audiences, hindsight changes the meaning of 
major plot points and nuances (such as Norman’s excusing his mother to Marion: “She isn’t 
herself today”). It seems that one cannot cross the same river twice, or for that matter watch 
the same film twice. Durgnat points out that Psycho represented a first for Hollywood of 
audiences returning to the cinema for a repeat viewings, significantly affecting the box office 
since “the second viewing adds another layer, which doesn’t invalidate the first but interacts 
with it” (2002:102). We will see in chapter 4 how this can be reversed in other types of 
remake.  
  It is this same level of interactivity that leads us to conclude that Billy has not made a 
mistake in Scream by attributing the quote, “We all go a little mad sometimes”, to Anthony 
Perkins instead of Norman Bates. Hitchcock himself made a similar slip when he told 
Truffaut that “Obviously, Perkins is interested in taxidermy since he’d filled his own mother 
with sawdust” (cited in Truffaut, 1983:282, emphasis added). Is it any wonder Anthony 
Perkins was typecast by the role of Norman Bates with this level of hypertextuality? In many 
ways, this is Deleuzian complex differentiation at its most succinct: Anthony Perkins is the 
repetition, the coda; it is in his movements, his bird-like appearance, and his countenance that 
Norman Bates resides. In taking the role he destroyed the very innocence that enabled him to 
do so, such that we can conceive that it is not Anthony Perkins who directs Psycho III at all, 
but Norman Bates himself, via his mother, as the literal ‘psycho director’. Is this not the 
beginning of a remake theory of the auteur/star?  
  This is why we should conclude that Linda Williams is wrong when she contends that 
Psycho is one of the first postmodern films, marking the end of ‘classical’ Hollywood cinema 
(2000:351). Rather, we would do better to situate it – as Žižek does – in a thoroughly 
modernist context, and we can prove this by looking at two things: the film’s architecture, and 
mother/Norman’s final soliloquy in which s/he says: “Let them see what kind of a person I 
am. I’m not even going to swat that fly. I hope they are watching… They’ll see and they’ll 
know, and they’ll say, ‘Why, she wouldn’t even harm a fly…’” Those critics who argue that 
Norman is thoroughly divided in this final sequence should look again. Instead, this final line 
proves that Norman really has become harmless now as he is fully consumed by his mother 
personality; that is, he has effectively become “really himself”. Here, Norman has withdrawn 
into his own private world and become an undivided subject in alienation. Žižek proposes that   110
Norman’s ongoing antagonism with his mother can be seen in the architecture of his world, 
since he is constantly torn between two buildings: the ‘horizontal’ modern motel, and his 
mother’s ‘vertical’ Gothic house (the fact that Marion works for an estate agency and the 
$40,000 is payment for a house are often overlooked ironies). Norman is always rushing 
between the two places, never finding a place of his own away from his mother’s superegoic 
injunctions. As such, Žižek observes that “the unheimlich character of the film’s end means 
that, in his full identification with the mother, he has finally found his heim, his home” 
(2008c:241).  
  In modernist architecture, this split is still visible as in the differentiation between the 
motel and the house, but in postmodern architecture, such as the work of Frank Gehry, old 
fashioned family homes are distorted by modernist curvatures, materials, or supplements. 
Žižek observes that  
 
if the Bates Motel were to be built by Gehry, directly combining the old mother’s house and 
the flat modern motel into a new hybrid entity, there would have been no need for Norman to 
kill his victims, since he would have been relieved of the unbearable tension that compels him 
to run between the two places (2008c:242).  
 
One might say that Norman would not even harm a fly in such a place. The point is, this final 
scene in the asylum effectively establishes the transference from modernism to 
postmodernism, denying Psycho’s successors any access to the modernist disjuncture intrinsic 
to his psychosis. Did not Deleuze already consider this when he remarked that Hitchcock was 
at the juncture of two cinemas, such that he “perfects” the classical form and, in turn, 
“prepares” for the modernist form that will succeed it (2008:xii)? The shot-for-shot remake 
would have to be perfectly imitative of the original as to render this split apparent by 
reinstating the unheimlichkeit (un-homeliness) of the text itself. Van Sant’s Psycho fails to 
accomplish this division. In fact, Van Sant’s Psycho really is a postmodern version, given it 
redesigned the Bates house for the remake to update it. However, the new house is not 
postmodern because Frank Gehry designed it, but because it did not replace the old house. 
Instead, the film’s set designers simply built the new house directly in front of the old house 
from the original, effectively signing a love letter to Hitchcock which includes the textuality 
of that original into its very construction.  
  Thus we should consider the fact that in order to reconcile death with love in 
contemporary postmodern culture we need only three people: Frank Gehry, Anthony Perkins, 
and Barbara Cartland.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CASE STUDY II: THE VANISHING AND THE MAN WHO WANTED TO KNOW 
 
Ghost – noun an apparition of a dead person which is believed to appear or become manifest to the 
living, typically as a nebulous image. 
-  A slight trace or vestige of something: she gave the ghost of a smile. – a faint secondary 
image produced by a fault in an optical system or on a cathode ray screen, e.g. by faulty 
television reception or internal reflection in a mirror or camera. 
-  ORIGIN Old English gāst (in the sense ‘spirit, soul’), of Germanic origin 
-  Ghosting – noun [mass noun] the appearance of a ghost or secondary image on a television 
or other display screen. 
 
 
Opening thoughts: Paris, nexus, or rethinking national cinemas 
 
When describing the facehugger’s attack in Alien, the film’s co-creator Dan O’Bannon used 
the phrase “alien interspecies rape” (speaking in Abbott and Leven, 2001). Out of the steady 
stream of invectives and tirades used to describe Hollywood’s trans-national remaking of 
European cinema, “alien interspecies rape” is, while from a different context, just about the 
most evocative of them all. If you recall, chapter 1 provided a metaphor for Lacanian 
jouissance in the motto “Enjoy Coke!”, which is exactly what horrified Lacan upon his arrival 
in the USA. Žižek continues with this metaphor when he writes that, in some ways, Coca-
Cola is a signifier for America, such that it could easily be advertised as “America, this is 
Coke!” Herein, Coke is figured as the ‘it’ of America, the object-cause of desire sustaining 
the ‘American dream’ (Žižek, 2008a:106). In this chapter, we will be exploring alien 
interspecies rape, but I want to keep Lacan’s vision of America in the background at all times, 
perhaps embodied in this vulgar “Enjoy Coke!” In fact, let us play around with Žižek’s 
metaphor a bit, for what if, upon returning to France, the same “Enjoy Coke!” commercial 
greeted Lacan there too? The effect would be properly uncanny, no? It would be as if his very 
visit to America brought back with it a new symbolic universe, or an all-too familiar instance 
of cultural imperialism…  
  This is our way in to the trans-cultural remake, for Carolyn Ann Durham has noted 
that when Euro Disney opened in Paris this exact reaction was provoked in the French people, 
who acutely perceived the oncoming “Disneylandization” of French culture (1998:1). While 
France’s cultural heritage had been perceived in the media as “under threat” from the onset of 
Hollywood’s expansionist approach to remaking, the fear of ‘Americanisation’ waned in the   113
1980s due to France’s integration into Europe (which softened the blow regarding the dilution 
of French culture). However, as Richard Kuisel notes, with Euro Disney opening in 1992 the 
dilemma about Americanisation focused “more than ever, on the issue of culture” (1993:230). 
Lucy Mazdon uses Barry Norman’s discussion of John Badham’s Point of No Return (1993), 
the Hollywood remake of Nikita (1990), as an example of remake theory’s “unproblematic 
valorisation of the source film” (Mazdon, 2000:1) over the (unproblematically demonised) 
remake. In the review, Norman writes that Point of No Return is “another example of 
Hollywood’s unfortunate tendency to remake fine Continental fare and turn it into 
sensationalist pap. […] what was once witty if somewhat vacuous entertainment has become 
plain, one-dimensional thrills” (cited in Mazdon, 2000:1). Mazdon notes that Norman’s 
remarks seem confused: on the one hand, the remake itself – that is, Point of No Return – is 
condemned as “plain” and “one-dimensional”, alongside the general activity of remaking, 
seen as “sensationalist pap”; on the other hand, the original – that is, Nikita – is regarded as 
“vacuous entertainment”, but the foreign original generally is labelled “fine Continental fare.” 
Mazdon’s point is that Norman is collapsing two arguments – the specific case of Point of No 
Return and Nikita and the general case of trans-national remaking – into one. Such an 
approach cannot help but overlook some of the issues at hand here. 
  Not all critics consider Hollywood’s remaking of “fine Continental fare” as 
“unfortunate” like Barry Norman. Some even defend the Hollywood remake by pointing out 
the hidden benefits to European cinema and culture, like David Ansen who expresses the 
hope that “perhaps, as Hollywood continues to retread and recycle, we’ll develop a renewed 
appetite for foreign flavors” (1990:86-7). Carolyn Ann Durham (1998) points out that if one 
includes Hollywood remakes of French originals as a part of France’s cinematic output then 
their global standing in the US is actually quite decent. In addition, the revenue made from 
the sales of European remake rights to Hollywood help to fund its domestic cinema, a kind of 
narcissistic protection of the European ‘ego’ through the self-destruction of its originals, or to 
put it in Hegelese, a being-for-remaking.  
  However, cracks soon appear in these arguments: Ansen’s point about trans-cultural 
remakes developing a renewed appetite for foreign flavours is undercut by the process of 
‘Americanisation’ that each European original undergoes in the process of being remade, such 
that any foreign flavours are quickly swamped (one is reminded of the move in some parts of 
America to replace ‘French fries’ with ‘Freedom fries’ during the perceived lack of support 
for the Iraq invasion in 2003). In addition, Durham’s point about remakes generating 
domestic revenue is undercut by the fact that production companies in the US buy the remake 
and distribution rights to foreign originals they plan to remake, before remaking the film 
without distributing the original. As Josh Young puts it in his article, ‘The Best French Films   114
You’ll Never See’, “clever French comedies end up being used as animated scripts” 
(1994:17). For Young, the verdict is unquestionable: the remake is “guilty as charged”.  
  However, while the critics seem to have reached a unanimous verdict, the jury is still 
out in some of the most recent remake theory debates. For example, Andrew Higson has 
questioned the very concept of a ‘national’ cinema, which he argues cannot be drawn on the 
basis of cinematic production alone. In fact, Higson argues that the term ‘national’ in 
discourse about cinema should be drawn “at the site of consumption as much as at the site of 
production […] on the activity of national audiences and the conditions under which they 
make sense of and use the films they watch” (1989:36). This shift from producer to user is 
reflected in Durham’s description of the difference between originals and remakes and their 
reception in different cultures:  
 
If, on the one hand, each film [original and remake] has initiated comparable commercial 
success in its country of conception, neither film, on the other hand, has been fully able to 
duplicate this audience appeal in the country of its model or copy. However, paradoxically, 
this situation would seem to reflect the simultaneous presence and absence of significant 
cross-cultural interests (1992:774). 
 
This is the perfect conceptualisation of Deleuzian complex differentiation, for here we have 
resemblance that differs and difference that resembles. Why, for example, was French 
comedy, 3 hommes et un couffin (1985), successful in France but not America, and its 
Hollywood remake, 3 Men and a Baby (1987), successful in America but not in France? To 
put the question in Lacanese: What small quantum of jouissance separates the two in their 
distinct ‘nationalisms’, or, where is the ‘Coke’ here signifying ‘America’? Marc Mancini 
observes that Coline Serreau, the director of 3 hommes et un couffin, was originally set to 
direct the Hollywood remake as well until she pulled out at the last minute for “health 
reasons”. Mancini states that suspicions were aroused by this explanation because it is well-
known that Hollywood producers prefer American directors to remake foreign originals as 
they are better able to capture the “American cultural idiom” (1989:33). Perhaps the problem 
is the same as the one identified by François Truffaut in La nuit américaine (Day for Night, 
1973), when he says “I speak English very well, but I don’t understand it.” The question from 
a remake perspective is: Do American directors even speak French (let alone understand it)? 
Durham (1992) notes the irony that while the word ‘remake’ is bilingual (‘le remake’), 
cultural meaning is often lost in the process of cross-national translation.  
  This case study looks at Spoorloos (1988), for with a text like this we have two 
complications to add to those above: (1) the original is a mix of both French and Dutch 
dialogue, locations and actors, making the original a nationally split picture in-and-of-itself;   115
(2) the original director, George Sluizer, also directed the Hollywood remake, The Vanishing 
(1993), so it is an auto-remake. Although rumours persist to this day that The Vanishing’s 
Hollywood producer Paul Schiff wanted an American to remake Spoorloos, Sluizer and the 
author of the original novella, Tim Krabbé, held the rights, so Sluizer managed to fend off the 
mysterious ‘health problems’ that plagued Coline Serreau. Finally, just as Higson has stated 
that the term ‘national’ in discourse about cinema should be drawn at the site of consumption 
as much as the site of production, so too should the term ‘national’ in discourse about 
cinematic audiences be drawn from the site of reception. Thus in referring to ‘American 
viewers’ I mean all audiences who make sense of and use the films under discussion.  
  Ultimately, this chapter is interested in the following observation by Hitchcock, who 
once suggested that “if you’ve designed a picture correctly, in terms of its emotional impact, 
the Japanese audience should scream at the same time as the Indian audience” (cited in 
Truffaut, 1983:320). Well, either Hitchcock was wrong, or these pictures are not being 
designed correctly… 
 
 
Raymond the Rat Man: Lacan’s supposed subject of knowledge  
 
“To get right to the point – knowledge is an enigma” 
 
-  Lacan, 1999:137 
 
Roger Ebert describes Spoorloos as “a thriller, but in a different way than most thrillers. It is a 
thriller about knowledge – about what the characters know about the disappearance, and what 
they know about themselves” (1991). The original Dutch film introduces us to Rex Hofman 
(Gene Bervoets) and Saskia Wagter (Johanna ter Steege), a couple travelling around France. 
However, their idyllic holiday soon turns into a nightmare when they stop for petrol and 
Saskia suddenly vanishes without a trace, leaving Rex helplessly searching for her. Just as 
soon as the viewer adjusts to the sudden shift in pace, the narrative is subjected to an anterior 
jump-cut to some months prior to the abduction, introducing us to Raymond Lemorne 
(Bernard-Pierre Donnadieu), a bizarre middle-aged family man who experiments with kidnap 
techniques including deception and chloroform at an empty second home in the country. 
Having introduced Raymond, the film jump-cuts forward three years to a point after Saskia’s 
abduction, where Rex has become obsessed with finding out his lost love’s fate. It is an 
obsession that begins to fascinate Raymond, and what soon follows is a cat-and-mouse tale as 
both men become involved in one another’s obsessive behaviour: Rex wants to know what 
happened to Saskia, and Raymond wants to know what drives Rex’s obsession to know. The   116
climactic and shocking conclusion has since garnered its cult status among fans and critics 
alike. Having revealed himself to Rex as Saskia’s kidnapper, Raymond reveals that he will 
never tell Rex the truth behind her disappearance, but must show him; thus Rex must go 
through the exact same experience as Saskia. In the final scene, after knowingly and willingly 
drinking a coffee laced with tranquilisers at the scene of Saskia’s disappearance, Rex awakens 
in the dark to the sound of earth pounding wood. The noise becomes less and less audible 
until finally there is only silence. Then, with his lighter, Rex lets out a blood-curdling scream 
as he discovers he has been buried alive, greeted with one final vision of Saskia. The film 
ends with Raymond staring at nothing, and a newspaper headline which documents the 
vanishing of the man searching for his vanished girlfriend. 
  After rewrites by Todd Graff, the remake changed, despite following largely the same 
plot: the location shifted to America, Rex became ‘Jeff’ (Keifer Sutherland), Saskia became 
‘Diane’ (Sandra Bullock), Raymond became ‘Barney’ (Jeff Bridges), and the timeline became 
linear (thus no jump cuts). The biggest difference, and the sticking point of this analysis, is 
the fact that The Vanishing speeds up the pace of the original plot and adds a fourth act, a 
‘happy ending’ in which Jeff is rescued from his earthy prison by his new girlfriend, Rita 
(Nancy Travis), in a significantly extended role. The film ends with Jeff killing Barney and 
strolling off into the proverbial sunset with his new girlfriend. While the film did modestly 
well at the box-office, it was a critical disaster, failing to match the original in either depth or 
substance. Nonetheless, many living-burial films emerged thereafter in Hollywood, and while 
The Vanishing cannot be directly linked to these as an undisputed influence, it seems clear 
that these two films resonated with their American audiences.
*   
  Where do we begin with an analysis of such a remake, which adds the complication 
of national difference into the remake equation? Higson argues that we should begin by 
comparing, as I have begun above, the similarities and differences between the two versions, 
a process of description. While I think that this approach is better than that of prescription 
(stating what a national cinema should be like), I think there are better ways of approaching 
the text in and of itself. Let us start instead then with the remaking inherent to any film 
prepared for foreign audiences, that is, with the translation of the film’s Dutch title, for it is a 
well-known motto that poetry is ‘lost’ in translation.  
  Much can be learned from the differences between the translations of titles, and the 
translation of ‘Spoorloos’ is exemplary in unearthing key cultural differences. A quick 
analysis of the Dutch title, for instance, reveals much as regards the repetitions that go on 
                                                 
* Besides The Vanishing, here is a list of Hollywood’s own ‘living burial’ films: Damien: Omen II 
(1978), Buried Alive (1990), Don’t Say A Word (2001), Kill Bill: Vol. 2 (2004), The Descent (2005), 
Captivity (2007), Buried Alive (2007), and Buried (2010). Also, see the following for Spoorloos-style 
theme of kidnap: Where Truth Lies (1996), Ransom (1996), Breakdown (1997), Oldboy (2004), Se7en 
(1995), and Hostel (2005).   117
even before remaking begins. The Dutch word ‘spoorloos’ has meaning beyond its Anglo-
American translation here as ‘the vanishing’, which connotes little of the ambiguities present 
in this delightful term. ‘The vanishing’ is suggestive of an ongoing event, an uncertain past 
tied to a very specific place, bound as it is by the definite article. The Dutch ‘spoorloos’ 
however, means ‘vanished (without a trace)’, which suggests the opposite, namely an event 
that belongs to another space but rooted to a specific (past) moment. The Dutch title questions 
whether the ‘thing’ that vanished (without a trace) was ever fully there in the first place, 
whether it is always-already a vanished object, and what such an indeterminate ‘place’ would 
resemble. The lack of any specific historicity in the Dutch meaning reinforces it as an ‘event’ 
(in time), though spatially detached, a ‘no-where’ or ‘everywhere’, taking place ‘back then’. 
In contrast, the Anglo-American title (reused for the remake) reinforces the place as being 
specifically ‘there’ but taking place ‘no-when’, or ‘always’.  
  Which of these titles best sums up this “thriller about knowledge”, to recall Ebert? 
The Deleuzian and psychoanalytic answer is, of course: both are best. For the full meaning of 
the ‘event’, we must look at the traversal of these two moments, the shifting of grammatical 
accidence from the Dutch title to the Anglo-American one. We must not forget the importance 
of the feminine subject here, for it is always a woman who is vanishing or vanished. Kathy 
Acker provides the link between the vanished/vanishing woman and death when she writes 
that “if a woman insists she can and does love and her living isn’t loveless or dead, she dies. 
So either a woman is dead or she dies” (1986:33). This statement not only fully recognises the 
contingent nature of the vanished/vanishing woman’s status, but also illustrates that this death 
has to do with love and its repetitions (which takes us back to Žižek and Deleuze’s figure of 
the neighbour). The accidence here between being vanished and always vanishing is 
consistent with the accidence between being dead and always dying (to bring back the 
zombie). Therefore, all that is missing from the Anglo-American translation is the self-
reflexive rhetorical question mark, as in, ‘The Vanishing?’, since this title is always 
questioning, just like its protagonist: is the woman vanishing/dying or is she vanished/dead?  
  The differentiation in Spoorloos’s title does not stop here. If the Dutch original title 
represents a moment locked into a past that cannot contain it, but spatially tangential, the 
Anglo-American translation vice-versa, and both linked explicitly to the marginality of a 
feminine experience of death, then the French title inverts everything (including the gender). 
When translated into French, the translators took a little liberty with the original title, thus the 
vanishing/ed became L’homme qui voulait savoir (The Man Who Wanted to Know). The 
French title solves the deadlock between the Dutch and Anglo-American titles using the same 
method with which we untie a Borromean knot: that is, it cannot be simply untied but must be 
cut (recalling Hitchcock’s legendary ‘cure’ for a sore throat…). Lacan acknowledges 
something similar apropos of Freudian love that “psychoanalysis alone recognizes this knot   118
of imaginary servitude that love must always undo again, or sever” (2003:8). In the French 
title, we get an effect of severance in the shift of focus from the desired object onto the 
desiring subject. Is this not the ultimate experience of love in a Lacanian sense; that is, of a 
male subject who must go to his desire, the object of his love, and identify with it (even if that 
means being buried alive or having his throat cut)?  
  Another link can be established in this growing chain of titles, for does the French 
title not recall Alfred Hitchcock’s own auto-remake, The Man Who Knew Too Much (1934 
and 1956)? Not only does The Man Who Wanted to Know invert Hitchcock’s title, but the 
original British version of The Man Who Knew Too Much also featured a young girl who was 
abducted, described as being “In a little hole in the ground somewhere” by her captor (Peter 
Lorre). That the kidnapped girl became a kidnapped boy in the 1956 remake also points 
towards the shift in gender implicit in this interlocking of fantasies. In a sense, while these 
titles designate a single film, they are remaking its subjective focus at each remove.
* Already, 
national cinemas are being defined even before Hollywood purchased the remake rights: 
while both the Dutch and French titles connote an event in the past that must be understood 
(Who vanished without a trace?; Which man wants to know?), they mark a shift in 
perspective drawn across gender lines; the Anglo-American experience of the film, by 
contrast, typically cannot deal with its grief, and so shifts the event, rather than the subject, of 
the experience. Knowledge links each of the films in this chain, to which we should add the 
Coen brothers’ The Man Who Wasn’t There (2001), which takes an entirely different stance in 
which nobody wants to know (hence the protagonist is excluded from the social order, 
escaping punishment for a crime he committed and confesses to, but eventually being 
executed for a crime of which he is innocent). Knowledge is clearly a dangerous commodity 
in the wrong hands. The Man Who Knew Too Much featured the tagline, “A little knowledge 
can be a deadly thing!”, something that was proven in Hitchcock’s Rear Window when the 
hero, Jeff (James Stewart), asked his girlfriend Lisa (Grace Kelly): “Why would Thorwald 
want to kill a little dog?” Lisa replies: “Because it knew too much”. Even a little dog, it 
seems, can know too much, and a remake always ‘knows’ more than it ‘thinks’.  
  It is in the French title of Spoorloos that we get the most pronounced shift from the 
Dutch to the Anglo-American title, in much the same way that it is through the crucial phase 
“I am being beaten by my father” that we get the shift from “A child is being beaten” to “My 
father is beating a child (whom I hate)” in Freud’s beating-phantasy. Suddenly, the 
protagonist of the phantasy becomes the object, rather than subject, of the event, where before 
s/he was either the subject of the gaze (Dutch title) or excluded entirely (Anglo-American 
title). This is the ultimate lesson learned by Rex at the end of Spoorloos: that it is not Saskia’s 
                                                 
* As a side note, there is much to be said of the subtitles constructing their own versions also; consider 
the fact that every version of Spoorloos contains some subtitling, whether French, Dutch, or English.     119
fate with which he should be concerned, but the precariousness of his own fate in the face of 
such a phantasmatic framework, evoking the sense of “Be careful what you wish for”, or 
Jenny Holzer’s famous dictum, “Protect me from what I want”.  
  This differentiation in remade titles provides our first link to the ghost in the remake, 
for where the Psycho remake behaves like a zombie – looking and sounding the same but 
behaving ‘differently’ – these ‘versions’ of Spoorloos behave like ghosts of one another – 
they are exactly the same as the original version, yet speak from different subject-positions. 
We will see how language plays a part in this shift later, but for now, consider how Freud’s 
essay on ‘The Uncanny’, a notoriously ambiguous text itself, varies depending on which 
translation one is reading. For instance, John Fletcher points to the insufficiency of the 
translation of the Germen idiom “es spukt” into the English “it spooks”. Instead, Fletcher 
argues that this simple translation ignores the added dimension of the thing itself ‘spooking’, 
and gives Derrida’s example of the two senses of “there are ghosts which haunt a house”. On 
the one hand, “ghosts spook the house”, and on the other hand “the house itself ‘spooks’” 
(Fletcher, 1996:33). Have we not also determined a sense in which there are ghosts which 
spook remakes, such as Van Sant’s ‘queered’ Psycho, and remakes themselves which ‘spook’, 
as with Spoorloos? Derrida writes that “when the very first perception of an image is linked to 
a structure of reproduction, then we are dealing with the realm of phantoms” (cited in 
Fletcher, 1996:33). The key to unlocking the remaking of Spoorloos to ask the following 
question: where else do we get a dialectical shift in subject-position, the desire for knowledge, 
and a ‘spooking’?  
  The answer is the psychoanalytic process itself. For Lacan, a successful analysis 
requires the process of the transference, something he lists as one of the four fundamental 
concepts of psychoanalysis. For a successful transference, the analyst must be designated as 
holding all the answers, such that he or she must become what Lacan called a ‘subject-
supposed-to-know’ (sujet supposé savoir). This knowledge is, for the patient, the key to 
his/her recovery, the solution to their problem, and so the counterpart of the subject-supposed-
to-know is the ‘subject-supposed-to-believe’, who is of course the analysand him or herself, 
the one for whom this knowledge is of utmost importance. However, Lacan warns us against 
trusting the knowledge of this subject-supposed-to-know when he writes that “those in the 
know are in error” (“Les non-dupes errent”), and that “there’s no such thing as a knowing 
subject” (Lacan, 1999:126). What does he mean here – how can the analyst be in error if s/he 
holds the key to unlocking the patient’s symptoms? Quite simply, the analyst actually knows 
nothing; he or she is merely the instrument through which the patient must enter a fiction of 
reciprocity, where eventually s/he will come to assume the traumatic kernel of their 
unconscious being, the ‘knowledge that does not know itself’. It is for this reason that Stuart 
Schneiderman suggests the alternative English translation of the term as “‘supposed subject of   120
knowledge’” (1980:vii) on the grounds that it is the subject, as well as the knowledge, which 
is supposed. If the analysand refuses to allow him/herself to get caught up in the symbolic 
fiction which structures his/her world, then they miss the reality in fetishistic disavowal.  
  I am reminded here of Žižek’s reading of Clarice Starling (Jodie Foster) as the 
‘analysand’ to Hannibal Lecter (Anthony Hopkins)’s ‘analyst’ in Jonathan Demme’s The 
Silence of the Lambs (1991). Why is it, Žižek asks, that Hannibal is the most frightening 
figure in the film despite being largely locked up in a maximum security prison, when another 
vicious killer, Buffalo Bill (Ted Levine), is on the loose and has a victim? In fact, despite his 
escape being the crux of the movie, once free Lecter simply vanishes from the diegesis, 
almost forgotten, until the final scene. For Žižek, Hannibal is terrifying because his 
cannibalism represents the “Idea of the analyst”, not in the physical sense of eating the flesh 
of his victims, but in relation to Clarice herself, of eating her desire. Consider Hannibal’s 
proposition to Clarice for information on Buffalo Bill: “If I help you, Clarice, it will be ‘turns’ 
with us too. Quid pro quo: I tell you things, you tell me things. Not about this case, though; 
about yourself. Quid pro quo – Yes or no?” What Hannibal wants is to get to the inner core of 
Starling’s desire, her inner being, what Heidegger referred to as a subject’s Dasein (being-
there). Therefore, as Žižek notes, Hannibal’s proposition to Clarice is: “‘I’ll help you if you 
let me eat your Dasein!’” (2002b:263), which is exactly what happens when she tells him of 
her childhood memories of the spring lambs screaming while being slaughtered. However, 
despite maliciously toying with Clarice in this scene, Žižek writes that “Lecter is not cruel 
enough to be a Lacanian analyst: in psychoanalysis we must pay the analyst to allow us to 
offer our Dasein on a plate…” (2002b:263). 
  The relationship between Raymond and Rex seems to be that of the analyst and 
analysand in Spoorloos also. Once again, the French version’s promotional materials are 
telling. Firstly, we have the French poster (below), from which Rex is absent and Raymond’s 
calculating head, half in light and half in shadow, dominates. This poster seems to indicate the 
supposed knowledge of the evil analyst with its depiction of Saskia being subdued by a 
demonic hand that seemingly ‘grows’ out of Raymond’s head.  
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Fig. 3.1: French poster for The Man Who Wanted to Know 
 
Secondly, we have the French trailer, which also seems to confirm this reading of Raymond 
as the master-analyst, for he dominates the trailer also, and even seems to break the fourth-
wall just as a voice-over asks: “What if the man who wanted to know… were you?”, 
suggesting Raymond as a cannibal analyst hungry for Dasein. In fact, we should risk asserting 
that only a cinematic analyst could break the fourth-wall, as Hannibal Lecter does in the scene 
when Clarice first meets him. Actor Anthony Hopkins reportedly suggested the brief 
transgression to director Demme in order to portray Lecter as “knowing everything”, like the 
Framptonian filmind.  
  However, despite this evidence, I must insist that Raymond is not a Lacanian analyst, 
nor Rex his patient. The relationship is simply different, and here is why. Simply put, I think 
we should read these French promotional materials differently, for while they seem to build 
on Raymond as a figure of pure knowledge and in complete control, our experience of the 
film paints a different picture. Firstly, Raymond dominates the poster art and trailer because, 
in France, Bernard-Pierre Donnadieu was a star, while Dutch actor Gene Bervoets, who plays 
Rex, was virtually unknown. Secondly, what if we read the line “What if the man who wanted 
to know… were you?” and Raymond’s breaking of the fourth wall alongside the final scene 
of the film, where he stares blankly into space? Suddenly, the entire scenario of the French 
trailer shifts: Raymond is no longer the subject-supposed-to-know in possession of the 
ultimate knowledge, but the inquiring subject-supposed-to-believe. He is the subject of the   122
knowledge – the voice-over is asking him. Take as an example, a great scene from the remake 
which unconsciously acknowledges this shift in perspective, when Barney tells Jeff: “Your 
obsession is my weapon […] you don’t care anymore if she’s alive or dead you’re just afraid 
that without the search you won’t know who you are […] Who is Jeff Harriman if he’s not the 
guy looking for Diane?” The question we should ask is: Who is Barney Cousins/Raymond 
Lemorne if he is not the guy who knows where Diane/Saskia is? Another perceptive addition 
to the remake is Barney’s motivation to seek out Jeff: in the original, Raymond approaches 
Rex because his obsession has consumed him entirely, whereas in the remake Barney 
approaches Jeff because his obsession has waned, which we see in the scene where Barney is 
frustrated that no new ‘missing’ posters have been pasted on the walls in the city.  
  In a sense, when Rex asks Raymond: “What have you done to Saskia?”, what he is 
really asking is: “Can you do it to me as well?!”, so that he can finally know the truth. 
However, Raymond is in a similar position, as more analysis of the films’ dialogue proves. 
When Rex asks Raymond why he kidnapped Saskia, Raymond tells him that he decided to do 
so after he saved a little girl from drowning in front of his daughter, who lauded him as a 
hero. Raymond, however, saw himself differently: “My daughter was bursting with pride. But 
I thought that her admiration wasn’t worth anything unless I could prove myself absolutely 
incapable of doing anything evil”: absolutely incapable of doing evil. In the Hollywood 
remake, Barney’s reasoning shifts slightly: 
 
In that moment she thought that I was a god. That would make most people feel great, but 
instead I suddenly panicked […] Saving a person’s life may have made me a hero but did it 
make me a good person? I had to prove to myself, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that I was as 
capable of evil as I was of heroism. Real evil: the worst thing that I could imagine, otherwise I 
would not deserve my daughter’s love (emphasis added). 
 
While Raymond has to prove himself incapable of doing evil, Barney has to prove himself 
capable of doing evil. What a change in logic! When we add to this that Raymond and Barney 
both reveal that they are claustrophobic, we soon begin to realise that being buried alive is 
their “worst thing” imaginable (“For me, to kill is not the worst thing that I could imagine”). 
However, while Barney succeeds in proving himself capable of evil, it is important to note 
that Raymond’s success in burying Saskia and Rex alive results in a critical failure. 
  Raymond’s logic is similar to Freud’s observations on his patient the ‘Rat-Man’, a 
patient whose neurotic contrivances were expressions of a basic ‘master question’: “Am I a 
great man or a great criminal?” (Lear, 2005:229n). This master-question was all-consuming 
for him, transforming even the most basic of deeds into a guilty act following the same 
pattern: “Should I feel guilty? But it wasn’t my fault! Maybe it was? What a bad person I   123
am!” The difference of course is that Raymond is aware of the “slight abnormality” in his 
personality as he tells Rex: “You can find me listed in the medical encyclopedias under 
‘Sociopath’ in the new editions”, even acknowledging the contemporaneity of such a 
description. Barney, however, reverses the Rat-Man’s logic: “Do I deserve my daughter’s 
admiration? But it was my fault that I have committed these terrible acts! Maybe it wasn’t (it 
is pre-destined)? What a good person I am!” My point is that Raymond is articulating his own 
patient-discourse here, and he is thus a möbius mirror double of the Rat-Man’s neurotic 
subject-supposed-to-believe, a patient working out his own hysterical symptoms. Barney, on 
the other hand, is on a different plane altogether, one where evil is for-itself a predisposition, 
once more proving the thesis that American cinema is populated by black-and-white, good-
versus-evil. It is here that we should read the difference between the films and their relation to 
knowledge in the titles: Spoorloos marks the shift from the Dutch to the French title, since 
Rex goes through the möbius traversal of a living nightmare into bliss and reconciliation with 
Saskia in death (the transference of a man who now ‘knows’ his own fate), while Raymond 
fails and still does not know; the remake however, always remains trapped in the ongoing 
‘vanishing’ of the Anglo-American title. No ‘man’ ever knows in this version, and Diane 
remains nothing but a mound of earth signifying a failed transference.  
  Either way, Raymond is still a strange analyst figure. While Rex ends the film in 
blissful reconciliation, Raymond sits alone staring into an empty space. In one of the better 
plot points of the final act in the remake, Barney is forced to drink his own drug laced coffee 
by Rita (Jeff’s girlfriend), who claims to be holding his daughter hostage, telling him: “If you 
wanna know what happened to her, you’re gonna have to go through exactly what she did: 
drink”. Perhaps the ultimate American remake would have been to conclude with Barney 
waking up, buried alive in his own “worst thing imaginable”. If, after all, we approach this 
knowledge of the real we are in a precarious situation, in danger of our very ontological 
consistency dissolving into nothing. Fletcher argues that the concept of the Derridean 
phantom invokes “a bewildering range of local or regional relations: the relation to the dead 
and to the past; to the stranger or the foreigner as other; to the future and the unborn” 
(1996:33). Is this not what we mean when we say that the trans-national remake itself 
‘spooks’ like a haunted house? To bring about a transference, we must traverse the fantasy, 
and in the final scene of the original, Raymond only succeeds in becoming the Rat-Man. One 
cannot help but think that the only way he could face his own unconscious fears would be to 
freely choose to drink his own drug laced coffee and bury himself alive; only then would he 
truly know the extent of his own evil… 
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Doesn’t everybody like a good happy ending? Choosing between ‘Americanisation’ or 
alienation (or, Le père ou pire) 
 
Steven Jay Schneider complains that the reception of The Vanishing depended to a large 
extent on whether the original had been previously seen, such that 
 
for those who did see Spoorloos first, its US remake ranges from a pale imitation, too painful 
to sit through, to an embodiment of everything that is wrong with Hollywood’s appropriation 
and assimilation of foreign films and worldviews (2007:8).
* 
 
This assimilation of films and worldviews has been described by many remake theorists as 
‘Americanisation’, or as Marcus Harney describes it, “Disneylandisation” (2002:74). Harney 
also speaks of the process of Americanisation in trans-national remaking as mise-en-état 
(‘putting into the state’), where an original must be resituated before it can be consumed by 
American audiences (the homophony with “Putting into the States” seems appropriate).  The 
obvious aspect of mise-en-état is the elimination of subtitles, which Durham notes to be 
supposedly loathed in Anglo-American audiences (second only to dubbing). Durham also 
points out that Europeans (specifically French) and Americans define the term ‘translation’ 
differently: where Europeans think of translating a foreign text into the mother tongue, the 
Anglo-American sense is of translating a foreign text from another language (1998:5). 
  Leitch however, argues that mise-en-état goes much further than simply translating a 
text from another language. He writes that the strategy of separating an original from its 
ancestry is reinforced by a “colonisation” that insists on  
 
textualising not only the predecessor films but the foreign culture itself, which is divided 
along textual lines into a positive culture to be acknowledged as romantic, exotic, dangerously 
unregulated, and a negative culture to be repudiated as uncompromising, difficult, and 
ultimately unresponsive to the demands of American consumers (Leitch, 2002:57). 
 
Michael Brashinsky sees this process in a positive light, stating that “as a postmodern artist 
has no other way to ‘interview’ reality but through an interpreter of another culture, it is hard 
to imagine a remake made within the same cultural tier as the original” (1998:169). Is this not 
a globalisation twist on Umberto Eco’s postmodern problem of the man who can no longer 
simply say “I love you madly” in an age of lost innocence? 
                                                 
* However, for those American audiences who did not see Spoorloos first, its US remake was found to 
be an “above average” thriller, grossing over $14.5 million at the US box office…    125
  We can already see two very distinct attitudes towards ‘making’ films in Europe, and 
‘remaking’ those films in Hollywood, but what of European ‘remakes’; do these attitudes 
extend to the remaking of its own cinematic history, or indeed of American originals? It 
seems not – in fact, Werner Herzog even went so far as to claim that his Nosferatu the 
Vampyre (1979) was not a remake of Murnau’s Nosferatu (1922) “In the American sense of 
the word” (cited in Millet, 1999:97). His statement prompted Raphaël Millet to sarcastically 
wonder what the ‘European sense’ of the word ‘remaking’ might be. Millet – a European 
critic – considers Herzog’s film to be not only a remake, but a “‘step by step, shot for shot 
remake of Murnau’s Nosferatu’, in the American sense of the word” (1999:97). Herzog’s 
view is astonishing given the degree to which he appropriates Murnau’s original film, and yet 
there is some sense that by virtue of the very fact that he is remaking a European film in 
Europe that this is not a remake ‘a l’Américane’; in some ways he is right. Herzog perceives 
the ‘American sense’ of remaking as a purely commercialist exploitation of the original 
lacking its own artistic integrity, but this is not to say that a remake in the ‘American sense’ is 
only concerned with the box-office, nor that it cannot be artistic. I think Herzog’s statement 
about his remake of Murnau’s classic is further complicated when we consider E. Elias 
Merhige’s Shadow of the Vampire (2000), which fictionally documents the making of 
Murnau’s original Nosferatu with the “What if…” premise that the reason Max Schreck 
(Willem Dafoe) was so convincing as Graf Orlok in the classic German horror is because he 
actually was a vampire. Of course, while Murnau (John Malkovich) is in on it, he soon finds 
handling the star of his film becomes somewhat more difficult than he imagined…  
  If Merhige’s Shadow of the Vampire is to be excluded from the “American sense” of 
remaking due to its complex meld of remaking, homage, and original horror fantasy, should 
we not also discount Gus Van Sant’s Psycho as an “American” remake on the same grounds? 
If so, is there not a sense that it is only the trans-national remake that constitutes the 
“American sense” of remaking (and only in the direction of Europe-America, never America-
Europe)? Producers of the Hollywood remake of Les Diaboliques argued something similar to 
Herzog when they claimed that “Americans have never seen the film with Signoret in it [Les 
Diaboliques]; therefore we are not making a remake” (Forestier, cited in Durham, 1998:180); 
clearly, there is some confusion not only between original and remake but between 
production and reception also.
* Perhaps we should consider remakes in the “American sense” 
then for as Andrew Higson reminds us, national cinema should not be defined by its place of 
production, nor should it be prescriptive in its distinction. Higson suggests that we should 
                                                 
* Les Diaboliques has been remade at least three times, mostly for television, in Reflections of Murder 
(John Badham, USA, 1974, TV), House of Secrets (Mimi Leder, USA, 1993, TV), and most 
notoriously for the cinema in Diabolique (Jeremiah S. Chechik, USA, 1996).   126
analyse each example and consider them separately; but by what criteria, and against what 
model? 
  Forrest and Koos argue that the success or failure of the Hollywood remake of the 
foreign original is dependent on the translatability of the original theme when it becomes 
‘Americanised’. They argue that Sommersby (1993), the remake of The Return of Martin 
Guerre (Le retour de Martin Guerre, 1982), failed because its distinctly French theme of the 
‘unknowable individual’ did not map onto the “recognizable [American] thematic paradigm 
of the Western’s loner” (Forrest & Koos, 2002:7). On the other hand, the aforementioned 3 
Men and a Baby successfully translated the theme of paternal nightmare in 3 hommes et un 
couffin, not by altering the theme but by simply amplifying it. For instance, in the scene from 
the original where looking after the baby causes one of the men to miss an important meeting, 
the same scene in the remake results in the loss of a multi-million dollar contract. It seems 
that the ‘American sense’ of remaking operates under the motto: bigger is better (an ideology 
exemplified by another US export – McDonalds and “supersizing”). The other type of 
successful foreign language remake occurs when the European original is already 
‘Americanised’, containing an American theme from the outset, or what Genette Vincendeau 
calls an “international generic code” (1993:25). One example includes Point of No Return 
(1993), a remake of Nikita (1990), and even this needed some mise-en-état. It is not hard to 
see how Spoorloos has been ‘Americanised’ in The Vanishing. Schneider points out that there 
are three main changes that Hollywood remakes make to an original in order to achieve the 
necessary mise-en-état to sell it to domestic audiences: (1) change the ending; (2) change the 
setting; and (3) change the language (2007: 7). I will come to the change of ending last, so let 
us first focus on the change of setting and language.  
  The film was shot mostly in Seattle, which as Schneider observes, removed any doubt 
for the audience as to where they were: 
 
In the opening scene, Jeff and Diane drive near Mt. Saint Helens; Jeff kicks around a 
hackeysack while waiting for Diane at the gas station, which is located next to a Dairy Queen; 
Jeff’s car keys are attached to a Bullwinkle Moose keychain; etc. (2007:7). 
 
Schneider notes that the effect of the film’s setting, along with its English dialogue, is to 
domesticate the text and eradicate any alienation on behalf of the viewer. However, while on 
the surface this seems somewhat tautological, it betrays the fact that alienation is fundamental 
to the original: the film is set in France and Amsterdam, plus it features three different 
languages (Dutch, French and English) and is thus always subtitled for monolingual 
audiences. Just as the remake removes any doubt for the audience as to its American setting, 
so too does the original remove any doubt for its native Dutch audiences as to its French   127
setting: road signs are continually pointed out, Rex and Saskia are the only two speaking 
Dutch, and coverage of the Tour de France can be heard throughout the opening scenes on 
the radio. For Anglo-American audiences, these differences might be reduced to the common 
observation: “Well it’s all foreign to me”, but there is a huge distinction here between French 
and Dutch culture. If one needs any more evidence, observe that while Spoorloos was 
nominated for an Oscar in the ‘Best Foreign Language Film’ category, it was promptly 
removed from the list on the technicality that the film from the Netherlands had more French 
dialogue in it than Dutch (50.1 against 49.9%). A deflated Sluizer remarked that “We were 
eliminated, or should I say we vanished from America, for the moment” (2003). So while the 
remake worked hard to remove all traces of alienation from the text during the cross-over 
from Europe to America, it seemed to forget that the original contains alienation at its very 
heart, something most of the (Anglo-American) criticism seems to have forgotten or ignored 
also.  
  Alienation in Spoorloos is not even restricted just to its mise-en-scène and dialogue; 
specific plot points revolve around the culture clash also. In one scene Raymond is shown 
desperately trying to learn English to widen his net of potential victims, and when he 
eventually meets Saskia she insists on testing her limited French on him (the irony of course 
being that if she spoke no French at all she would not have become his victim). At another 
point in the film, Rex curses in Dutch and Raymond asks him to translate, admitting: “Ah, 
yes, we’re not big on languages in France. It’s difficult”. He admires Rex’s French 
pronunciation, and remarks that “It makes this easier”. Sluizer could almost be accused of 
being a Francophobe given the murderer is a (famous) Frenchman, and the French language 
not only makes Raymond’s life ‘easier’ and co-opts Saskia into his chloroforming grip (recall 
the French poster), but eliminated the film from the Oscars. Even the French title seems to 
describe the film better than the Dutch one… 
  Another scene that stands out in the original is the one following Rex and Raymond’s 
first meeting in Amsterdam, whereupon they drive back to France. Just as the film seems to 
be veering towards a climactic conclusion, in the middle of everything Rex turns to Raymond 
and asks: “Can we take a break?” As Rex and Raymond stretch their legs from the long 
journey, the plot does likewise, and a fascinating ten-minute scene of trivial dialogue between 
the two rivals ensues. Initially, the scene is quite tense, but Raymond soon disarms Rex when 
he playfully banters about the meaning of Dutch names, asking him if he is familiar with the 
Dutch Tour de France rider, “Zoltemèque”. “Know him?” queries Raymond, adding that it 
“doesn’t sound Dutch. Sounds more like a Mexican god”. Rex, however, is quick to correct 
him: “It’s Zoetemelk. Zoe-te-melk. Couldn’t be more Dutch.” While some critics might 
accuse this long discussion in the middle of the drama as an unnecessary break, one which 
slows the pace of the film, I could not disagree more. In the same way that the thesis of   128
transgression in Psycho is contained in the ten-minute break where Norman cleans the bloody 
bathroom, so too is the thesis of alienation in Spoorloos contained in Rex and Raymond’s 
‘rest break’. At the heart of this film is the post-ideological thesis that in a globalised 
community, one is forever locked in-between two (or more) cultures, and it is a thesis that the 
remake disavows. Perhaps this is what Julia Kristeva meant when she said that “a person in 
the 20
th century can exist honestly only as a foreigner” (cited in Corrigan, 1991:80). The 
film’s Dutch audiences exist as foreigners in its Parisian location, majority French dialogue, 
and French star, Donnadieu; the film’s French audiences exist as foreigners in its Dutch 
protagonist, dialogue, and story origins.  
  We must, however, resist the conclusion that the remake made a mistake in redacting 
this alienation effect. Durham is right to reject the standard notion that regards Hollywood 
remakes as mindless assimilations intent on making nothing but money. She writes that 
Hollywood remakes are “attracted to foreign films precisely to the extent that they resist 
foreignness and represent concerns and interests fully consistent with the cultural climate of 
the United States” (Durham, 1998:200). It is not simply the sense that (what the remake 
producers took to be) the translation of something foreign into something familiar betrays the 
fact that it was foreign even to the ‘foreigners’, nor is it even the sense that they missed the 
distinction between different types of ‘foreignness’ in the foreign; rather, it goes back to 
Durham’s point about Europeans regarding foreign adaptation as bringing an alien text into 
the mother tongue and the Anglo-American sense of receiving an alien text from another 
language. The former implies a historicism based on the immutability of European 
(particularly French) culture, a culture so rigid in its historicity that it is wary of any attempts 
to adapt it. The latter, by contrast, implies from the outset a sense of the émigré, of a ‘crucible 
culture’ in its infancy constructed from the discourses of innumerable immigrants. Does not 
Lacan conclude something similar when he states that “whatever, in repetition, is varied, 
modulated, is merely alienation of its meaning” (1998:61)? Lacan and Deleuze are at their 
most resonant here, for Deleuze writes that “the cinema author finds himself before a people 
which, from the points of view of culture, is doubly colonized: colonized by stories that have 
come from elsewhere, but also by their own myths become impersonal entities at the service 
of the colonizer” (2009c:213). In every sense then, it is in the notion of colonisation that we 
see the most radical diversity constituted via the very mythmaking procedures inherent to any 
culture attempting to articulate a history for itself barely 200 years old. 
  Perhaps the horror of Spoorloos is to be located in the perversion of the French 
language and its culture, which the film registers with a beautifully delicate touch in the 
‘Dutch-ness’ of its approach. Quite simply, the American version need only allude to this 
difference in several near-imperceptible moments. One such moment of differentiation 
between the original and remake can be seen in the moment when Raymond deceives Saskia   129
into believing that he is a salesman by opening a box of wall tiles he says contains key-chains. 
Saskia assumes that the word “Tiles” on the side of the box is a French word for “Key-chain”, 
and gets in to his car, believing the ruse. When this scene is replicated in the remake, the same 
situation occurs, except this time Barney tells Diane that the product is French itself, and that 
the name is French also. Diane then asks for “Un tile infinité, please!” in a French accent, the 
pun of course, being that it sounds as if she has said “Until infinity!”, or “To infinity (and 
beyond?)”! Another touch of the foreign in The Vanishing remake can be seen in Jeff 
Bridges’s decision (if his) to give Barney a vaguely European accent despite being American 
(according to his birth certificate, he was born in Seattle). On the one hand, the foreign accent 
cements him as the archetypal villain (are not all villains foreign in American popular 
culture?), but on the other hand, there is a sense that Barney is all-American, and his accent is 
the trace of difference left over from the lost thesis of the original. 
  Having discussed the change of setting and change of language, let us now consider 
the happy ending: is this an affect of remake alienation also? Roger Ebert writes that “the 
ending of the original ‘Vanishing’ is of a piece with the rest of the film. It is organically 
necessary to it. No other ending will do. That is why this Hollywood remake is so obscene” 
(1993). Sluizer is unambiguous about the reason for the change in ending, and attributes it to 
“a change of power at Fox” where “the deal I had originally made when I reshot the remake 
was not kept. So the problems were more high level power games than a change of opinion 
about the end of the movie” (2003). Ultimately, Sluizer states that the American producers 
felt that since “redemption [is] important in America” the “villain should be punished” 
(2003). Thomas Leitch considers The Vanishing’s happy ending in two ways: on the one 
hand, it “corrects the error that made the earlier film so bleak and unsettling by providing a 
happy ending for American audiences”, and on the other, it presents “Kiefer Sutherland, a star 
in whose welfare they [American audiences] could be expected to have a residual investment” 
(2002:57).
* Ebert and Leitch are both right and wrong here: Ebert is right to regard the 
original ending as “organically necessary”, but wrong to regard the remake’s ending as 
“obscene”, and Leitch is right to assert that as redemption is important in America, the 
“villain should be punished”, but is wrong to suggest that this “corrects the error” of the 
original. If we combine their arguments we get the correct rendering: while the original 
ending was organically necessary to the European text, redemption is important in America, 
so the villain should be punished in the remake. 
                                                 
* As a side note, neither actress playing the vanishing woman was known prior to making these films: 
despite finding fame after, Sandra Bullock had only television roles prior to The Vanishing, and for 
Johanna ter Steege, the role of Saskia was her debut.   130
  Forrest and Koos point out that Hollywood likes happy endings because American 
audiences tend to prefer the clear-cut, black-and-white narrative to the open and ambivalent 
(European) one. They suggest that this means that 
 
the remake functions as the ideal point of cultural comparison between the two cinemas with 
one intended ostensibly for the supposedly naïve, childlike American, the other for the ironic, 
adult European (Forrest & Koos, 2002:8). 
 
While Forrest and Koos identify this popular idea of American audiences as “naïve” and 
“childlike”, they are like many other remake theorists, uncertain as to whether they agree with 
it or not. Roger Ebert complains of the “insult” paid to American audiences, asking: “[Do] 
American producers believe the American movie audience is so witless it will not accept 
uncompromising fidelity to a story idea? Are Europeans deserving of smart, cynical 
filmmaking, but Americans have to be approached on a more elementary level” (1993)? In 
light of Andrew Higson’s suggestion that national cinemas should not be reduced to just the 
place of production, I tend to agree with Ebert, finding this view of American audiences not 
only insulting but oversimplified and reductive. As we will see, there is a clear indication that 
some American audiences at least are ready to leave the crèche (and have been for some 
time), and that perhaps the problem is to be located elsewhere, in something much more 
sinister. 
  When George Sluizer was asked in an interview to compare the original and remake 
of Spoorloos he replied that when it came to adapting the film for the American market the 
producers struggled most with the “concept of Eternity”, which, Sluizer said “we [Europeans] 
understand better than Americans” (2003). This constitutes a most crucial difference between 
the two versions, as Sluizer remarks: “As I sometimes joke: ‘You exchange things in 
America, everything is a bit of plastic and you can throw it away and take someone else. Like 
you get rid of your girlfriend and take another one’” (2003). We can reframe this using 
Lacan’s lesser known formula, “le père ou pire?”, inadequately rendered in English as “The 
father or worse”. “Le père ou pire?” marks the point at which a subject has to decide, 
ultimately, to join a community and give him/herself over to the symbolic law of the father, 
thus giving way to their desire, or, on the other hand, to repeat a previous choice as an ethical 
act, and exclude oneself from one’s community altogether. Since Lacan wrote that “the only 
thing one can be guilty of is giving ground relative to one’s desire” (1992:321), Žižek 
observes that this “forced choice is not between good and bad but between bad and worse” 
(2008c:87). 
  There are three choices in Spoorloos and The Vanishing which mirror the three 
‘times’ of the shower scene from the previous chapter. The first choice is the same in both   131
versions where, having run out of petrol in a dark tunnel, Rex/Jeff decides to leave 
Saskia/Diane in order to find some more. When he returns, she is distraught by the experience 
and makes him promise never to leave her again. The second choice is also the same in both 
versions and is an imaginary one: having confronted the possibility that he may never know 
her fate, Rex/Jeff admits to his new girlfriend that sometimes he imagines Saskia/Diane to be 
alive and happy somewhere far away, “and then, I have to make a choice: either I let her go 
on living and never know, or I let her die and find out what happened; so… I let her die.
* The 
third and final choice is where Lacan’s “le père ou pire?” comes into play. But what is this 
choice? If ‘le père’ (the father) designates the betrayal of one’s desire in accepting the 
symbolic law of the nom-du-père (the name-of-the-father), then ‘pire’ (worse) is the refusal 
of the symbolic and rejection of the terms of the original choice itself. Lacan uses the example 
of Antigone’s suicidal “No!” to King Creon after he demands that she choose between 
renouncing her betrayal of his order or be buried alive. Rather than submitting to his rule, she 
opts for worse, ‘pire’, and is buried alive, thus repeating the earlier forced choice (when she 
buried her dead brother against Creon’s order). Žižek points out that there are examples of 
figures in Hollywood of choosing pire and the ‘proper’ ethical act, noticeably in the final 
Russian roulette scene from The Deer Hunter (1978), in which a traumatised Vietnam 
prisoner-of-war, Nick (Christopher Walken), is forced to play Russian Roulette for his life 
and later plays again for money until he is killed playing the game. Žižek argues that Nick 
must continue to play the deadly game after escaping in order to ‘pay off’ his debt to death, 
such that in repeating an earlier choice he squares his guilt, whereas his friend, Michael 
(Robert De Niro), despite enduring the same ordeal, struggles to function after rejoining the 
community.
† 
  The key difference between the endings of Spoorloos and The Vanishing are 
contained in this image: Rex passes through the mirror to the other side, not to the abyss, but 
to Saskia and ‘eternality’; Jeff, on the other hand, stays on the side of the Law, accepting the 
patriarchal codes of Hollywood endings.
‡ Once again, this is illustrated by what we might call 
                                                 
*  These lines are repeated near-verbatim in the otherwise rather poor neo-noir, 8MM (1999), another 
film about a man who ‘wants to know’ the whereabouts of a vanished girl.  
 
† Examples in literature are to be found in William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice (1979) about a woman 
forced to choose between her two children, and Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, about a pair of lovers 
forced to choose between their families, the Montagues and the Capulets. In both cases, the choice of 
‘le père’ would have resulted in them giving way to their desire; however, both Sophie and the “star-
crossed lovers” choose ‘worse’/pire and commit suicide. 
 
‡ Marc Foster’s Stranger than Fiction (2006) provides the perfect narrative accompaniment to this 
fantasmatic ‘happy-ending-over-harsh-reality’ sensibility in Hollywood, where an author can either kill 
off the protagonist of her novel and confirm it as her magnum opus, but live with the consequence of 
killing a real man, or have a happy ending and save this man, but consign her masterpiece to the status 
of popular fiction; she chooses the latter and ruins her book and reputation.   132
the ‘French connection’, for Michel Chion (1992) has pointed out that it is no coincidence 
that there is congruence between the French words for ‘embodiment’ (mise-en-corps), 
‘coffining’ (mise-en-bière) and ‘burial’ (mise-en-terre). We can add to Chion’s triad our own 
English equivalents in ‘womb’, ‘tomb’, and ‘home’. Is there not a sense that, like Norman at 
the end of Psycho, Rex finds his heim, his home, in his tomb? The link to nationalism is 
provided by Benedict Anderson, who argues that the Unknown Soldier in an unmarked tomb 
is the most arresting emblem of modern society’s “imagined communities”. Anderson writes 
that the most perverse act of sacrilegious desecration would be to fill such a tomb with real 
bones, for these cenotaphs are “saturated with ghostly national imaginings” (1991:9). 
Anderson thus begins to consider “the cultural roots of nationalism with death” (1991:10), 
since one could not imagine a tomb of the ‘Unknown Marxist’, or a cenotaph for “fallen 
Liberals”. The Unknown Soldier always has a nationality, and as such, nationalism is 
inextricably bound to death. Perhaps we should propose the term ‘mise-en-abîme’ (‘placing 
into infinity/the abyss’) then, the commonplace meaning of which is the visual experience of 
being between two mirrors and seeing a chiastic replication of oneself reproduced into 
infinity. This is the image of the living dead, of the subject who chooses pire, the subject who 
excludes him or herself from his or her community. It is perhaps more difficult to imagine 
what Jeff, who chooses père, sees when he looks in the mirror. 
  But what kind of choice do Rex and Jeff actually have – is it any more of a choice 
than Saskia and Diane? The answer to this question lies in Lacan’s rethinking of the 
Highwayman’s phrase “Your money or your life!”, in which he reminds us that if one chooses 
money, one loses both, but if one chooses life, one must go on living without money, or as 
Lacan puts it “a life deprived of something” (1998:212). Where does alienation come in to 
this however, for one can surely live without money? It is here that Lacan offers the first 
rephrasing of the Highwayman’s challenge, one rethought in terms of Hegel’s notion about 
man’s entrance into slavery, bound up in the phrase: “Your freedom or your life!” Suddenly, 
this alienating dimension becomes clear: the slave can choose ‘freedom’, and immediately 
forfeit his or her life, losing both, or s/he can choose ‘life’ and continue living but with the 
sacrifice of freedom. Hegel’s point here is that in order to have anything at all, the slave must 
choose to give up his/her freedom, must choose slavery (père). Lacan calls this the “lethal 
factor” (1998:213), but it is not until he introduces the element of death into what becomes 
his final rephrasing of the Highwayman’s challenge that we get the familiar shift from one 
side to the other in the möbius band. Thus, with Lacan’s last notion, “[Your] freedom or 
death!”, the twist is that in choosing either proposition, we end up with both (pire). Take 
Lacan’s example of the freedom to die of hunger, where in choosing freedom, one dies; 
alternatively, one can “choose death, for there, you show that you have freedom of choice” 
(Lacan, 1998:213). It is clear that in the remake Jeff is faced with the choice between freedom   133
or life, whereas in the original, Rex is faced with the choice between freedom or death. So, 
Jeff goes on living without the knowledge he craves, whereas Rex dies and knows. Is Jeff not 
then the perfect example of a modern day cinematic slave? He cheats death but pays for it 
with the cost of his life, that is, his inner ethical being. Thus, we can now answer the question 
at the beginning of this paragraph quite simply and state that Rex is the only one who really 
ethically chooses at all, while Jeff is only faced with a false choice.  
  A quick comparison of the films’ mise-en-scène confirms that this difference runs 
throughout the versions, even from the very first choice. Compare, for example, the two 
images of the tunnel just preceding the first choice, where Saskia/Diane and Rex/Jeff run out 
of petrol in the tunnel. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2: Tunnel vision: Spoorloos and The Vanishing  
 
These images come from identical points in the narrative, however the image from Spoorloos 
is noticeable darker than the image from The Vanishing. In the latter, the head-lights, Jeff’s 
face in the rear-view mirror, and a light at the end of the tunnel are clearly visible. The mise-
en-scène is telling its own story here as regards the different markets each version is being 
aimed at, with the latter clearly reducing the tension of the scene while increasing the sense of 
this tunnel as a new space. Played side-by-side, the two scenes reveal more, for it is a mere 15 
seconds after entering the tunnel that Jeff and Diane run out of gas in The Vanishing, and both 
the entrance and exit of the tunnel are still clearly visible throughout. After a lorry nearly hits 
them, Jeff walks off and leaves Diane but behind him the tail-lights of the car can still be 
plainly seen. In the original however, Rex and Saskia are driving in the tunnel for almost a 
full minute before the car runs out of fuel, and during this time Saskia tells Rex of her dream 
of being trapped in the golden egg, floating through space, a story absent from the remake. 
Then, when the lorry nearly hits them, Saskia exclaims that this is the golden egg, that she is   134
living her dream.
* When Rex exits the tunnel having abandoned Saskia, it is pitch-black 
behind him. We should read this re-inflection of the scene as being exemplary of the deadlock 
between European and American notions of the abyss. The crucial shot is of Jeff looking in 
the rear-view mirror – what is it about the abyss of dark spaces that haunts American cinema 
so? The original cut of David Lynch’s Lost Highway was so dark that many scenes simply 
featured shadows upon shadows ad infinitum. When released on DVD, the picture has been 
visibly brightened to render the scene clear and visible. Is not the problem with The Vanishing 
the fact that we can never be sure that the light at the end of the tunnel is not going to turn out 
to be a lorry speeding straight towards us? In a funny kind of a way, the happy ending is one 
such light at the end of the tunnel in American cinema also…  
  This statement leads me to a somewhat playful turn in which I would like to suggest 
that the choice facing the auto-remaker is one of ‘père ou pire?’ also. Any foreign remaker 
moving to Hollywood is also faced with a need to repeat the choices from the original, or else 
betray their desire and conform to the symbolic father of the Hollywood style. Sluizer clearly 
chose père, but one auto-remaker who attempted to choose pire was Michael Haneke, who in 
2007 remade his Austrian original Funny Games (1997) in America shot-for-shot, even using 
the blueprints of the original house for the remake house (unlike Van Sant then). The result is 
uncanny. Mike D’Angelo references the happy ending of The Vanishing in his review of 
Funny Games U. S., saying that it “ends with the hero buried alive… and then dug up by his 
girlfriend, who helps him defeat the bad guy and restore order. Cue pop song. Haneke is 
having none of this shit” (2008). Rather than have this “shit”, Haneke painstakingly replicates 
everything from the original, including the timing, sets, and its bleak ending. What is 
interesting though is that Haneke plays in one ‘rewind’ scene with this light at the end of the 
tunnel in American cinema, and here the light really is a false hope, one he exploits with a 
cruel exactitude and awareness of American stereotypes. This is arguably why his remake 
was received so poorly, and was considered ‘offensive’ to American audiences. When asked 
why the remake would not introduce a happy ending, producer Hamish McAlpine argued that 
“The minute you sacrifice that irony, you’re sacrificing Michael Haneke’s soul, and the film” 
(cited in Arendt, 2006). Perhaps this is a true kind of ‘European sense’ of remaking then, 
seeing as American distributors even appended the English title with the qualification “U.S.”, 
to stamp their identity on it. Nonetheless, Haneke stated that his remake was “as much an 
auteur’s film as the first one”
†, with the addition that “for Americans it’s interchangeable. In 
reality nothing is” (cited in Katey, 2008), which is an almost exact repetition of Sluizer’s 
                                                 
* A comparison with the tunnel dream and its realisation in Gaspar Noé’s Irréversible (2002) is 
favourable here. 
† This observation inverts Hitchcock’s own auto-remake assertion regarding the difference between the 
two versions of The Man Who Knew Too Much, that “the first version is the work of a talented amateur 
and the second was made by a professional” (cited in Truffaut, 1983: 94).   135
criticism about the American tendency to exchange things like a “piece of plastic”. 
Nonetheless, if we were in any doubt prior to Funny Games U.S. as to the consequences on 
the box office of choosing mise-en-abîme over mise-en-état, then following the statistics we 
should rest assured that the results are predictable. Funny Games U.S. bombed at the box 
office, pulling in just under half of its reported $15 million budget. Nonetheless, Haneke 
understood his sacrifice, stating that Funny Games U.S. would only be a success if audiences 
“misunderstood the meaning behind it” (2009). For him, the only way to properly ‘translate’ 
the message of the original was to be offended and walk out of his film in disgust. The critics, 
of course, obliged him.  
 
 
What happens when you cut the thesis out of a ‘thesis film’: the objet petit a in the 
remake 
 
Haneke’s Funny Games cannot be considered a ‘typical’ case of the auto-remake due to the 
unprecedented level of autonomy he retained pre-, during, and post-production. Funny Games 
thus sits better alongside Van Sant’s shot-for-shot Psycho than Sluizer’s auto-remake The 
Vanishing. The issues of auto-remaking must be located elsewhere then. Domestically, 
Hitchcock is perhaps the most obvious place to start given his importance to this thesis. 
Michael Serceau said of Hitchcock that “to say that a great director always remakes the same 
film is yet another truism” (cited in Forrest & Koos, 2002:22), echoing Hitchcock’s own view 
that “self-plagiarism is style” (2009). Technically, Hitchcock was a foreign auto-remaker for 
the original version of The Man Who Knew Too Much (1934) which was British. However, 
following Higson we should remember not to divide national cinemas by virtue of where they 
were made but by their economic, textual, exhibitory, and critical criterion. Thus, here are 
three auto-remakes of particular interest that crossed boundaries other than passport control, 
boundaries that led to death at the box-office (and one that failed even to make it to the box-
office).  
  (1) Our first example is of a Thai original, Bangkok Dangerous (1999), remade in 
Hollywood in 2008 by the original directors Oxide and Danny Pang. The original features a 
deaf gunman, Kong (Pawalit Mongkolpisit), whose disability gives him an edge over other 
gunmen as he does not react to the gunshots he fires. Eventually, he becomes a hit-man for 
the mob and is torn between his girlfriend and his job. While the film is fairly predictable, it 
engages us with the fascinating premise of a disabled protagonist in Kong (and the 
professional edge it gives him). However, when the Pang brothers gave their film the 
Hollywood treatment, this fascinating premise was lost as the new protagonist, Joe (Nicolas 
Cage), is not deaf. In an interview for the New York Times Oxide Pang explained the decision:   136
“We’d like to keep him the same, but we understand from a marketing point of view Nic 
needs to have some lines.” Their solution was simple: “What we’re going to do is transform 
his girlfriend instead into a deaf [man]” (Pang, cited in Jessop, 2006). This is despite the 
Hollywood precedent for a deaf protagonist having been set back in 1997 with James 
Mangold’s Cop Land (1997) starring Sylvester Stallone.  
  (2) Number two on our list is Jean-Marie Poiré’s auto-remake of his French original, 
Les Visiteurs (1993), which saw a medieval knight time travel into the future (with 
predictably comic results). The Hollywood remake, Just Visiting (2001), recast the original 
stars, Jean Reno and Christian Clavier, and relocated to America. However, the film 
ultimately proved that humour does not translate as well as horror, for while Les Visiteurs 
out-grossed Jurassic Park in France, the remake bombed in both countries, pulling in less 
than half its estimated $35 million budget (Willmore, 2008). While the original revelled in its 
R-rated toilet humour, the remake tamed it down to a PG-13 and cut half of the more obscene 
jokes out. Perhaps even more interesting than this remaking however is the proposed remake 
that never was: a Miramax-commissioned dubbed version of the original overseen by Mel 
Brooks and deemed “unreleasable” (Willmore, 2008). Is not this the ultimate non-remake, one 
that falters before it has even been released?   
  (3) To complete my trilogy of disaster auto-remakes is Dick Maas’s De Lift (1983), 
remade in Hollywood in 2001 as Down (U.S. title, The Shaft). The original featured a killer 
elevator which terrorises an office block, elevating a technical repair worker from zero to hero 
as he saves the day. The remake featured the star-power of Naomi Watts and James Marshall, 
accompanied by Michael Ironside and Ron Pearlman. If this all sounds a little unfamiliar, 
then perhaps the reason is that the remake was never properly released. Despite following the 
original storyline, the remakers transported the action to a fictional New York ‘Millennium’ 
building. However, its scheduled release date of September 2001 saw it shelved along with 
similarly themed films following the aftermath of the September 11
th attacks on New York. 
The film eventually got a release on DVD in 2003.
*  
  Is this not a case of hear no evil, speak no evil, see no evil? What each of these auto-
remakes share in common is the change made on the part of the Hollywood producers: the 
remake of Bangkok Dangerous hears no evil in curing its protagonist’s hearing disability; the 
‘unreleasable’ dubbed remake of Les Visiteurs speaks no evil with its new English dialogue; 
and the unreleased Down sees no evil with its direct-to-DVD release, despite an impressive 
cast and budget. Each of the changes made to these three auto-remakes follows Schneider and 
                                                 
* Other trans-national auto-remakes of note include: Francis Veber’s Les Fugitifs (1986), remade as 
Three Fugitives (1989); Ole Bornedal’s Nattevagten (1994), remade as Nightwatch (1997); Takashi 
Shimizu’s Ju-on (2002), remade as The Grudge (2004); Hideo Nakata’s Ringu 2 (1999), remade as The 
Ring Two (2005); and, of course, Haneke’s Funny Games (1997) remade as Funny Games U.S. (2007).   137
Leitch’s ‘essential’ changes for an American remake, including a star the audience can invest 
in (Nicolas Cage, who must speak), English dialogue, and an American setting (although a 
fictional skyscraper in New York City in September 2001 seems particularly unlucky).  
  While I have looked in the previous part at the major changes to the star-wattage of 
the protagonist, the dialogue shifts, and the setting, there are other aspects of The Vanishing 
which were altered that must be considered separately, aspects that can be loosely identified 
in the ‘master question’ facing the producers of the remake, which was: Why does Rex drink 
the drugged coffee in the original? Sluizer remarks that “Americans really didn’t understand 
that someone might be willing to die for the love of his girlfriend” (2003), and as such the 
American producers kept asking for a clearer rationale as to why a sane man would put 
himself at the mercy of someone responsible for his girlfriend’s abduction. While they could 
not change Jeff’s choice, they could change his sanity, so Sluizer’s solution was to have Jeff 
suffer a nervous breakdown, since he observed that “all Americans have nervous 
breakdowns” (2003). However, in a different context, Alan Williams articulates the problem 
when he asks: “When you cut the thesis out of a thesis film, what do you have left?”, to which 
he responds: “Despite handsome cinematography and reasonably good performances – rather 
little” (2002:160). Well, having discussed the ‘big’ changes in the previous sections, I now 
want to focus on this “rather little” leftover/trace remaining in remake.  
  Critic Desmond Howe puts it best when he writes that The Vanishing is “the same 
movie, only completely different. It follows the same plot, except where it changes 
everything” (1993), which might as well be the epigraph for this entire thesis. The quote 
perfectly renders the paradoxical nature of remaking: while it looks, acts, and feels the same, 
we should not be fooled: it is the same! Recall Žižek’s example of Groucho Marx enquiring 
of a stranger: “Say, you remind me of Emmanuel Ravelli”. “But I am Emmanuel Ravelli”, the 
stranger replies, to which Groucho responds, “Then no wonder you look like him!” In short, 
the ‘thesis’ of the film is posited only in the moment of its reception, and only in the minds of 
the spectators engaging with it – after all, what is a thesis if no one brings the antithesis?  
  Sluizer reflects on The Vanishing in a similar way, and recollects being asked to 
change some dialogue from the original in the scene where Raymond’s daughter turns to him 
and asks: “Daddy, do you have a mistress? Don’t look so shocked. At your age you’re 
allowed to, right?” The Vanishing’s producer, Paul Schiff, felt that the idea of a little girl 
telling her father to get a mistress was completely out of touch with American audiences (for 
whom adultery is not openly discussed nor accepted). Sluizer was only half-joking when he 
proposed new ‘in-touch’ dialogue: “Daddy, why don’t you divorce mum, I’m the only one at 
school with two parents, all the other kids only have one” (2003), alluding to the high divorce 
rates in America. He writes that the producers then thought he was “a black hearted European 
because kids would not say those things in America” (Sluizer, 2003). The line was eventually   138
changed to “I wouldn’t blame you for cheating on mum” in the remake, and loses the sense 
from the original of his daughter’s complicity in the affair (and by extension, the abduction) 
when she gives her father a knowing wink. In the remake, Barney’s daughter clearly 
disapproves of the affair she imagines her father having, and eventually it is this which leads 
to Barney’s downfall (as the daughter, mistaking Rita for the girlfriend, leads her to Barney 
and Jeff). The point is not that the producers ‘cut’ the thesis of the original out of the remake, 
but that they cut the thesis of the remake out of the remake. The cycle of repression implicit 
here proves that Hollywood is not only capable of cutting another national ideology out of its 
pictures (which perhaps we should support) but that it will go so far as to cut its own ideology 
out – that America does have a high divorce rate, etc. This is the ‘ghosting’ implicit to the 
‘American sense’ of remaking and Hollywood hystory generally: not that it represses the 
signifiers of a foreign culture, but that it represses its own. 
  This process of repression always leaves a trace, the “rather little” noted by Williams. 
Recall Žižek’s phrase, “What more does this statement contain, that has caused you to make 
it?” (2006a:19), which illustrates the sensitive nature of Sluizer’s new dialogue, which clearly 
gets too close to the truth. In the Psycho remake, it was a declaration repeated again and again 
in stereo, where every deviation from the original spoke volumes; here, in The Vanishing, we 
are dealing with something much more subtle, for “no less than the superfluous act of 
mentioning, the act of not mentioning or concealing something can create additional 
meaning” (Žižek, 2006a:19). The relevance of this example to that of the producers denying 
their own ideology is contained in Lacan’s understanding that repression and the return of the 
repressed are one and the same process: it is only with the very superfluity of suppressing the 
new content that the content becomes ‘content’ at all. One might argue that perhaps the 
producers really did believe the dialogue simply to be ‘out of touch’ like the original 
dialogue, but then one must ask: why protest to this degree (thinking Sluizer a cynical “black-
hearted European”)? “The Lady doth protest too much, methinks”, for there is more truth in 
their protestations than in what they are protesting. Are we not approaching the real thesis of 
the remake here?  
  Paul Schiff also felt that there were certain “expectations” from American audiences 
for this “kind of movie” (cited in Avins, 1993:20), expectations that he felt made the 
compromises worthwhile. Schiff’s statement concerning this “kind of movie” seems to echo 
Werner Herzog’s sense of a remake “in the American sense of the word”, a “kind of movie” 
that required a “positive, affirming result at the end of the journey” (Schiff, cited in Avins, 
1993:20). Durham argues that  
 
the problem with American remakes of French films comes down to the most basic of 
tautologies: French films are French and American films are not. One wonders, in that case,   139
what precisely they are, since they somehow seem to be ‘not French’ without necessarily 
remaining – or becoming – American either (Durham, 1998:11).  
 
One also wonders whether the ending of The Vanishing remake is a “positive, affirming result 
at the end of the journey”, even excluding the purist’s argument about remaining faithful to 
the original. Let us be clear here: this is not an issue of fidelity, for as Brian McFarlane argues 
“fidelity is obviously very desirable in marriage; but with film adaptations I suspect playing 
around is more effective” (2007:4). As Durham points out, the issue is not that the Hollywood 
remake is not French/Dutch but that it is not American.  
  Let us return to the question plaguing the producers of the remake, namely: Why does 
Rex drink the drugged coffee? Is there not a prescriptive element to the American remake 
akin to what Carol Feldman describes as the sense of national narratives as “tell[ing] us not 
just who we are, and were, but who we should be” (2001:141)? While all films to an extent 
engage in such an activity, there is an additional level of enunciation here. As Richard 
Kearney notes, “the problem is not that each society constructs itself as a story but that it 
forgets that it has done so” and “whenever a nation forgets its own narrative origins it 
becomes dangerous” (2002:81). Are we not in pure Hitchcockian waters here, where “a little 
knowledge can be a deadly thing”?  
  The final act of The Vanishing is not about knowledge as it is in Spoorloos; it is about 
forgetting, amnesia. Remember that in the remake, Barney only seeks Jeff out because the 
latter is forgetting his ‘narrative origins’. Elsewhere the difference between the two endings 
reveals more. While the final act of Spoorloos features Raymond gazing onto an open space, 
the final act of The Vanishing takes place in a restaurant some months on from Jeff and Rita’s 
ordeal, where they discuss a book deal with a publishing agent. When a waiter brings two 
cups of coffee, both emit a nervous laugh and in unison say: “No coffee thanks, we don’t 
drink that anymore!” What is the point of this cheap (unfunny) joke? Simply, it is a diversion, 
standing in for the simple fact that there is no answer to the question of why Rex drinks the 
coffee in the original; for Jeff and Rita the rejection of the coffee itself misses the point of 
Barney’s offer in the first place. We are here back in the realm of the patient who receives 
his/her message back to them in an inverted form (for example, Lost Highway’s “Dick 
Laurent is dead”). Remember our example from chapter one of the story of a factory worker 
suspected of stealing wheelbarrows? It is not the content of Jeff and Rita’s refusal of the 
coffee in this final scene that should interest us but the gesture itself: the nervous laughter, the 
discomfiture of their body language, the compulsive way they both answer at exactly the same 
time, etc. We should not take the content of the joke at face value but look at the enunciation 
itself: can we not imagine a scene following this one in the restaurant where, having fetishised 
coffee as the locus of his terror, Jeff’s disturbances force him into a lengthy period of therapy,   140
still bombarded as he is by the meaningless signifier of ‘black coffee’? This extended ending 
would still be ‘in-touch’ with Schiff’s American “kind of movie” (we should also append 
Sluizer’s comment that “All Americans have nervous breakdowns…” with “…and undergo 
extensive therapy to cope with this”).  
  The reason the coffee joke is unfunny is because it – as with Freud’s own unfunny 
jokes – dances a fine line between comedy and psychosis, leaving us unsure of whether to 
laugh or cry (recall the joke about the kettle borrower’s logic from chapter 2). It is with this 
joke that we should conclude that American audiences are neither naïve nor child-like, but 
patients locked in a repressive cycle with an evil analyst who has stopped listening (or 
perhaps no longer knows how to listen). To paraphrase Lacan, God is not dead in American 
cinema; he is unconscious (1998:59). The only way to deal with an unconscious God is to 
diffuse one’s symptoms via the fetishisation of the “rather little” objects (the objets petit a) 
that are leftover, the objects which cause our disgusted fascination (the example here being 
black coffee). Another such fetishised object can be seen in the different lures used by 
Raymond and Barney in Spoorloos and The Vanishing. In both versions, Raymond/Barney is 
given a present for his birthday by his daughter, and in both versions he uses this object as a 
lure to get his victim, Saskia/Diane, into his car and the clutches of a chloroformed rag. In 
Spoorloos, the lure is a key-chain with the symbol ‘R’, an initial shared by both Raymond and 
Rex as two subjects orbiting around the same symbolic referent (unknown knowledge). 
However, in the Vanishing, the lure is a bracelet featuring the symbol for eternity, ‘∞’, which 
is the very symbolic meaning of the original that the remake has disavowed, the ‘thesis’ it 
unceremoniously cut. 
  Ultimately, this near-imperceptible change in the lure is a representation of The 
Vanishing’s fetish object par excellence, such that, despite the loss of the thesis of eternity 
from the ‘thesis film’, it displaces that theme onto the bracelet and is somehow able to cope 
with the trauma of translation. Is this not the “rather little” left over of the Real in Alan 
Williams’s complaint? Barney himself tells Jeff that “sometimes the devil is in the details”, 
and it is the devil that we see in other “rather little” elements in the remake also. In the first 
section of this chapter we explored the linguistic meanings of ‘spoorloos’ beyond its 
translation into English. Does not its literal meaning as “vanished (without a trace/traceless)” 
enter a new dimension when we consider the irreducible traces left in the Hollywood remake? 
Perhaps the defining image of The Vanishing is the mound of earth concealing Diane’s body 
that Jeff and Rita stare wordlessly at prior to the final scene in the restaurant when they refuse 
the coffee. In Spoorloos of course, there are no mounds of earth: Rex and Saskia really have 
vanished “without a trace”.  
  Remakes like Van Sant’s Psycho and Haneke’s Funny Games form the exception 
disturbing the surface of Hollywood’s false appearance (the Other Scene erupting onto a   141
contemporary fabric), whereas remakes like Sluizer’s The Vanishing allow Hollywood to go 
on functioning with its hysterical history by latching onto another, fully contingent, space. 
This ‘foreign’ history need not be secure itself, it just needs to be ‘other’, and this is how 
trans-national remaking must be defined: by its status as a fetish object for other national 
cinemas. If my first case study of Psycho posited the shower scene as a symptom of American 
cinematic experience, then I hope this case study has posited the happy ending as the fetish 
enabling American cinema to go on dealing with its problematic hystory. 
  To finish then, let us consider Deleuze’s interest in the subtle ambiguities of the 
French language, for Lacan is not the only French theorist noted for his interest in 
homophones. Indeed, the French word for ‘shot’ is ‘plan’, and Deleuze plays on the dual 
nature of the word plan to mean both ‘shot’ and ‘plane’, as in varying planes of thought. 
Furthermore, Deleuze’s precise rendering of the term ‘découpage’ (‘cutting’) is vital in 
understanding the cinematic mechanism, for he uses the word to mean both ‘cutting’ in the 
sense of ‘to cut’ and of creating new ‘cuttings’. In short, with different cuts of films we enter 
onto new planes of film-thinking where each precise rendering of the film’s thesis registers 
both a new cutting and the cutting out of a previous thesis. Thus, just as we discerned 
Deleuzian and a Lacanian ‘cuts’ of the shower scene, so too can we discern Deleuzian and 
Lacanian ‘cuts’ of the living burial scene, and this time we need not raid our imaginations, for 
they come down nicely on either side of the remake divide. The Deleuzian living burial scene 
is Spoorloos’s link to the Eternal. There is no new concept in the final act, just repetition to 
the n
th power of the repetition internal to the original act, positing the original as repetition-
for-itself (Rex’s living burial is not the second time after Saskia’s, but, rather, it is Saskia’s 
living burial to the n
th power). The Lacanian living burial scene is The Vanishing’s repression 
and fetishisation of the objet a, difference-in-itself. It is only here that a little imagination is 
perhaps needed to complete the scenario, that is, with the extended ending following Jeff’s 
refusal of the coffee in the restaurant, his ensuing breakdown, and months of therapy on the 
analyst’s couch.  
 
 
“If at first you don’t succeed…” Re-marketing the original and the return of the 
repressed in Hollywood 
 
So, Bangkok Dangerous removed its thesis of a deaf hitman to bow down to its star, Nicolas 
Cage. A review in Variety noted how this film is the first since Dickie Roberts: Former Child 
Star (2003), five years earlier, to debut at number one in the US with such a low gross ($7.8 
million on its opening weekend). Lionsgate distributor Steve Rothenberg noted that the film’s 
star pulling power alone coupled with marketing strategies would mean that the remake of   142
Bangkok Dangerous “will be a nicely profitable film for us” (cited in Variety, 2006). 
However, while some Hollywood remakes are guilty of removing their foreign ‘theses’ in 
order to sell them to bigger audiences, some are innocent. Furthermore, not all foreign 
originals contain foreign theses in the first instance, as Lucy Mazdon has observed of Jim 
McBride’s 1983 Hollywood remake of Jean-Luc Godard’s French modernist classic, À bout 
de souffle (Breathless, 1960). While many criticised McBride’s remake for ploughing 
hallowed foreign ground, Mazdon points out that Godard’s original is already ploughing 
Hollywood’s cinema archive. Godard wrote that his American influences made him want to 
“take a conventional story and then remake, in different ways, all the cinema which had come 
before” (cited in Mazdon, 2000:79). Mazdon notes that the most striking and recurrent 
intertexts of Godard’s À bout de souffle are its references to Hollywood cinema, particularly 
the gangster films of the 1930s and the films noirs of the 1940s. For example, the film’s 
protagonist, Michel (Jean-Paul Belmondo), is so obsessed with Humphrey Bogart that he not 
only imitates his style but even his mannerisms and personal tics, such as Bogart’s habit of 
rubbing his fingers over his lips. 
 
 
Fig. 3.3: Michel Poiccard (Jean-Paul Belmondo) doing Humphrey Bogart – too cool for (film) school  
  
Mazdon notes that trans-national remaking is a two-way process, that Godard is both copying 
and transgressing the codes of À bout de souffle’s Hollywood intertexts long before it is itself 
remade in McBride’s Breathless. For example, Michel both is and is not Bogart in this film: 
he wears the fedora hat but always at an angle (as is the French way), and frequently forgets   143
his persona in moments where he is distracted, gesticulating less like Bogart and more like an 
idiosyncratic Frenchman.
*  
  For Mazdon, the curious thing about McBride’s remake, also called Breathless, is that 
it resembles the old Hollywood classics that Godard himself dug up for the original, in many 
ways by-passing Godard’s refraction of that style in his film. Breathless is a representation of 
a representation, what Deleuze would call a simulacra-phantasm, a “bad copy” which has lost 
its resemblance to the original while retaining the image. These are empty imitations that go 
from one thing to another thing, producing only the effect of resemblance but without the 
necessary referents, and as such they lack any real depth. On the other hand À bout de souffle 
is what Deleuze would call a copy-icon: a secondary processor which goes from one thing to 
the Idea of the original. Another example of this distinction can be found in La Jetée (1962), a 
film which utilises many of the images of Hitchcock’s Vertigo in rendering an apocalyptic 
vision of Paris following World War III, and one man’s travel into the past to reconcile 
himself with a haunting image of a woman and the brutal execution of a stranger. The film 
imitates Vertigo’s themes of obsession, the mysterious female image, and even replicates the 
scene where Scottie and Madeleine visit the sequoia trees. However, we can tell it is a copy-
icon because like À bout de souffle, it too goes from the thing (Vertigo) to the Idea implicit in 
the original, more than the original (time travel). The film ends with the protagonist falling in 
love with the mysterious woman from his childhood past and eventually becoming the 
executed stranger.  
  Furthermore, the example of La Jetée is intensified when we consider that it too was 
remade in Hollywood by Terry Gilliam as Twelve Monkeys. However, unlike Breathless, 
Twelve Monkeys is no empty simulacra-phantasm for it updates Marker’s La Jetée and 
successfully Americanises it, staying true to the Idea of the original and its theme (of the 
möbius impossibility of meeting yourself in the future, and witnessing your own death in the 
past). However, the copy-icon is always lurking somewhere, and in 2005, John Maybury’s 
The Jacket answered the call. In this version of the La Jetée narrative, the protagonist, Jack 
Starks (Adrian Brody), is a Gulf War veteran remanded to a psychiatric institution after he is 
convicted of murder upon his return to America. While there, he is drugged, confined to a 
straightjacket and imprisoned in a mortuary chamber, whereupon he finds he can travel in 
time. He too meets a woman, Jackie (Keira Knightley), with whom he feels an uncanny 
connection. The film betrays its own premise however with the happy ending which 
Americanised the bleak (European?) ending of Vertigo, which each of the other versions 
retain. Each of these examples illustrates that trans-national remaking is not limited to box-
office ‘cash-cows’, and that sometimes the original already contains an ‘American’ theme to 
                                                 
* For a nice counterpoint on this, see Herbert Ross’s Play it Again, Sam (1972), featuring a protagonist 
(Woody Allen) who becomes more and more like Bogart as the film wears on.   144
begin with. To complicate matters even further, Mazdon observes something interesting in 
Serge Daney’s review of McBride’s Breathless remake, when he remarked that  
 
There is something fascinating about the way American cinema always, everywhere, knows 
how to recuperate and recycle ideas, making them anodyne and timeless. A bout de souffle, 
like all Godard’s films, is an old, dated film. Breathless, like all American films is already 
ageless. It has no wrinkles, it’s true, but then it never will have (cited in Mazdon, 2000:85). 
 
Mazdon agrees with this quote, writing that many American remakes are “the object of 
‘hyperreality’ in which ‘reality’ and the ‘past’ have been eclipsed and disappeared” 
(2000:85). However, I think we need be more careful, for with examples like Twelve Monkeys 
we must be prepared to look for those American films which do contain wrinkles, and like 
their aged foreign-language originals seek to stimulate, rather than recycle, their own defunct 
referents.  
  Let us look at this from another perspective. Rather than simply draw a line between 
‘ageless’ American remakes and ‘dated’ European fare, perhaps we should recall Kant’s 
distinction between negative and indefinite judgement, where a positive statement has both a 
negative opposite, and a ‘third’ intermediary statement. We should follow Žižek’s use of 
alive-dead-undead with the triad of ageless-dated-undated, for if a text has no historicity, 
against what can it be measured? While Spoorloos certainly keeps good company in top ten 
horror movie lists now,
* it was by no means an instant hit. Sluizer recalls that it received a 
“lukewarm” reception at the Cannes Film Festival: “no one wanted the film, no one in 
America, no one in England, and no one in Australia, and not even in my own country [could] 
I get a distributor”, such that he felt the film was “a real, real failure […] because they [the 
distributors] thought it was too clever and no one would like it” (2003). However, while the 
distributors seemed reluctant to jump aboard the Spoorloos bandwagon, the film was 
eventually included in the Sydney Film Festival over a year later, and audiences were 
somewhat less reluctant. From Australia, word spread like wildfire to England, then to 
Europe, and finally America, where it was eventually released in 1991. So the distributors 
clearly got it wrong; audiences were not only clever enough to understand Spoorloos’s 
premise, but they loved it. Another European director soon experienced almost identical 
distribution problems. In fact, there are quite a few striking similarities between Sluizer’s 
experiences with Spoorloos and Ole Bornedal’s experiences with his Danish thriller, 
Nattevagten (Nightwatch, 1994). One could even say that Bornedal’s Nattevagten shared a 
case of folie à deux with its Dutch cousin. 
                                                 
* Film critic Mark Kermode included the living burial scene in his top ten ‘scariest moments’ of all 
time, alongside many horror classics including Alien and Nosferatu (Kermode, 2003).   145
  Bornedal’s Nattevagten caught the eye of Hollywood producers after establishing 
itself as a cult hit, and it was not long before they commissioned him to make the move to 
Hollywood to remake his original as Nightwatch in 1997. In a repeat of Spoorloos however, 
the shocks of the original were toned down and the studio sought audience-investment in new 
star Ewan McGregor, fresh to Hollywood from the success of the British smash-hit, 
Trainspotting (1996). Nattevagten’s plot concerns a student, Martin (Nikolaj Coster-Waldau 
in original, McGregor in remake), who takes a job as a nightwatchman at a local morgue to 
pay his way through college. At the same time a series of grisly murders takes place, and 
before long Martin finds he is the fall-guy following some bizarre occurrences at the morgue. 
As with Spoorloos, several unconscious signifiers allude to Nattevagten’s excess textuality, as 
in one scene when the killer asks Martin: “Have you ever been killed before?” The overriding 
sense of déjà vu plays on the fact that this line is repeated in the remake just prior to the real 
killer’s attack on Martin (again). Another line in the original plays the same game of 
repetition, as Martin asks a friend if telling his girlfriend that he is in love with her will sound 
like a line from “a bad American movie”. Even the mise-en-scène is replicated, as the black-
and-white photograph in Martin’s cabin is the same as the one used in the original.  
  There are many productive (mis)readings available to us at each level of the return of 
Spoorloos and Nattevagten, from the ‘making’ of the original films (including their 
distribution difficulties and titular translations) to their ‘remaking’. But what about the 
marketing, does this not also warrant its own return, perhaps as the Deleuzian ‘unmaking’? 
Lucy Mazdon notes that “the French film and its remake are separate artefacts; indeed the 
production of a remake can be seen to create a new audience for the work upon which it was 
based” (2000:78), and as such we must consider the marketing and remarketing of the 
original in relation to its remaking. This is also apparent in American-American remakes as 
well, for following Van Sant’s Psycho, Universal released the Psycho Collection – Psycho 1-4 
in 2003, and the original Psycho was re-released as a “2 Disc Special Edition” in 2005. In the 
case of Spoorloos and Nattevagten, it was perhaps inevitable that the original would be re-
released following the critical condemnation of their remakes as “inferior”. Each new 
reviewer suggested by implication alone that somewhere out ‘there’ existed a superior 
original creating an intrigued new audience potential. Never missing a sales opportunity, their 
respective studios (Twentieth Century Fox in the case of Spoorloos and Dimension films in 
the case of Nattevagten) decided to re-release the original versions on DVD to capitalise on 
the remake publicity. As such, both originals were newly re-packaged, containing brand new 
taglines, cover-art, critical opinions, and, of course, Anglo-American titles.  
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Fig. 3.4: DVD cover-art for the re-release of Spoorloos and Nattevagten 
 
In the case of the Nightwatch re-release, the cover boasted that “before ‘Saw’ and before 
‘Se7en’, there was the classic ‘Nightwatch’”. This statement is more than a little problematic, 
as it seems on the one hand to be suggesting an influence on these later American paradigms, 
and yet on the other hand, suggesting that perhaps this ‘ups the ante’, so to speak.
* Perhaps 
even more problematic is the appendage to both titles of: “The original version/vision of…” 
While the Nightwatch re-release presents itself as “Nightwatch, the Original Vision of 
Terror”, The Vanishing goes one step further, and actually incorporates the additional 
message into the title itself, as “The Original Version of The Vanishing”. Is this a fourth title 
to add to the Dutch original, Anglo-American, and French titles? If so, this title contains the 
very complex differentiation implicit in Deleuze’s sense of unmaking, for while ‘Spoorloos’ 
is the made title and ‘The Vanishing’ and ‘L’homme qui voulait savoir’ are remade titles, then 
‘The Original Version of The Vanishing’ should be considered its unmade title. These are not 
the only two examples of such hyper-reflexive titles, as Lucy Mazdon points out another 
example in the re-release of Le retour de Martin Guerre in the aftermath of its Hollywood 
remake, Sommersby. The re-released French original was described as “The film remade as 
Sommersby” (2000:78), which is an even more overt reference than “The original version 
of…”, as it even emphasises its remaking in the title. In an inversion of this process, 
sometimes the original can be used to sell the remake, as in the example of À bout de souffle, 
which when remade as Breathless was sold to French audiences as À bout de souffle (Made in 
                                                 
* One is also reminded here of the omnipresent claim for superiority in the DVD market with horror 
releases boasting such things as: “What you didn’t see in the cinemas”, and “Extreme edition”…   147
USA), with markedly similar artwork. Another example from Hollywood’s more recent 
fixation with East Asian cinema can be found in the re-release of Hideo Nakata’s original 
Japanese horror, Ringu (1998), which, having been remade by Gore Verbinski (this time to 
critical acclaim – see appendix) as The Ring (2002), was re-released with the new appended 
title: “The Original Movie that Inspired The Ring: Ringu”. 
  Are we not, in each of these examples of ‘The original version of…’, at the most 
extreme level of fetishistic disavowal? While, as Christian Metz argued, every cinematic 
spectator must disavow using the formula: I know very well (that the film is not real), but all 
the same (I will believe in it as if it were), the consumer approaching the re-released “original 
version of…” has the additional weight of cleaving the new version in three, between the re-
released-original, the original-original, and the remake. As such, this new title confronts us 
with two messages and an underlying unconscious one: (1) it claims authenticity as the 
original version; however, by stating its claim on originality it (2) explicitly acknowledges its 
prior remaking to lend weight to itself as a version. As such, the re-release is not aimed at 
Americans who did not see the original, but, rather, it is aimed at Americans who did see the 
remake.
* (3) The unconscious message is a rewriting of Ken Marks’s question concerning the 
necessity of the remake, of which he asked “If the original did not exist, would this picture [a 
remake] be worth seeing?” (1998), which we should amend here to read: “If the remake did 
not exist, would the ‘original version of…’ be worth seeing?” The re-release is balancing the 
remake’s critical materiality with the original’s cult status; in a sense, at the same time as it 
‘unmakes’ the original, it ‘remakes’ the remake. If it needed one (which of course, it does not) 
the remarketed French version should perhaps have been: “The Man Who Wanted to Know 
(Again)”. 
  It is perhaps more helpful to us to consider trans-national remakes in the same way 
that Rick Altman claims we should consider film genres; that is, as sites of conflict amongst 
different groups. This chapter has revealed some of those groups already, including: critics, 
academic scholars, directors, producers, etc. So what, then, is trans-national remaking? Alan 
Williams asks a related question: “So what is French national cinema?”, and his answer is 
that, “in a sense, it is whatever you need it to be to make a point in the ongoing struggle to 
conceptualize France, and the cinema” (2002:5). Williams warns that this struggle is both 
dynamic and perpetually unfinished, and that to ‘make’ national cinemas is to reduce things to 
being “in-themselves, and not part of a complex dynamic in which they do things to and for 
nations” (2002:6). In chapter one, we explored Deleuze’s notion of logical sense, which has 
the formula ‘both/and’ over ‘either/or’, a formula with which Van Sant is clearly working. 
                                                 
* Once again, never ones to miss a trick, Fox included in the re-release plenty of advertising for the 
remake, including an exclusive 2003 interview with Sluizer who speaks candidly about the remake and 
a photo gallery from the 1993 production.   148
However, that is the zombie remake, while here we have a ghost remake, a remake which 
‘spooks’ itself. Perhaps we should add a third formula here, one that is ‘irrational’, and yet 
entirely consistent with Lacan’s sense of père ou pire. Such a formula would have to follow a 
different, and appropriately darker, psychoanalytic humour. This formula would not be faced 
with choosing between two choices, nor would it have to choose both choices; rather, this is 
the choice to reject the very framework of the choice itself. Žižek points out that when Stalin 
was asked the question, “Which deviation is worse, the Rightist or the Leftist one?”, Stalin 
answered: “They are both worse!” (1997). Thus our formula for the trans-national remake is 
‘neither/nor’, that is, the third, hidden way out, to choose not to choose, that is, to emphasise 
the “complicity of the opposites” (Žižek, 1997). Žižek reminds us that this “‘choice of the 
worst’ fails, but in this failure, it undermines the entire field of the alternative and thus 
enables us to overcome its terms” (1997). Is this not why the most artistic and brilliant 
remakes always seem to fail? Lacan writes of the sexual relationship that “it fails. That is 
objective […] the failure is the object” (1999:58); it is not a matter of analysing how the 
trans-national remake might succeed in representing its nationality, but repeating until you are 
blue in the face why it fails.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE ‘IRRATIONAL’ REMAKE: TIME AND MEMORY IN UNMAKING 
 
Irrational – adjective 2 Mathematics (of a number, quantity, or expression) not expressible as a ratio 
of two integers, and having an infinite and non-recurring expansion when expressed as a decimal. 
Examples of irrational numbers are the number π and the square root of 2.  
 
 
Opening thoughts: The re-viewer and the time-image as unmaking 
 
This study of the remake is not yet complete, for while Forrest and Koos argue that “when 
Hollywood isn’t remaking films from its own archives, it is looking towards Europe” 
(1998:26), we should come to realise that something is missing from this simple split between 
American-American and foreign-American remakes. Missing is the remake that does not 
recur, imitate or exchange with its original; a remake which condemns both cinematic habit 
and memory, and plays instead with humour and irony; it is a type of remake hitherto 
unexplored in all but a few places in remake theory. The closest approximation of this third 
type of remaking is to be found in Anat Zanger’s description of the “disguised version”, 
where a remake conceals its status as a remake and yet, at the same time contains “elements 
necessary to insure [sic] that the version – even in disguise – will be recognized as such, that 
is, as a version” (2006:103). I have illustrated that an essential feature of the remake is its 
declarative dimension. Can we move from a sense of the remake as being for-itself to a 
remake as being to-itself (that is, from being in language to being outside of it, about it)? This 
question is undercut by Zanger, who writes that “disguised versions […] emphasize precisely 
those parameters that declared versions seek to conceal” (2006:104), such that, a version can 
have either declared or latent referentiality to a source text. If we have thus far been primarily 
dealing with texts whose reference is declared (often violently as with the case of Psycho), 
then what of latent repetition in film – can we simply ignore these as versions? Just as the 
presence of the analyst alters the discourse of the patient in psychoanalysis, so too does the 
presence of the declaration alter the discourse of the remake. In this chapter however, I want 
to put forward a case for considering a ‘latent’ or ‘disguised’ remake as a wholly different 
kettle of fish altogether, one no less subjected however to our remake theory from chapter 1. 
The central issue in this chapter is not to find an alternative approach to remakes than ‘spot-
the-difference’, but to find an approach to spot these remakes in the first place.  
  Let us (why not?) conceive of this entire thesis in terms of Deleuze’s three modes of 
construction, for if chapter 1 was concerned with ‘making’ remake theory, and chapters 2 and   151
3 explored ‘remaking’ across two case studies, then perhaps this chapter is best thought of as 
exploring ‘unmaking’, the unfolding to the others’ folding and refolding. Implicit in this sense 
of unmaking is the importance of the viewer and reviewer through time, a facet of remaking 
rarely explored in any philosophical depth. Nonetheless, any viewer of a remake is caught in a 
dual moment, which Linda Ruth Williams describes in a literary context: “in this way, links 
are made, connections and sequences established, the reader looks back as she reads on. 
Reading (perhaps all reading) proceeds in two different directions at once” (1995:134). Does 
this not go double for the viewer of the remake, and the reviewer of the original? It seems 
somewhat strange then, that the area least explored in remake theory is that of remake 
reception. 
   
 
The machine as ideal father: Rethinking the ‘return of the repressed’ with T2-as-
remake 
   
Anat Zanger considers the disguised remake with a structuralist approach, one which sees the 
concealment of a deeper, underlying arrangement of signifiers that society desperately 
attempts to quantify with surface-phenomena intended to conceal its replicant status. For 
example, Zanger argues that Alien
3, while not declaring itself as a version of Joan of Arc, 
nonetheless partakes in what Hrushovsky coined as a “double referential mechanism” 
(2006:108). Thus while it seems not to belong to the series of ‘Joan of Arc’ films, Zanger 
argues that it should be seen as a part of that series no less. However, far from falling into the 
trap of discovering every text to be a latent version of a Master-narrative, from Cinderella to 
Oedipus, as pointed out by Smith (1981) and Bellour (1979) respectively, I am keen to show 
that there really is a disguised remake with a real, tangible connection to a series it seems not 
to relate to. Deleuze did, after all, consider repetition as constituted only via a disguise 
affecting the terms and relations of the real series, writing that “repetition is truly that which 
disguises itself in constituting itself, that which constitutes itself only by disguising itself” 
(2009:19). After Deleuze, those remake theorists who argue that ‘latent’ or disguised 
remaking does not exist are forced to think again.  
  While Zanger’s work on the disguised remake will be useful here, I want primarily to 
move away from her structuralist approach towards a more fluid Deleuzian and Lacanian 
model which takes into account the jouissance of the remake; one which approaches its death 
drive. Key to this is an engagement with the notion of time, for as Linda Ruth Williams has 
argued, we ignore the temporality – and not just the historicity – of a text at our peril. 
Drawing on a Laplanchian psychoanalytic framework, Williams argues that any return to a 
prior moment contains “an intertextuality which operates temporally, as different time-zones   152
interpenetrate the ‘timelessness’ of fable with the specific unfolding of personal history” 
(1995:135). This sense of Freudian Nachträglichkeit (crudely translated as ‘deferral’) is so 
important to a film which is characterised by its status as not only a returning text, but one 
whose return is deferred (some time always elapses). Laplanche writes that “Nachträglichkeit 
means many things in German; it means the fact that something comes afterwards; it means 
also something like revenge or bearing a grudge, when you take revenge because of 
something that took place before” (1992:42). In much the same way, latent/disguised remakes 
can be seen as a form of revenge.  
  Firstly, we need to establish the precise nature of this type of remake ‘revenge’, for I 
want to be clear in saying that there is no Hollywood equivalent to the evil mastermind 
plotting world domination in a volcanic lair somewhere. This revenge is completely 
irrational; it is the arbitrary ‘event’ motivated by a pure insistent drive. In moving from the 
‘action-image’ in his first volume on cinema to the ‘time-image’ in his second volume, 
Deleuze explores the way that images impact on one another through time. The cut (découpe) 
extends in two directions at once, reaching back into the past and pushing forward into the 
future, creating a viewer who, not unlike Williams’s reader, is left facing in two directions at 
once. The cut creates space and meaning, as well as removing other spaces and alternate 
meanings (consider the meanings of the common film phrase “cutting room floor”).  
  While the time-image is much more than a ‘return of the repressed in the movies’, 
what if, via Lacan, we can show that as much as psychoanalytic film theorists have 
oversimplified Deleuze, these Deleuzians have also grossly oversimplified the return of the 
repressed? To put it simply, is it not that our conception in psychoanalysis of the return of the 
repressed – irrespective of its relationship to the cinematic form – is what is lacking in 
contemporary film theory? Suddenly our problem in remake theory becomes somewhat 
different: rather than use psychoanalytic theory to reveal the return of the repressed, would it 
not be more productive to use film remakes to reveal the return of the repressed in 
psychoanalysis? It is my thesis that Lacan, and Žižek after him, have been articulating 
something approaching Deleuze’s critique of the return of the repressed all along; did not 
Lacan observe that the true function of the unconscious is its profound relation with ‘the cut’ 
(1998:43). It is ‘vulgar’ Lacanian psychoanalysis that is to blame for remake theory becoming 
stuck on repeat, so to speak, hopelessly ill-equipped to deal with the issue of memory and 
time. What we need is a dose of filmosophy!  
  Robert Eberwein (1998) begins to approach the topic of time in remakes but stops 
short of actually addressing it. Zanger also writes that “repetition is, first and foremost, a 
movement in time” (2006:112), but similarly refrains from engaging with the philosophical 
weight of the issue. It is from this reluctance to deal with the question of time in remaking 
that I have identified what can be called the ‘master-question’ in remake theory, one that   153
consistently arises and yet as soon as it does, is just as reliably passed over in silence. This 
master-question appears in Kauffmann (1993:28), Durham (1998:180), Marks (1998), and 
Zanger (2006:18) as a version of the following: Is the remake still a remake without the 
original? This question not only recalls the old epistemological debate over whether a tree 
falling in a forest makes any noise if there is no-one to hear it, but, as with every master-
question, it conceals a hidden obverse (clear to any good semiotician), which can be written 
as: Is the original still an original without the remake? On the face of it, both versions of the 
question seem somewhat nonsensical; common sense leads us to answer “of course” to the 
former and “of course not” to the latter. However, what these simplified answers do not take 
into account is Deleuze’s logical sense (as opposed to his common/good sense), a sense 
constantly grappling with the paradox of being. 
  Žižek notes that Lacan’s work on the paradoxical nature of the return of the repressed 
concerns the manner by which the symptom returns to the subject. Laplanche writes that 
“‘afterwards’ is not the after-effect but it is also something going back to before” (1992:41). 
However, this sense of ‘going back to before’ does not adequately deal with the question: 
“From where does the repressed return?” Lacan’s answer is quite surprising, for he argues 
that it is not from the past, but “from the future” (Žižek, 2008a:58). The meaning of the 
symptom is not constructed from the constitutive trace it left in its buried historicity, but, 
rather, its retroactive reconstruction in analysis. It is the analytic process that enables the 
symptom to be approached as such, in which the very framework of the symptom is posited. 
What is the symptom prior to its return from the future? Put simply, it is nothing, a hole in the 
fabric awaiting the language with which it can be spoken into existence. Friedrich Schelling is 
right to loop Freud’s description of the uncanny as everything that “ought to have remained 
secret and hidden but has come to light” (1990: 345), back on itself, such that psychoanalysis 
not only tells us about this something, but “is such a ‘something’ itself” (cited in Cohen, 
2005:70). Objects and places are not uncanny in themselves but become uncanny in their 
relationship to subjects who observe them through time. “Every historical rupture”, writes 
Žižek, “every new advent of a new master-signifier, changes retroactively the meaning of all 
tradition, restructures the narration of the past, makes it readable in another, new way” 
(2008a:58). In remake terms, a film’s mise-en-scène becomes uncanny via a hallucinatory 
return which is split between two moments, between two spectators (who are one and the 
same person). Linda Ruth Williams writes that a film’s “Mise-en-scène is thus read as the 
film’s body, the site of symptomatic signs given out visually which the film’s narrative cannot 
bring itself to express” (1995:136). Meaning here is not fixed, for the depth of field of the 
time-image has as much to do with memory as it does with movement, leading to what 
Deleuze calls the “figure of temporalization” that “gives rise to all kinds of adventures in 
memory, which are not so much psychological accidents as misadventures of time,   154
disturbances of its constitution” (2009c:107). Is not the remake the ultimate cinematic 
expression of a misadventure of time? 
  Why is Freud’s essay on the uncanny rarely evoked in remake theory? One would 
imagine that all remakes are uncanny, no? The answer is simply that this ‘something’ is that 
which ought to have remained hidden, but has somehow been revealed. True remakes are 
declarative; their mise-en-scène does not contain the symptom but the fetish further disguising 
the symptom. If we widen the scope of our investigation to include Zanger’s ‘disguised 
version’, and take Deleuze’s figure of temporalisation into account, we will find that remakes 
achieving a sense of the uncanny are, by definition, remakes where we did not expect 
remaking, where the remaking should have remained concealed. These remakes are not 
remakes in the traditional sense at all, but hidden remakings, what I will call ‘irrational 
remakes’. Before I give some examples of irrational remakings, I must first provide a 
metaphor for this temporal paradox intrinsic to the remake. This metaphor is the counterpart 
of the facehugger from chapter 1, which we could designate as a metaphor for the jouissance 
of the remake, or what we might call the ‘material’ property of the remake. The metaphor is 
that of the terminator in James Cameron’s The Terminator (1984) and Terminator 2 (T2, 
1991), which, by extension, is a metaphor for the Lacanian drive of the remake, or what we 
might call the ‘memory’ of the remake. 
  It is in The Terminator’s idée fixe “The future is not set” that we should begin to see 
Lacan’s definition of the symptom as coming “from the future” take shape. The film’s plot 
begins with a complex temporal paradox set in a dystopian future where rebel humans battle 
artificially intelligent machines (Cyberdyne Systems) for supremacy. On the eve of a human 
victory, the resistance, inspired and led by John Conner, learns that the machines have sent a 
ruthlessly efficient cyborg, the T-800 (Arnold Schwarzenegger) to the past to terminate 
John’s mother, Sarah Conner (Linda Hamilton), effectively wiping out his very existence and 
crippling the resistance. John himself sends back a lone warrior, Kyle Reese (Michael Biehn), 
to protect his mother and as-yet unborn self from termination, and the film chronicles their 
ongoing fight for survival, a survival on which the future of mankind rests. Cameron revisited 
the Terminator story with a bigger budget in the hugely successful special effects-laden 
‘event’, Terminator 2: Judgement Day (T2, 1991). T2 features a remarkably similar storyline 
with only basic changes: this time it is a teenage John Conner (Edward Furlong) himself, and 
not Sarah Conner (reprised by Hamilton), who is to be protected, and a new model T-800 
(Schwarzenegger) has been sent by the resistance to protect him, while a more sophisticated 
‘liquid-metal’ T-1000 (Robert Patrick) is the machine sent to terminate him. 
  Many theorists have explored time travel in The Terminator from different 
perspectives, including the introduction of noir into the family home (see Fred Pfeil, 1993) 
and time travel as a critical dystopia of the primal scene itself (see Constance Penley, 1993).   155
Few, however, consider it in terms of remaking. Why not – simply because it was not 
marketed as such? There are two interconnected issues here: (1) is the sequel a type of 
remake? (2) Is the remake a type of genre? The answer to the question of whether sequels are 
remakes is that, at least in the context of this study, they perhaps should be considered so. 
While Lucy Mazdon actually evokes Terminator 2 to illustrate the differences between the 
sequel and the remake (2000:4), Carol Clover argues that sequels should be regarded as 
remakes because although they feature the continuation of a particular world, they really just 
retell the same story. In much the same way that different versions of the same film hide 
under new titles to indicate that the story has changed, Clover argues that sequels are in fact 
an even better way of hiding this remaking, since rather than simply negate their relationship 
to an original, sequels openly present that relationship as having a contingent signification 
(2000:131). Sequels are remakes which “hide in plain sight”, so to speak. This sense is 
complicated further by Robert Eberwein who writes that when the sequel is remade it “is 
itself the subject of multiple remakes” (1998:30); in other words it is a doubling that is then 
redoubled. 
  The second question about the issue concerning the remake as a genre category is 
somewhat more difficult to answer; however, I will now attempt to do so. This is yet another 
remake question that has been raised as many times as it has been insufficiently answered, 
and while they might not realise it, some genre theorists are actually already remake theorists. 
Linda Ruth Williams argues that “[genre] hybridity is endemic to the classical form” 
(2005:22), but Anat Zanger makes a distinction between the kind of hybridity ‘endemic’ to 
genres and the dynamics of repetition intrinsic to remaking. For example, when speaking 
about narrative comprehension in film, Edward Branigan has argued that narrative form is the 
most important way in which we perceive our environment, but that this narrative depends on 
our building of story structures “based on stories already told” (1992:1). Meaning, for 
Branigan, exists only when a specific pattern is achieved, which is one way of describing 
genre. One example can be found in Robert Ray’s claim that David Miller’s Flying Tigers 
(1942) is an unaccredited remake of Howard Hawks’s Only Angels Have Wings (1939), and 
on first glance he appears to be correct. However, Jennifer Forrest and Leonard R. Koos have 
been quick to point out that, taken in the context that a whole series of World War II combat 
films used the blueprint from Hawks’s original, Flying Tigers becomes less a remake and 
more “the first of many actualizations of the combat film subgenre” (2002:5). This confusion 
is what Constantine Verevis is aiming to reduce when she makes the important distinction 
between ‘cinematic remaking’ and ‘film remakes’, where the former belongs to any cinematic 
work that refers, revisits, or engages with any number of “technological, textual and cultural 
practices” (2006:vii), and the latter to remakes ‘proper’ (that is, as an industry category). 
Sometimes, changes in genre trends and production cycles help mask remakes, such as the   156
noir thriller, The Asphalt Jungle (1950), remade as a Western in The Badlanders (1958) to 
capitalise on the popularity of the Western at the time. Elsewhere, the remake might highlight 
a complex shift in the dynamics of a genre film, such as the remaking of classic noir, The 
Postman Always Rings Twice (1946), as a self-conscious neo-noir in 1981. Of course, one of 
the burning questions in remake theory follows the obvious similarity between Frank 
Krutnik’s description of genres as “frameworks for mediating between repetition and 
difference” (1991:11), and the same description of remakes. Perhaps the question “Is the 
remake a type of genre?” is thus incorrect; instead, let us be bold and ask instead: “Is the 
genre film a type of ‘cinematic remaking’?” 
  It is here that we run into our first clash between our irrational remake and Zanger’s 
disguised version, and it is the same issue identified originally in genre studies. I can already 
hear the film historian’s complaint of yet another ‘meta-discourse’ – the practice in academia 
of the inclusion and exclusion of texts via the categorisation of a series according to a specific 
academic perspective – recalling the statement falsely attributed to Hegel that, “If the facts 
don’t fit the theory, so much worse for the facts!”. Genre theorists such as Rick Altman 
(1999) and Steve Neale (2000), among others, argue that we must avoid collapsing 
institutional and analytical categories of genre, for as Andrew Tudor states: “(Genre notions) 
are not critics’ classifications made for special purposes; they are sets of cultural conventions. 
Genre is what we collectively believe it to be” (cited in Neale, 2000:18). Tudor is here 
alluding to the importance of institutional categories of film established in publicity and 
marketing, including the film’s distribution, exhibition, studio marketing departments, etc., all 
of which Lukow and Ricci (1984) have described as the film’s ‘inter-textual relay’ (which 
also includes the credit/title sequences). Primarily, the impact of the focus on the inter-textual 
relay is that the history of a genre term, such as ‘Horror’, is as much a history of the term 
itself as it is of the film to which that term is being applied. 
  However, this very prohibition against academic ‘meddling’ with industry categories 
fails to take into account much of what I have been arguing in this study: that, as Zanger 
observes, “no ‘meta-version’ exists” (2006:123), cinematic marketing is just as subject to 
repression and unconscious wish-fulfilment as any other discourse. In fact, I would go so far 
as to state that instead of inhibiting my designation of the irrational remake, the fact that these 
films were never marketed as such actually contributes further to their irrationality; if it were 
marketed as a remake, it would cease to be irrational. These are unconscious repetitions and 
after all, why not? I have been giving evidence throughout this thesis both diachronically and 
synchronically to prove that remaking far exceeds all industry categorisations. This is where 
Zanger’s disguised remake shows limitations that our irrational model will not: her 
structuralist model is ill-equipped to deal with the unconscious, the common complaint of the 
deconstructionist. To submit to Tudor’s view above is effectively to close doors, and to argue   157
that meticulous historical research into production and marketing are our only options for 
categorisation. Otherwise, we can go the way of the deconstructionist and look to the 
Derridean deferral of meaning, the proliferation of endless signification giving way to 
ambiguity and formlessness. For the Lacanian, there is always a third option, one which 
actually recalls Michel Foucault’s sense of a textual ‘episteme’ (épistémè), wherein the work 
is positioned in relation to the dialogues which shaped it, as well as those into which it 
entered and by turns, shaped. These texts mark a discursive break, a point at which history 
shifted. For Foucault, the historian always partly constructs his or her subject matter, thus 
when the remake enters a semiotic field it is necessarily disturbed, made problematic, 
something that cannot be wholly reduced to marketing factors.  
  Let us reframe this debate using our terminator metaphor, for when Kyle Reese and 
John Conner, in The Terminator and T2 respectively, announce (with clear Marxist overtones) 
that “The future’s not set. There’s no fate but what we make for ourselves”, we get our first 
möbius entanglement crucial to ruining the view that T2 is nothing more than a sequel. With 
this declaration, John Conner is quoting from his mother, who learned the words from Kyle 
Reese (John’s biological father) in the original movie. While this seems to suggest that these 
films relate to one another as sequels (with crucial knowledge being passed from the former 
to the latter), the filmic chain radically loops back on itself when we remember that in the 
original, Kyle was himself quoting from a speech he learned from John in the future. Thus the 
suturing point for this möbius band, if we collapse it, is John quoting himself – not from the 
past – but from the future. Once again we find ourselves in Lynchian territory, where the 
meaningless phrase returns from the future to bring into effect, the actions of the past. As 
such, our first job is to reverse the phrase, and translate the speech into Lacanese, rendering it 
as “The past is not set, there is no history but what we make for ourselves in the future.” In 
remake terms, this sense is clear even in the most elementary of dimensions: for example, to 
return to our case studies, we cannot simply say that Van Sant’s Psycho had no effect on 
Hitchcock’s original, or that The Vanishing had no effect on Spoorloos (we can even satisfy 
the film historian on this count by indicating the re-marketing of the original, etc.).  
  However, this analysis is still rooted in Bergson’s matter, or the remake equivalent of 
Deleuze’s ‘movement-image’. How do we move on to engage with memory, or the remake in 
memoriam (the connotations of death are appropriate here)? One remake theorist committed 
to showing that the original is not fixed, but is disturbed by its remaking through time, is 
Robert Eberwein, who uses the Invasion of the Body Snatchers as an example. However, 
while Eberwein seems dedicated to introducing some much-needed temporal fluidity to 
remake criticism, he begins by stating that he will not address Abel Ferrara’s Body Snatchers 
remake because “it will remain for later critics to look back and speculate on the condition of 
reception for the film in a way that I am convinced we really can’t since we are inside the   158
historical and cultural moment” (1998:16). Quite apart from confirming my earlier thesis that 
this is a film largely ignored in the Invasion series in critical opinion, Eberwein has also 
slightly missed the point here, despite otherwise producing an excellent analysis of the earlier 
films in the series. Our reproach to Eberwein should be that in reactivating the semiotic field 
of the earlier Invasion films, Ferrara’s remake disturbs the spatio-temporality of the original 
versions as well. It effectively proves that the “historical and cultural moment” is not set. One 
cannot simply separate these texts out from one another: just as it is inconceivable that one 
can speak of a remake without addressing its original, it is my thesis that we can no longer 
speak of originals without addressing their remakes. 
  Eberwein almost says as much in his introduction when he writes that “in one sense, 
the original is a fixed entity. But in another sense it is not”. He then goes on to provide the 
familiar qualification: “please understand that I am not arguing that a return to the original 
will necessarily yield a ‘new’ meaning in the film” (1998:15). My question is: Why not? 
Eberwein himself says that “a remake is a kind of reading or rereading of the original. To 
follow this reading or rereading, we have to interrogate not only our own conditions of 
reception but also to return to the original and reopen the question of its reception” (1998:15). 
However, unless meaning is unequivocally ‘fixed’ this point becomes rather moot, for the text 
is not fixed, but always embryonic in its proliferation of hidden streams of meaning that posit 
and re-posit the viewer at every turn, pushing into new spaces and times. 
  However, as I keep stressing, it is not my desire to get lost in a poststructuralist 
proliferation of deferred meaning, hence the absence of Derrida from my bibliography. 
Rather, if we return to T2, I want to show how the original is fixed by its 
sequelisation/remaking; how definitive meaning can and is produced but repressed at the site 
of its reproduction. T2 provides another example that reflects its own dynamic textual status 
at the level of plot and story, for another striking quotation replicated across the two versions 
is Sarah Conner’s discussion about John’s paternal origins. In the original, Sarah speaks to 
her unborn son via a tape-recorder, asking “Should I tell you about your father? That’s a 
tough one. Will it change your decision to send him here… knowing? But if you don’t send 
Kyle, you could never be. God, you can go crazy thinking about all this”. Lacan writes that “it 
counts, it is counted, and the one who counts is already included in the account” (1998:20), as 
in the anecdote about a child who says that “I have three brothers, Paul, Ernest and me”. 
Lacan is keen to observe that the mistake here is to assume that the child is wrong, for “it is 
quite natural – first the three brothers, Paul, Ernest and I are counted, and then there is I at the 
level at which I am to reflect the first I, that is to say, the I who counts” (1998:20). Sarah 
Conner has, of course, forgotten to include herself in the equation here, of her own 
reconstruction as the maternal original, and this is exactly the minimal difference between the 
original and the irrational remake: first we have the original which has X versions (including   159
itself) and second we have ‘it’, the original as an event with an underlying being capable of 
producing more than it knows. Recall, for example, how Elsaesser (2001) distinguishes 
between the ‘text’ of Psycho and the ‘event’ of Psycho. In true remakes the subject does not 
‘overlook’ its own inclusion in the ‘text’ of the film, and as Lacan writes, “one only has to be 
aware of the fact to find oneself outside it” (1977:vii), such that in knowingly counting 
oneself, one removes oneself from the counted; if nothing is overlooked and the remake 
knows it is a remake, then in knowing, it is, as Lacan writes, in error; that is, it becomes 
ignorant of the symbolic fiction (‘text’) which sustains it (as ‘event’). 
  The difference between Sarah Conner’s message in the original Terminator and the 
message in T2 is this same minimal difference between the subject who is counted and the 
subject who counts, hence why the message in the original is a recording addressed to a future 
subject within the diegesis, the ‘little other’ literally waiting to be born. By contrast, the 
message in the sequel is addressed to none other than the symbolic order itself, the non-
diegetic ‘big Other’ to whom voice-overs are always addressed in film: 
 
Watching John with the machine, it was suddenly so clear. The terminator wouldn’t stop, it 
would never leave him. It would never hurt him or shout at him or get drunk and hit him or 
say it was too busy to spend time with him. And it would die to protect him. Of all the would-
be-fathers that came over the years, this thing, this machine, was the only thing that measured 
up. In an insane world, it was the sanest choice.   
 
We should note the radical shift also from Kyle Reese as the father of the original message to 
the T-800 as the father of this new message (adding new meaning to Lacan’s “There where it 
was, it is my duty that I should come into being”, ‘it’ being the machine). In the original 
message, Reese is the dead, or symbolic, father internalised only as the memory of his name, 
which in Oedipal terms recalls the fact that John sent his own father to his death. In the 
revised message it is Kyle’s murderer, the T-800, who is idealised as a Lacanian imaginary 
father, one who is either an ideal or an evil cruel agent who imposes His Will (like a God), 
“ruining the child” (Lacan, 1992:308). Is it any wonder that John is thrown hopelessly into 
Platonic confusion in T2?
* However, if we reverse the designations, the message still makes 
sense, for we can also consider Kyle as an imaginary father and the T-800 as a symbolic 
father. This is no progression but a flow of pure becoming, as Deleuze would say, where the 
T-800 is a being-for-death, whose termination in the original film established the framework 
enabling Cyberdyne Systems to initiate ‘Skynet’ (after the company recover its processor and 
skeletal arm protruding from a compactor). It is significant that Kyle Reese’s last words are 
                                                 
* Suffice it to recall that one of T2’s trailers features a production line of T-800s all bearing 
Schwarzenegger’s image. The trailer was created specifically to differentiate between the old evil T-
800 and the new one without, of course, spoiling the fact that the new version is good.    160
“Come on, motherfucker!”, for as Constance Penley points out, he is actually the mother-
fucker (1993:69). Kyle is what Lacan would call a pure ‘fucker’, since while he explicitly 
‘fucks’ Sarah Conner, he is coded as an inexperienced (virginal) and boyish lover being 
initiated by a maternal woman, rather than a potential father. This continual traversal of the 
two fathers is cemented by the (possibly apocryphal) rumour that James Cameron’s initial 
proposal for the casting of the two terminators in the sequel was for Michael Biehn to return 
alongside Schwarzenegger as the ‘bad’ T-1000. This plot twist would have been perfect for 
the Deleuzo-Lacanian film theorist, resonating clearly with the dual figure of the evil/good 
neighbour. 
  Just as our Alien facehugger metaphor demonstrated a sexualised maternal Thing 
impregnating new versions with jouissance, this new Terminator metaphor demonstrates a 
desexualised paternal Law positing the original as such. We can see this in Sarah Conner’s 
move from Kyle Reese to the T-800, which illustrates that she has learned a valuable lesson 
regarding all good and evil fathers. At first Sarah is horrified at the sight of the T-800, 
although her horror is not that it is somehow the same old evil version from the original 
movie, but that the earlier model was arbitrarily coded as evil in the first place, while this 
version – the same model but different version – is good. Recall Žižek’s point concerning 
Madeleine in Vertigo as destabilising, not the reproduction of the perfect form (that Scottie 
cannot dress Judy perfectly enough as a version of Madeleine), but the form itself (that there 
is something wrong with the very model of Madeleine). We have the same problem with 
remakes in that we misrecognise the original forms and make no distinction between the 
‘version’ and the ‘model’. Thus it is not the disguised remake itself which is irrational, but the 
process of remaking in this particular way that recodes the original content as irrationally 
motivated, as containing a drive that we cannot simply attribute to Hollywood avarice. 
Ultimately, the remake is not unlike the opposition between John Conner and Kyle Reese, 
both as father and son in a möbius entanglement that can only be severed by the T-800: as the 
French say, it is the sense of ‘peut être et avoir été’ (‘to be and have been’), to which we need 
only make a small addition, which is: ‘to come and have come (that is, ‘arrive’ in both senses 
of Freud’s Wo es war)’.  
 
 
Why is the irrational remake irrational? From the simulacra-phantasm to the copy-icon 
in the primal scene 
 
The key here is, as ever, the topology of the möbius band and its supplement is the radical 
dimension of the Thing which curves its space. We should read the original T-800’s severed 
arm from the original as the objet petit a, the object of jouissance that instigates everything   161
(including itself). It is no coincidence that, as a complementary metaphor to the facehugger 
from Alien, they look remarkably similar; does not the alien also posit its own existence? To 
cement this unholy unity between the metaphors of the T-800 and the facehugger, we need 
only recall Dan O’Bannon’s description of the latter as responsible for “alien interspecies 
rape”, and the fact that the terminator’s penetration of Sarah’s thigh in the original has been 
described as “a kind of cold rape” (cited in Penley, 1993:66). In one scene from T2 the T-800 
convinces Miles Dyson (Joe Morton) – the unwitting architect of Cyberdyne Systems – that 
the holocaust of the human race is a future reality by slicing the skin from its hand and arm, 
revealing the metallic endoskeleton beneath.  
 
 
Fig. 4.1: Terminator bone in T2 
 
This deliciously abject moment nicely reminds us of the unstoppable mechanistic life teeming 
beneath the living façade in an underrated moment worthy of Lynch at his best (the 
similarities between the mechanistic movements and sinewy tensions of the arm and Blue 
Velvet’s opening scene where we move from sunny flowers to the crawling insects under the 
penetrating gaze of the microscopic shot is uncanny in itself). Recall Lacan’s description from 
chapter 1 of the lamella ten years prior to the filming of Alien and how tantalisingly close it 
comes to also describing the alien facehugger. The same description also seems to express the 
evil terminator in this series also (especially the T-1000’s liquid constitution). It is worth 
repeating part of that description:  
 
It is the libido, qua pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, or irrepressible life, life that 
has no need of organ, simplified, indestructible life. It is precisely what is subtracted from the 
living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexed reproduction (Lacan, 
1998:198).  
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The uncanny horror in this scene is not brought about by the transition from human flesh to 
metallic bone, but, rather, the fact that just beneath the skin there resides a pure substance that 
seems to be more alive than life itself. Put simply, while the T-800 is stripping away the 
living tissue revealing the undead metal beneath, it is in fact this metallic structure that 
represents the shiny, pure life of jouissance, of enjoyment-as-suffering. Any relief in the face 
of jouissance (relief say, in terminating a terminator), is undercut by the fact that this 
destruction only leads to more life (that one termination plants the seed for other – more 
sophisticated – terminators to follow). 
  But there is more here concerning remakes when we consider the machinic quality of 
Lacan’s description from above, a quality that the facehugger metaphor only partially 
embodies. The key is Lacan’s evocation of the Aristotelian ‘tuché’, or what he calls the 
encounter with the Real. Lacan writes that in order to fully appreciate Aristotle’s tuché we 
must first master the important distinction between Freud’s sense of ‘reproduction’ 
(‘reproduzieren’) and his sense of ‘repetition’ (‘wiederholen’), which are frequently conflated 
as concepts. Paolo Cherchi Usai makes the distinction between reproduction and repetition in 
film, noting that  
 
the assumption is that the spectator is indifferent to the fact that the moving image is derived 
from a matrix, and believes in the possibility of seeing it again under the same conditions as 
previously. From that standpoint, as much as in oral literature, cinema is not based on 
reproduction. It is an art of repetition (2001:59). 
 
In remake terms, repetition first appears in a form that is obscured, that is not self-evident, 
and which designates itself as ‘other’. Lacan writes that “nothing has been more enigmatic 
than this Wiederholen, which is very close, so the most prudent etymologists tell us, to the 
verb ‘to haul’ (haler) […] very close to a hauling of the subject” (1998:50-1). Indeed, this 
sense of being hauled into being (across time), of there being a moment at which the subject 
becomes what it always was, depends on a repetition of this traumatic act. The trouble with 
remakes is that this tuché, this encounter with the Real, is disguised by the automaton, the 
mechanical reproduction, ‘reproduzieren’, at the level of the symbolic. It is, however, no less 
subjected to this sense of being hauled into being (suffice it to recall Schwarzenegger’s 
catchphrase, “I’ll be back”, in which he is not just ‘back’, but back from the dead).   
  I propose that every original film retroactively established as such, contains such a 
tuché concealed within an automaton, that is, a repetition concealed inside a reproduction 
which is homologous with it. It is our goal to strip away the false ‘flesh’ (which is just a 
disguise), and reveal the bare mechanical workings of jouissance beneath the skin. However, 
this terminator metaphor must be viewed as having a contingent, and constantly evolving,   163
relationship to time. In the flesh strip-scene mentioned above, the shock is not that of the 
Dyson family seeing metal where they expected bone, but of the spectator him/herself seeing 
metal where they expected metal. It is the shock of seeing what we knew was there but had 
disavowed from reality. In everyday life this is the same difference between seeing meat that 
has been shaved, gutted, and packaged in a supermarket and seeing it hanging on a hook in an 
abattoir; it is the same meat only presented in a manner to which we are not accustomed. This 
is why the irrational remake is a kind of revenge (it is enough, of course, to find a simple 
animal hair in our meat, let alone some bone or a piece of shot). 
  While our zombie metaphor seems more appropriate than ever, it is a mistake to 
forget the ghost metaphor here, for in sharp contrast to the machinic rebirth of the T-800 in 
this series of films, Robert Patrick’s T-1000 can blend into the crowd with a spectral non-
presence as the ultimate embodiment of the pure thing. In sharp contrast to Schwarzenegger’s 
unwieldiness, Patrick is lithe, an everyman seemingly capable of being literally any-thing 
(including Sarah Conner’s doppelgänger at the end of the film). Here, we are not faced with 
the classic “ghost in the machine” but the reverse: it is the machine in the ghost, which Žižek 
writes of in another context: “there is no plotting agent behind it, the machine just runs by 
itself, as a blind contingent device” (2008d:6). Does not the film’s tagline “It’s nothing 
personal” (intended as a pun on the common action tagline of the 1980s and 90s, “This time, 
it’s personal”) confirm this? Ultimately, the remake could have the same motto, that there is 
nothing personal in its attack on the original, but, rather, it is merely the realisation of a 
motiveless, machinic insistence devoid of moralistic functioning. This is why we need the 
terminator metaphor as the counterpart to the facehugger metaphor; one or the other will not 
do, for just as the terminator has an organic aesthetic disguising a machinic being, so too does 
the facehugger have a machinic aesthetic disguising an organic being. By extension, the 
zombie is both pure dripping flesh and machinic insistence, and the ghost is both pure spectral 
insistence and the remainder of an absent corporeality. We can easily move from Freud’s 
reproduzieren to his wiederholen by imagining some remake twists on Benjamin’s ‘The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, including: ‘The Remake in the Age of 
Mechanical Repetition’… 
  On a ‘making of’ documentary (2000), James Cameron stated that the Universal 
Studios ride ‘T2 3-D: Battle Across time’ was “a stepping stone to a third theatrical 
production” (2000) of the Terminator franchise, a film he fully intended to direct. However, 
soon after, Cameron declined the chance to direct Terminator 3, stating that he had “never 
planned on doing a third film, because the story was finished with T2” (2000). While it seems 
on the surface as though Cameron is implying that the story was finished with T2 because 
across the two films he fully explored these themes, on the contrary, we should read his 
statement as meaning that he explored the issues fully only after he remade the original and   164
established the möbius loop. T2 is thus what Deleuze would call a copy-icon, a positive 
repetition that reveals the hidden content in the original left unarticulated. The subsequent 
Terminator sequels (Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines, Terminator Salvation, and proposed 
others in pre-production) are merely what Deleuze would call simulacra-phantasms, ‘bad 
copies’ that efface the Newness of the original concept. Instead, these simulacra-phantasms 
favour a degraded return to some secondary process revealing nothing, but concealing a 
distinct lack of surface-depth. What is perhaps most depressing about the most recent version, 
Terminator Salvation (2009), is that it had a really good premise: that of a human (Sam 
Worthington) who is actually transformed into a machine that has no conception of itself as a 
machine but still believes itself to be human. Unfortunately, this premise was lost in a haze of 
explosions and missiles, such that its ‘Blade Runner-esque’ depth was reduced to a simple 
Hitchcockian MacGuffin, what Žižek would call a vanishing mediator. See how this 
distinction between the copy-icon and the simulacra-phantasm runs along a knife’s edge?  
  While it seems as though I agree with Deleuze’s condemnation of the simulacra-
phantasm, I must stress that this does not mean that we should stop considering them, for they 
nonetheless aid us in finding the irrational remakings. Žižek notes that when Plato dismisses 
art as copies of copies and introduces three ontological levels (ideas, their material copies, 
and copies of these copies), “what gets lost is that the Idea can emerge only in the distance 
that separates our ordinary material reality (second level) from its copy” (2004a:160). Thus 
for Žižek, when we copy a material object we are copying the object’s Idea, not the object 
itself. “It is similar”, continues Žižek, “with a mask that engenders a third reality, a ghost in 
the mask that is not the face hidden beneath it […] the Idea is something that appears when 
reality (the first-level copy/imitation of the Idea) is itself copied” (2004a:160). Here, Žižek is 
suggesting that we must look to that which is in the copy, in excess of the original. Deleuze is 
keen to emphasise that Platonism is reversed when the simulacrum rises to the level of the 
icon and copy, leading to that Nietzschean ‘Twilight of the Idols’ which “denies the original 
and the copy, the model and the reproduction” (2009b:299). In the face of such a rising 
phantasm, the model simply ceases to be.  
  In light of this critical failure of the idol, perhaps we should suggest that the logical 
counterpart to The Terminator films is Robert Zemeckis’s Back to the Future (1985), for if 
the Terminator series is concerned with the (re)construction of paternal authority, the latter is 
concerned with the (de)construction of maternal desire. One of Freud’s most scandalous 
propositions was that as babies we develop our sexuality via our mother’s touch: “she strokes 
him [the child], rocks him and quite clearly treats him as a substitute for a complete sexual 
object” (Freud, 2001:222). In an inversion of John Conner’s situation, Back to the Future’s 
protagonist, Marty McFly (Michael J. Fox), travels back to the past himself, and in the 
process he manages to erases his own history by interrupting a ‘quilting’ moment between his   165
future mother and father. In a calamitous situation, Marty replaces his father as the object of 
his mother’s affection and actually ruins his father’s own chances with her. Whereas John 
Conner sends his own father back to the past to create the framework for the event of his 
being, Marty McFly removes his father from the past to destroy this seminal (‘semen’-al) 
framework. Instead, Marty supplants his father as the object of his mother’s desire. Constance 
Penley argues that the success of this otherwise “banal and clumsily made” (1993:67) film is 
down to its construction of a formative desire articulated by Freud as the primal scene, or, as 
Penley puts it, the theme: “what would it be like to go back in time and give birth to oneself?” 
(1993:68). For Freud, the primal scene occurs when a child hears his or her parents having 
sex and thus is catapulted both into the scene of his or her conception, and the sex scene itself. 
Penley points out that the clue is in Back to the Future’s TV advert, which boasted a tale 
about “The first kid to get into trouble before he was ever born” (1993:68); while this may be 
true, Marty McFly does not even come close to the kinds of trouble that John Conner gets into 
before he was ever born.  
  Both of the incestuous bonds in these films fulfill the same historical requirement, 
where, in traveling to the past, the protagonist becomes what he always-already was; that is, 
he realises the ‘destiny’ he was already living.
* The remake functions in precisely the same 
analogous way, both as the paternal drive towards self-destruction and the supplanting of the 
original, and as the maternal self-preservationist/restorative desire for the original. Lacan 
wrote that “things which mean nothing all of a sudden signify something, but in a quite 
different domain” (1988:158), and it is my thesis that it is only when the repetition inherent to 
the original is properly activated in a copy-icon that it is recognised as a ‘great’ film, which 
returns to Linda Ruth Williams discussion of textual Nachträglichkeit. Did not Psycho and 
Spoorloos experience something of a delay in being recognised as a classic and cult films 
respectively? Suffice it to recall that, upon being asked his opinion on the impact of the 
French Revolution of 1789, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai simply replied that “It was far 
too early to tell”. These are not simply Platonic copies of copies in a Warholian negation of 
their originals but the ultimate establishment of the Great Original itself, the establishing of 
the big original Idea.   
  But why is this irrational remake irrational? The psychoanalytic answer is provided 
by Sebastian Gardner, who describes psychoanalytic ‘irrationality’ as being exhibited when a 
subject does not  
 
                                                 
* In the same way as the ideal version of Terminator 2 would have been for Michael Biehn – John’s 
real father in the original – to return as his destroyer alongside Schwarzenegger in the reversed role, 
would not the perfect Oedipalisation of Back to the Future be where Marty McFly, unbeknownst to 
him, actually did consummate the relationship with his mother (preferably in the back-seat of the 
DeLorean)?   166
think about himself in a way that would both make adequate sense of his own thoughts and/or 
action, and at the same time avoid exhibiting incompleteness, incoherence, inconsistency, 
lapse into unintelligibility, or some other defect of a void to signify, in a suitably broad sense, 
self contradiction” (1993:3-4). 
 
For Gardner, the irrational subject of psychoanalysis is one who fails the test of self-
confrontation, one who is unable either to justify or explain him or herself, or else in 
attempting to do so, betrays a failure of self-knowledge (in other words, for Gardner, we are 
all irrational subjects). Ultimately, Gardner leaves us with the axiom that the subject who 
experiences him/herself as rational contradicts his/her own rationality. The Deleuzian 
approach to irrationality resonates with this, for Deleuze writes that 
 
the cut, or interstice, between two series of images no longer forms part of either of the two 
series: it is the equivalent of an irrational cut, which determines the non-commensurable 
relations between images […] Ultimately, there are no longer any rational cuts, but only 
irrational ones (2009:205-6). 
 
This description is exactly what happens in Sarah Conner’s first meeting with the T-800 in 
T2, where audience knowledge is momentarily undermined via the time-image, or what 
Deleuze also called film-thinking/feeling. The irrational cut is, for Deleuze, the difference 
between classical and post-classical cinema, between objective film-being and subjective 
film-thinking, and I wish to extend this logic to the remake, and differentiate between 
objective remaking and subjective remaking. Let us now return (appropriately) to Psycho and 
look at two examples of irrational remaking which focus on a failure of self-knowledge, 
examples to be found in an unobvious part of its textual edifice: the flushing toilet. 
 
 
The exploding toilet (or how to have a proper conversation with Norman Bates): The 
time-image in the irrational remake 
 
Harvey Greenberg comes up with a perfect metaphor for remaking when he writes that:  
 
In poker, when cards are poorly shuffled and redealt the result is often a ‘ghost hand.’ If the 
last hand was good, its ghost hand is likely to be a poor, watered-down thing better left 
unplayed. In their long Hollywood history, most remakes of earlier films have been ghost 
hands (1998:115). 
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There is more to Greenberg’s metaphor than meets the eye here, beyond a view of the remake 
as a kind of shadow of a former ‘hand’. That it connects to our discussion of the partial organ 
as ghostly remainder is appropriate to begin with, but perhaps more interesting is the 
implication that a weak ghost hand is somehow destined to come up following a strong one, a 
mathematical certainty which nonetheless appears as something uncanny, recalling Žižek’s 
‘machine in the ghost’. Furthermore, there is in this image an appropriate Deleuzian 
connotation with the irrational cutting (decoupage) of the deck: while in the minds of the 
players, these cards could produce any number of complex variations, what emerges is 
something far more sinister, as though the dealer is somehow transcendent here.  
  The irrational remake is precisely this ghost hand, an interstice between an original 
and a remake which no longer forms part of either version, but reveals a new space for 
meaning in-between the two. This irrational cut is temporally contingent, as my reading of the 
Terminator films above stresses, and as such it can only be viewed in the transition from the 
one game to the other and back again, not in isolation. The ‘ghost hand’ is only a ghost hand 
if both hands are played and remembered in series; this is then, always a relational level of 
experience. To attempt to see it in a singular work is to miss the mark, to search in the wrong 
place – suffice it to recall the third stage of the remake process in chapter 1’s analogy of the 
Alien reproductive cycle, where in analysing the dead facehugger the crew misses the fact that 
it has already shifted elsewhere (into the throat, the chest, the dining-room table, etc…).  
  Ultimately, it is Žižek who describes the ghost hand of remaking in his description of 
Van Sant’s Psycho as one of only two ways do an “ideal” remake of a Hitchcock film.
* For 
him, if one merely tries to imitate Hitchcockian sinthoms (images containing jolts of 
jouissance, for example: the shower scene), the result is “a Shakespeare Made Easy output” 
(Žižek, 2008c:234) – any number of true remakes could be included as examples here. 
According to Žižek, the first kind of ‘ideal’ Hitchcock remake is the recreation of its ideal 
form; that is, a shot-for-shot remake (such as Van Sant’s) which replicates exactly every 
frame of the original in order to create an uncanny double. In this exact replica, the 
irreducible differences become additionally overt, rendering it all the more palpable that we 
are indeed dealing with an entirely different film. This is why Žižek describes Van Sant’s film 
as a “failed masterpiece, rather than a simple failure” (2008c:234), because while it attempted 
to achieve this state of uncanniness, it ultimately failed to do so for the very reasons we 
explored in chapter 2 (the real question is whether Van Sant could ever have succeeded). To 
return to Greenberg’s poker metaphor, we could regard this as the effect of a player who 
‘stacks the deck’, which is to say, cheats to achieve that perfect hand again…  
                                                 
* While I am interested in introducing Žižek’s ideas about this kind of remaking I am not keen on his 
word ‘ideal’ here, primarily because it is somewhat restrictive and over-simplified, another reason why 
I have suggested ‘irrational’.     168
  The second kind of ‘ideal’ remake is to be found elsewhere however. In fact, for 
Žižek, just as the first kind of proper Hitchcock remake is to be found in the most obvious 
places (high-profile shot-for-shot remakes, etc.), the second kind are to be found in the most 
obscure places, ‘disguised’, as Zanger would put it. John Orr argues something similar when 
he writes that Van Sant’s “real attempt” to remake Psycho is his meditation on the 1999 
Columbine High School Massacre, Elephant (2003), and not his actual shot-for-shot remake 
(2005:3). Although I do not entirely agree with him, he is thinking along the right lines here, 
for the ‘real attempts’ to remake Psycho are not to be found in the countless homages, pop 
references, and allusions. Rather, Žižek’s second ‘ideal’ Hitchcock remake is to be found in 
those films which “stage”, as Žižek argues, “in a well-calculated strategic move, one of the 
alternative scenarios that underlie the one actualized by Hitchcock, like the remake of 
Notorious in which Ingrid Bergman survives alone” (2008c:235). In this way, Žižek argues 
that this second type of ‘ideal’ remake poses a challenge to its original by realising an 
alternative historicity, one which radically contemporises, rather than dates, this act of 
filmmaking. As the definition in the epigraph to this chapter suggests, irrational numbers have 
an infinite and non-recurring expansion, and in the same way we are not dealing with simple 
recurrence in irrational remakes either. This time, rather than being in the situation of the true 
remaker playing a poor ghost hand following a good original hand, or the first type of ideal 
remaker stacking the deck, the irrational remaker need simply play the poor, neglected hand 
from the previous game, knowing full well that a poor shuffler will provide them with a good 
ghost hand in the next game. What would such a remake look like? Žižek offers Francis Ford 
Coppola’s The Conversation (1974) as an ‘ideal’ version of Psycho, but stops short of going 
far enough into this example to really explore this as a remake. I propose to do this, and 
suggest The Conversation as an exemplar of irrational remaking.  
  So, if the irrational remake stages one of the alternative scenarios that underlie the 
one actualised by Hitchcock, which of Psycho’s unplayed scenarios is staged in The 
Conversation? The film follows professional surveillance specialist, Harry Caul (Gene 
Hackman), who, having stumbled on a murder plot after reconstructing a conversation 
between a couple in a noisy park, convinces himself that someone will soon be murdered in a 
hotel. He books himself into the neighbouring room, and sure enough, following the muffled 
sounds of an argument on the balcony adjoining the rooms and separated only by frosted 
glass, Harry witnesses a shadowy body thrust up against the partition with a bloody smear. 
Having been traumatised by what he witnesses, Harry waits long enough for the murderer to 
be long gone before he climbs onto the balcony of the next room to inspect it for clues that the 
murder has indeed taken place. Doubting his own sanity, Harry first inspects the toilet and 
bathroom sink for traces of blood, and then in a self-conscious allusion to Psycho, inspects the 
shower and plug-hole (see below). Breathing a sigh of relief at the lack of blood, Harry   169
catches sight of the toilet once more and with a clear sense of foreboding he breaks the hotel 
seal before pulling the toilet chain. To his horror, the water begins to cloud with blood and 
well up over the side, spilling on the floor and around his feet.  
 
 
Fig. 4.2: The Conversation’s Harry Caul inspecting the plug-hole and the spewing toilet 
 
This terrifying scene in The Conversation is just about the only connection to Psycho in an 
otherwise unrelated thriller, and yet the scene resonates beyond mere film quotation or 
allusion. Why? The focus on the plug hole of the shower followed by an exploding toilet is 
both distinctive and the double condemnation of habit and memory: not only is there no doubt 
as to which film audience members are thinking of when Harry inspects the plug-hole of the 
shower, but there is also no doubt as to which film Harry himself is thinking of. Psycho is 
here a part of the textual fabric of this film; not just a textual allusion for the ‘knowing 
spectator’ or allegorical wink in the direction of the film connoisseur, but a traumatic 
flashback to a moment of absolute unexpectedness recalling the moment of Marion’s murder 
in the original Psycho itself (another ‘Real’ shower scene then). But why is this not simply a 
film quotation? 
  Harry’s inter-textual knowledge is undermined along with the audience’s, as the toilet 
itself becomes the focal point of the scene, overriding the shower as the usual locus. 
Audiences familiar with Psycho will almost certainly recall the shot immediately prior to the 
shower scene in which Marion flushes a torn-up note (on which the details of her crime are 
written) down the toilet. In fact, Psycho’s censors objected more to the shot of a flushing 
toilet (the first in Hollywood history) than to any of the shots in the shower scene. Thus 
Coppola is acknowledging not only the semantic link between these shots (that is, they are 
connected by Marion’s actual murder), and the clear visual link (that is, the swirling of the 
water down the hole), but also the historical link. Compare the couplet above from The 
Conversation with the couplet below from Psycho to see the remarkable similarity:  
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Fig. 4.3: Water swirling down the toilet and then down the plug-hole in Psycho 
 
The repetition of these images is reversed in The Conversation, from the direction toilet-sink 
to sink-toilet in much the same way as the very function of the toilet is reversed also, spewing 
back, as opposed to flushing away, its contents. If we follow Deleuze’s lead, this reference in 
The Conversation’s bathroom scene is not of the order of generality as there is no new 
concept being evolved here, no variation on the theme; it has no exchange value. Rather, The 
Conversation is extending that which is already implicit in Psycho, repeating the excess of the 
original’s textuality, that is, the horror of the shot in Psycho of the flushing toilet leading to 
the demise of the film’s protagonist.  
  The Conversation presents Harry as being quite particular (anal), as someone who 
enjoys cleanliness and order, bringing him into sharp alignment with Norman Bates. 
However, to really prove this point about the exploding toilet as the irrational repetition 
inherent to Psycho, we need only look at how this scene in The Conversation is subsequently 
reincorporated back in the Psycho series via the first sequel, Psycho II, which features a near-
identical scene featuring Norman himself. One can only speculate here, but it seems a near-
certainty that Psycho II is referencing The Conversation’s exploding toilet in an early scene 
following a suspicious murder when, upon inspecting a gurgling toilet, Norman pulls the 
chain, which instead of flushing its contents, spills them over the floor.  
 
 
Fig. 4.4: The spewing toilet and plug-hole: Psycho II 
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This scene in Psycho II twists the original Psycho and The Conversation around one another 
in seamless homology, for this time Norman goes straight to the toilet without even bothering 
to check the plug-hole, as though he had seen The Conversation. To make matters worse for 
Norman, blood begins to ooze from the plug-hole in the shower also. The usual relationship 
between cause-and-effect here is radically disrupted as murderous secrets spill over clean 
white bathroom tiles to the evident surprise of the flusher.
* 
  The exploding toilet scene is a Deleuzian ‘time-image’ par excellence, for as Deleuze 
writes, it is with the time-image that “we are plunged into time rather than crossing space” 
(2009:xii). What is this simple shot of an exploding toilet if not the literal ‘plunging’ of a 
specific cinematic time? The pure horror of the exploding toilet is matched by the pleasurably 
disgusting act of cleansing in which Hitchcock’s films take delight. In Psycho II, the blockage 
causing the exploding toilet is revealed to have been a bloody towel used to mop up the very 
murder scene Norman is investigating. If this bloody rag were not proof enough of the 
connection, then Hitchcock’s own idiosyncratic compulsiveness for the combination of 
cleanliness and murder completes it, especially when we combine two quotes from the 
director: (1) “In films murders are always very clean. I show how difficult it is and what a 
messy thing it is to kill a man” (2009); and (2) “When I take a bath, I put everything neatly 
back in place. You wouldn’t even know I’d been in the bathroom” (cited in Truffaut, 
1983:260). Žižek notes how Norman’s ten-minute clean-up scene in the original Psycho 
enables the audience on the one hand to calm themselves after the shower murder, and on the 
other hand to start identifying with Norman via his sheer efficiency at dealing with the mess, 
something approaching the sense of a ‘Job well done’, or as Žižek puts it, the sense that “In a 
country governed by Norman, trains would certainly run on time!” (2008c:239). Hence, given 
this knowledge, it should have been easy to spot that Norman was not responsible for this first 
murder in Psycho II, for it is the girl, and not he, who cleans up the mess. Freud wrote that 
obsessive cleanliness is a component symptom of what he calls the ‘housewife’s psychosis’ 
(2001: 20), which post-Psycho must surely take on new meaning. While the cleaning of the 
bathroom in the original Psycho revels in a job well done, both The Conversation and Psycho 
II contain the sense that this is a bathroom that cannot be cleaned, something approaching the 
sense of “This mess belongs to you, so you clean it up!”, or, if you recall, a Lacanian murder 
scene. 
 
                                                 
* The turn of the ‘spewing toilet’ has featured elsewhere in cinema: in 1991’s Sleeping with the Enemy 
and 2002’s Dirty Pretty Things. See also in East Asian cinema, 2000’s Seom (The Isle).   172
 
Fig. 4.5: Norman Bates sympathises with Harry Caul inspecting a spewing toilet  
 
  Thus in these irrational remakings of Psycho, the spewed contents of the toilet are 
what Lacan would call lamellae; irreducible remainders constituting a terrifying jouissance 
embodied in our ‘Thing’ metaphors of the alien facehugger and the exposed arm of the T-800. 
These fissures in the symbolic are not caused by the intrusion of the Real, but are the gaps in 
the symbolic fabric itself, or what we might call ‘flushed unflushables’ (after Žižek’s 
‘unknown knowns’ – the knowledge which does not know itself). Whereas the fetishised 
shower scene is a synecdochic ‘part’ standing in for the whole, this irrational toilet scene is a 
part standing in for the hole, or its repressed content. We should supplement Linda Ruth 
Williams’s statement that some films make “you question the terms under which you proceed 
to make sense of [them]…” (1995:145), with “…and their originals”, for while the true 
remake idealises and annihilates in a single gesture of Oedipal contingency, these irrational 
remakes do not. Rather, the latter seek to affect both themselves and their originals by 
disturbing the fields into which the broadly defined ‘events’ of these texts are situated and 
historicised. Therefore, if the hysteric is split in precisely the way of the true remake, perhaps 
then these irrational remakes provide an alternative remake experience, one that escapes the 
discourse of the remake as an industry category altogether (and thus the criticism that 
follows).  
  The perfect image of this irrational return is actually contained in the toilet handle 
itself, which Žižek sees in parallel with the red button in science fiction novels which, when 
pushed, causes the end of the universe, the knowledge of which compels the protagonist even 
more to push the button (why else would Harry Caul flush the toilet?). Žižek writes that the 
toilet bowl here is an object “which simultaneously attracts and repels the subject, [and] can 
be said to be the point from which the inspected setting returns the gaze (is it not that the hero 
is somehow regarded by the toilet sink?)” (2008c:236). It is most pertinent to our argument 
here to note that Coppola is not what we might call a ‘Hitchcockian’ director. In fact, his style 
is markedly closer to European directors such as Michelangelo Antonioni, whose Blowup   173
(1966) was cited by Coppola to have been his main influence (1974). That the plots of both 
Blowup and The Conversation rely on a small imperceptible detail in a recording marks them 
out as having a very different style to Hitchcock, who relied for his plot devices on the 
‘MacGuffin’, which he famously described as “actually nothing at all” (cited in Truffaut, 
1983:138), simply an element introduced to activate the narrative. By contrast, the mise-en-
scène in Antonioni and Coppola’s films are fascinatingly perverse; not nothing, but something 
(literally some-Thing).  
  Of course, this simple opposition misses the point, for Hitchcock clearly does have a 
perverse fascination with his mise-en-scène, only these are elements that seem to stick-out 
from the plot, to have apparently no relation whatsoever to the forwarding of the narrative. 
Examples include the scene in the remake of The Man Who Knew Too Much, when Benjamin 
McKenna (James Stewart) struggles to eat his food in a Moroccan restaurant without a knife 
and fork and clearly dislikes getting his hands dirty (this is further enhanced when it is 
pointed out to him that the left hand only is used to eat, the right being reserved for more 
private matters). Topaz (1969) is another example in the scene where an official diplomatic 
document is stained by the grease from a sandwich. Both are small details that take on an 
extraordinary significance of pleasurable disgust for our protagonists. If we take Hitchcock at 
his word that the MacGuffin is ‘nothing’, the question arises as to why it is these elements 
that remakers tend to focus on, and not the other, pleasurably disgusting elements which tend 
to be left out? Is this not where the Idea of the film is located? What is the significance of 
Psycho’s MacGuffin of the $40,000 compared to the toilet handle flushing Marion’s life 
down the drain? The $40,000 is sunk into the swamp along with Marion’s car when Norman 
fails to notice it. One can only wonder why Van Sant updates the amount of money in the 
remake to $400,000 when it seems the choice is clear: one should either remake ‘as 
Hitchcock’, and stick to the amount of $40,000; or else one should remake as someone else 
(Antonioni/Coppola) and focus on the toilet handle (or equivalent ‘alternative scenario’). 
  There is more evidence for considering the toilet as Psycho’s ‘symptom’ in the film’s 
trailer, in which Hitchcock gives a guided tour of the Bates Motel while alluding to the 
horrific “mess” with a grimace (but giving nothing away). When he reaches cabin #1 
Hitchcock says: “cleaned all this up now – big difference. You should have seen the blood. 
The whole place… Well, it’s too horrible to describe…” Then, he regards the toilet and, 
picking up the lid, states that “A very important clue was found here [looking in]… down 
there.” In much the same way that Norman struggles to say the word “shower” when showing 
Marion around in the film, Hitchcock here struggles with the word “toilet” in the trailer. For 
Žižek, the domain to where excrement vanishes after a toilet is flushed is a metaphor for the 
horrifyingly sublime ‘beyond’ of the primordial, pre-ontological chaos into which things of a 
different order (that is, shit) disappear. He writes that “although we rationally know what goes   174
on with the excrement, the imaginary mystery nonetheless persists: shit remains an excess 
that does not fit our daily reality” (Žižek, 2008c:238). Lacan was right then to claim that we 
make the transition from animal to human only when we problematise the issue of disposing 
with our waste. For Žižek, it is the drain itself that is horrifying in Psycho, not what comes out 
of it, but the passage into a different ontological order, a black circle framed by porcelain 
white, like Malevich’s black and white squares. Žižek describes this space as a “topological 
hole or torsion that bends the space of our reality so that we perceive/imagine excrement as 
disappearing into an alternative dimension that is not part of our everyday reality” 
(2008c:238). As an irrational remaking, the scene from The Conversation simply reverses the 
direction in which this reality flows in Psycho, for instead of moving from the clean flushing 
toilet to the bloody plug-hole in the shower, it moves from the clean plug-hole in the shower 
to the bloody spewing toilet.   
  The big question still remains: on what level does this type of remaking differ from 
the other types seen in my case studies? Well, Psycho and Spoorloos are not signifiers but 
symptoms, and, according to Lacan, the symptom is always a sign intended for someone. “The 
signifier”, Lacan writes, “being something quite different [to the symptom], represents a 
subject for another signifier” (1998:157). This formulation is crucial to the irrational remake, 
for what is it if not a subject for another signifier? We must amend our formulation that the 
toilet is Psycho’s ‘symptom’ then to it being Psycho’s ‘signifier’, for here we get a message 
addressed only to another signifier (linking The Conversation and Psycho II). On a larger 
scale, is this the traversal then from the remake-as-symptom to the remake-as-signifier? Can 
we not posit a text like À bout de souffle as being a specifically French subject for the 
signifier of American film noir, and, specifically, Humphrey Bogart? The Conversation is a 
love letter to Psycho with all the menace of Frank’s description of the love letter in Blue 
Velvet, or Lacan’s conception of love as evil. However, what the irrational remake cannot be 
is a symptom; it can ‘stand-in’ for the symptom only; it can be the signifier of the shower-
scene-as-fetish, or what we might designate as a truly new cinematic subject.  
  Žižek writes that when such elements erupt for the first time they are “experienced as 
a contingent trauma, as an intrusion of a certain non-symbolized Real; only through repetition 
is this event recognized in its symbolic necessity” (2008a: 64-5). One even wonders if 
Psycho’s censors objected to the flushing toilet before or after they had been shocked by the 
shower murder… Either way, they were right to object, although probably for the wrong 
reasons. The right reason to regard the flushing toilet as a problematic image, and our final 
proof that focusing on the exploding toilet is an irrational way to remake Psycho, is actually 
contained in the image of the swamp at the end of Psycho, for the real problem is that the 
flushing toilet is just a smaller version of a much bigger shit hole. It is here that we find 
another film which irrationally remakes Psycho, a film which returns to Psycho’s final image   175
of Marion’s car being retracted from the swamp while oozing a putrid-looking sludge. Our 
work on the time-image will be challenged here more than ever, for this is a Psycho remake 
that was made in 1955, five years before the release of the original. 
 
 
Swamp ‘Thing’: Diabolical jouissance in the irrational remake 
 
When Norman threw what he believed to be nothing more than an old newspaper into the 
boot of Marion’s car just prior to sinking it into a swamp, Psycho audiences held their breath 
thinking he may miss the $40,000 wrapped inside. Shortly after, this apprehension was 
superseded by another, contradictory intake of breath when that same car failed to sink. 
Hitchcock was right when he observed that audiences were secretly pleased when the car 
containing Marion’s corpse finally sank at the end of Norman’s ‘clean-up’. Indeed, Psycho 
audiences begin their identification with Norman almost immediately, feeling nervous for him 
as we might a thief in a museum attempting to avoid tripping the alarm. We thus become 
complicit in two crimes: firstly as an extension of our sympathy for Marion’s theft, and 
secondly as our sympathy for Norman’s erasure of his ‘mother’s’ crime. Clearly, the shift 
from the one to the other takes place almost instantaneously, from having a vested interest in 
the car’s contents, to praying along with Norman that it will sink. It is at the point at which 
Norman ‘flushes’ Marion’s car that the money is all but forgotten, and the transition from 
Marion to Norman as subjective locus is complete. Having lost the main subjective point-of-
view already, the degree to which audiences need Norman to succeed here is exemplary, such 
that if the car does not sink, $40,000 or no, things will be bad for everyone… The sense of 
‘not sinking’ is to be equated with the sense of ‘not flushing’ here, and this is why both Harry 
and Norman never recover from their trauma of the exploding toilet: in The Conversation, 
Harry already had to break the hotel’s paper ‘seal’ to inspect it, confirming that it had already 
been cleaned, and in Psycho II, Norman discovers that the very object used to clean the crime 
scene is the cause of the exploding toilet. In both instances, the trauma of the exploding toilet 
is compounded by the fact that it previously looked clean.
* 
  At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that the irrational remake extended both 
back into the past and reached forward into the future, so if The Conversation is reaching 
back to Psycho, which version reaches toward it? The answer is Henri-Georges Clouzot’s Les 
Diaboliques (1955), a film much discussed for foreshadowing the shower scene in what was 
retroactively called the ‘bath scene’. The film takes place in a boarding school run by a 
                                                 
* Is the exact reverse of this not true in Trainspotting, where Renton (Ewan McGregor) plunges 
headfirst into a toilet of shit to find his heroin suppositories and, after a fantasy sequence in which he 
swims in a Clearwater pool, emerges inexplicably clean where we expected him to be filthy?   176
sadistic headmaster, Michel Delassalle (Paul Meurisse), who physically and psychologically 
abuses his wife, Christina Delassalle (Vera Clouzot), until she and his mistress, Nicole Horner 
(Simone Signoret), decide to murder him. Using the pretence of a divorce to lure Michel into 
a remote village, the two drug and drown him in a bathtub and dump his body in the school’s 
neglected swimming pool which has formed a thick layer of scum, in the hope that the police 
will assume he drunkenly fell in and drowned. However, when the pool is drained the 
following morning the body is gone, and Christina begins to have heart problems. The 
problems continue as the deceased headmaster’s ghostly image appears throughout the 
school, and sightings of him are reported in the town. Is Michel alive, dead, or undead? One 
night, Christina hears noises and when she goes to investigate the bathroom she finds her 
husband’s corpse in the tub. Suddenly, the corpse moves, rising from the tub with a blank 
lifeless stare. Christina dies of shock and the ‘dead’ headmaster removes fake contact lenses 
from his eyes before revealing Nicole’s complicity with him in faking his death to procure the 
rights to the school, which Christina owned. 
  There is a story that Hitchcock once received a letter from an angry father who 
complained that after seeing Les Diaboliques, his daughter refused to take a bath, and that 
now, following the release of Psycho, she refused to shower. Hitchcock’s advice was: “Send 
her to the dry cleaners!” (2009). Is there not a sense that Les Diaboliques is retroactively 
established as having opened some cinematic space awaiting the inscription of Psycho five 
years later? Žižek considers the issue of the precursor when he cites Borges as illustrating that 
Kafka is present in a multitude of precursors from old Chinese authors to Robert Browning. 
However, “if Kafka had not written we would not perceive it; that is to say, it would not 
exist… Each writer creates his precursors. His work modifies our conception of the past, as it 
will modify the future” (cited in Žižek, 2004:112). For Žižek, the dialectical solution to the 
dilemma of “Is it really there, in the source, or did we only read it into the source?” is that it is 
always there, but we must perceive this retroactively, from a later perspective, and that this is 
the sine qua non of real freedom (2004a:113). Following the release of Psycho, Les 
Diaboliques emerges as one of its precursors waiting to be reinscribed. This is cinematic 
repetition in advance, right down to the scene where Christina dies of shock and pulls a net 
curtain off its rail in a symmetrical mirroring of Marion’s death throes where she pulls the 
shower curtain off its rail.  
  I am certainly not trying to contend that Hitchcock was in some way ignorant of Les 
Diaboliques, or that it had no influence on his filming of Psycho. Such a view is simply 
incorrect, for a well-known anecdote tells of Hitchcock’s frustration at losing out on the rights 
to the novel from which Les Diaboliques came – Pierre Boileau and Thomas Narcejac’s Celle 
qui n’était plus (The Woman Who Was No More) – by a matter of hours. That Les 
Diaboliques earned Clouzot the title of ‘The French Hitchcock’ only reinforces that   177
Hitchcock would have almost certainly viewed Clouzot as competition, if not a rival. In 
addition, Robert Bloch, the author of Psycho, is even quoted as having said of the adaptation 
of his book into a film that “there was hardly anyone else in the world I would have preferred 
to Hitchcock, except Henri-Georges Clouzot, who had done Les Diaboliques” (cited in 
Rebello, 1998:191). Clearly, there is a mutual drawing of inspiration from both directors here, 
but we nonetheless cannot help but feel as though Clouzot had somehow seen Psycho before 
making Les Diaboliques. Anat Zanger suggests another precursor to Psycho when she notes 
that the murder scene in Fritz Lang’s While the City Sleeps (1956) bears “an astonishing 
resemblance” to Psycho’s shower scene. “Hitchcock’s film however”, Zanger notes, “has 
acquired the status of the ‘original’ – everything else is an imitation” (2006:20), even if it 
were released before. This is the true meaning of a film’s ‘event’, one whose repetition is not 
only guaranteed in the cinematic future but also in its past. This seems to be anticipated in the 
opening scenes of Psycho in which the specific date and time are recorded, a historical 
baptism of sorts that Van Sant updated (he added “1998” to his version).  
  Žižek uses the example of the sinking of the Titanic in 1912, stating that “it was a 
shock, ‘the impossible happened’, the unsinkable ship had sunk; but the point is that precisely 
as a shock, this sinking arrived at its proper time – ‘the time was waiting for it’: even before it 
actually happened” (2008a:74). The traumatic ‘Thing’, or stain of the Real, can only become 
a symbolic event in this way, for “when it erupts for the first time it is experienced as a 
contingent trauma, as an intrusion of a certain non-symbolized Real; only through repetition 
is this event recognized in its symbolic necessity” (2008a: 64-5). Deleuze argues a similar line 
in The Logic of Sense when he suggests a crucial difference between ‘frozen scenes’ and 
‘repetition’, writing that  
 
the body is reflected in language: the characteristic of language is to take back into itself the 
frozen scene, to make a ‘spiritual’ event out of it, or rather an advent of ‘spirits.’ […] 
Difference gives things to be seen and multiplies bodies; but it is repetition which offers 
things to be spoken, authenticates the multiple, and makes of it a spiritual event (2009b:329). 
 
Saul Kripke calls this process a “primal baptism” (1980:83-5), and I think there is clear link 
between the sense of baptism and of birth from the primordial sludge contained in the image 
of the swamp into which Marion’s car is sunk, and from which it later returns.  
  There is a foreshadowing of Psycho’s swamp in Les Diaboliques in the image of the 
scum-covered swimming pool from the opening scene into which Michel is unceremoniously 
dumped by the murderesses. While the end credits roll over Psycho’s swamp, the opening 
credits roll over Les Diaboliques’s swimming pool. This dual shot of the swamp and pool acts   178
as another kind of suturing point marking the traversal of the möbius band; where the one 
image begins the other ends, in a continually spiralling relation. 
 
 
Fig. 4.6: The opening shot of the swimming pool in Les Diaboliques and the final shot of the swamp in 
Psycho 
 
Indeed, there is something of a ‘primordial soup’ about these two shots which, viewed next to 
one another, could be the same exact place. Both of these ‘swamps’ hide bodies, and both 
spew those bodies back; has the return of the repressed ever been so clearly rendered as it is 
here in this cinematic couplet? Perhaps we should regard this as the ‘Hitchcockian’ motif of a 
space that cannot be cleaned, a place of the Real (thus the biggest mistake of the Hollywood 
remake of Les Diaboliques is to have the pool cleaned). That the opening and closing credits 
roll over these images highlights the closeness of language and horror in the death drive, in all 
its filthy glory.  
  Let us return to what is perhaps Gus Van Sant’s most cryptic reason as to why he 
took on the project of remaking Psycho, the dual argument that he must do the film 
“[Because] no one else would” and “So no one else would have to”. There is a similar sense 
of pure drive here, of the machinic libido ‘hauling’ the subject into being. As with the 
moment in T2 when Sarah Conner carves “No fate” into a table, Van Sant’s reasoning 
illustrates the prohibition of the dead symbolic father. The future is indeed not set, but our 
freedom as beings of choice is not that we can choose to change that future – it is unalterable 
– but that we can choose to accept it, to activate ourselves in it. So if the idée fixe of chapter 1 
was “Memento mori” (“Don’t forget to die!”), this chapter’s idée fixe is Nietzsche’s amor fati 
(“Learn to love your fate!”). Each of us is irrationally driven by the Thing which emerges 
from the Hitchcockian swamp and it is our duty not to exchange this encounter in the real but 
to go to it, and learn to love it. This is what Žižek means by the “sine qua non of real 
freedom”, that our fate is both predetermined and chosen retroactively. We do not need to get 
rid of remakes to resolve the impasse of cinematic hysteria but go to meet them, accept them,   179
and learn to love them; for like remakes or loath them they are the ‘swamps’ of contemporary 
cinema, spewing back our repressed historicity.  
  This is the meaning of the scene just prior to the ending of both Psychos where 
Norman’s face transforms momentarily into a skull, displaying a profound solidarity between 
the jouissance of the spewing toilet and the death drive of the swamp.  
 
 
Fig. 4.7: Skull dissolve: Norman’s grinning skull dissolving into the spewing swamp  
 
Van Sant used the very same fleeting image of the skull from the original in the remake; proof 
that, while perhaps without a sense of Lacan’s death drive, he is certainly not without a sense 
of irony. Nonetheless, this is the symbol of the death drive; it is fleeting, almost 
imperceptible, and immediately transforms into sludge. Did Lacan not warn us, after all, that 
a master-signifier such as this is always in danger of suddenly changing into shit (1998:268)? 
Raymond Durgnat has observed that this image of the car containing Marion’s body sinking 
into the swamp indicates that “to cite a popular idiom, she’s in deep shit” (2002:140). Durgnat 
goes further in providing the equation “Norman equals swamp equals shit – an equation with 
substantial vernacular back-up, as in ‘You little shit’ or the slang ‘bog’ for toilet” (2002:141).
* 
This is all well and good, but what is the link between pleasure and jouissance, and when 
does the one become the other?  
  Roland Barthes has distinguished between two ‘texts’ of desire: (1) the “text of 
pleasure: the text that contents, fills, grants euphoria; the text that comes from culture and 
does not break with it, is linked to a comfortable practice of reading” (1976:14). This is a text 
that in Lacanian terms is properly entrenched in fantasy and ensconced in the symbolic order; 
it not only allows us to desire but tells us what to desire, and as such it is encountered as 
enjoyable. (2) The “text of bliss: the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts 
(perhaps to the point of boredom), unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological 
assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories, brings to crisis his relation with 
                                                 
* The link between the toilet and burying in Spoorloos is contained in the phrase “bowels of the earth”.   180
language” (1976:14). This ‘text of bliss’ is traumatic because it reveals the substance-
knowledge of the Real, and in the process, it destabilises the form-illusion of misrecognition 
concealing this substance in the ‘text of pleasure’. As Žižek writes, “access to knowledge is 
paid with the loss of enjoyment – enjoyment, in its stupidity, is possible only on the basis of 
certain non-knowledge, ignorance” (2008a:73). True remakes are clearly pleasure texts, 
which aim to keep the traumatic realm of language at bay. Irrational remakes, by contrast, are 
always bliss texts imbued with jouissance, which are unsettling precisely because they 
reintroduce the language of unconscious knowledge previously disavowed. Anat Zanger also 
notes this Barthesian distinction between pleasure texts and jouissance texts, but links them to 
remakes in a different way, stating that  
 
pleasure is located in the moment of homeostasis between tension and release, that is, when 
difference and repetition are in equilibrium. Jouissance, in contrast, relates to the freezing of 
the moment of the annihilation of tension, that is, when differences and repetition are not 
satisfactorily balanced (2006:121).  
 
Zanger cites Van Sant’s Psycho remake as “the ultimate actualization of pleasure, that is, 
originality as repetition” (2006:121), but what kind of pleasure is it exactly? Žižek describes 
fantasy in terms of its differentiation from the symptom: “[the] symptom (for example, a slip 
of the tongue) causes discomfort and displeasure when it occurs, but we embrace its 
interpretation with pleasure” (2008a:80), such that its examination is a source of intellectual 
satisfaction and humour. However, “when we abandon ourselves to fantasy (for example, in 
daydreaming) we feel immense pleasure, but on the contrary it causes us great discomfort and 
shame to confess our fantasies to others” (Žižek, 2008a:80). Is not the same distinction 
apparent in the difference between Van Sant’s Psycho and Coppola’s The Conversation as the 
symptom and fantasy of Hitchcock’s Psycho respectively? Van Sant’s remake caused 
considerable discomfort and displeasure on its release and yet as a remake it is the focus of 
many studies from which much pleasure is derived from enumerating its many mistakes and 
errors. Coppola’s The Conversation, by contrast, caused immense pleasure as a reverie of the 
Psycho myth, but to explore its toilet connection seems somewhat shameful or at least 
undignified as a subject for academic study. We should suggest The Conversation as the 
ultimate actualisation of jouissance in the Psycho series, a remake that destroys traditional 
cinematic pleasure and throws the very experience of spectatorship into state of loss and crisis 
by revealing what audiences were really daydreaming about when watching Psycho back in 
1960…  
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“Because you’re worth ‘It’”: The death drive in the irrational remake 
 
For Žižek, it is not reality itself which is multiple, but the fantasies that sustain that reality. 
Against the idea of ‘multiple realities’, we should, as Žižek claims, insist on the fact that “the 
fantasmatic support of reality is in itself necessarily multiple and inconsistent” (2000:41). 
This is the irrational remake’s retort to Hollywood’s sense that one can either choose “My 
way, or the highway”, for there is no mutual exclusion in the unconscious. Once again, the 
phrase is “To have one’s cake and eat it”. This is the reason David Lynch has been something 
of a lynchpin (if you will excuse the expression) for this thesis, because his cinema is the 
presentation of multiple fantasies, an œuvre undermining the phantasy of the ‘ideal couple’ 
(revealing the frog embracing a bottle of beer just beneath). As Žižek writes,  
 
by displaying the two fantasies side by side in hypertext, the space is thus open for the third, 
underlying fundamental fantasy to emerge […] in the most efficient way to undermine the 
hold this fantasy exerts over us? (2000: 44).  
 
A film like Lost Highway is pure film-thinking, a time-image which exemplifies the structure 
of the möbius band and irrational remake. Thus in the irrational remake, and each of David 
Lynch’s films, it really is possible to have one’s cherry pie and eat it!
* 
  When Anat Zanger asks the question: “Is it necessary […] to be familiar with 
Hitchcock’s version in order to enjoy Van Sant’s?” (2006:18), she is asking the right question 
but in the wrong context. Because Van Sant has altered the sexual politics in his remake of 
Psycho, and once again over-relied on the libidinal investment surrounding the film’s 
fetishised shower scene, our answer should be a resounding “No” – that is, viewers can 
almost certainly enjoy his version independently, precisely because he failed to stick to his 
shot-for-shot mandate. In fact, Anne Heche famously revealed in an interview that prior to 
taking on the role of Marion she had never seen the original Psycho herself (speaking in D-J, 
1999). A more precise question then would be: Is it necessary to be familiar with Hitchcock’s 
Psycho in order to properly enjoy Coppola’s bathroom scene from The Conversation? The 
answer here is a resounding “Yes!”, because only then is the uncanniness of Harry Caul’s 
                                                 
* While I do not have the space to explore them at any length, I would like to suggest a couple of 
additional examples of irrational remaking to get us started with this new field: Roman Polanski’s The 
Tenant (Le locataire) in 1976 as the realisation of Rear Window (1954)’s unexplored blurring of the 
line between Peeping Tom reality and paranoiac fantasy; Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange 
(1971) as realising in Singin’ in the Rain what Timothy Corrigan notes as the eponymous number 
dancing “a thin line between an acceptable generic engagement with the reality of the dark and rainy 
streets […] and pure, compulsive lunacy” (1991:141).   182
inspection of the ‘spotless’ bathroom-cum-murder-scene fully rendered. The exploding toilet 
(which is never corroborated by a third party) is the explosion of jouissance and the image of 
the death drive only to viewers familiar with Psycho.   
  To describe the death drive, Josh Cohen uses the example of anti-aging cream adverts 
where youthful looking women model the product before they are revealed to be older than 
they appear (“Look at her, she’s over 50! You too can reverse time…”, etc.) Put simply, the 
death drive is present in the gap between the smooth image and the description, such that 
while the woman in the advert may appear 10 or more years younger than she really is, it is 
not that those years have simply disappeared, but, rather, that they are still present in the 
absence (abyss) of wrinkles. This is a real ‘mise-en-abîme’; an erased history that haunts the 
flawlessly smooth skin in its very lack, and flaunts itself in the descriptor such that these are 
products that erase the very fact of having lived. This effect is properly uncanny, a face that 
somehow just does not ring true, betrayed by language (what else?). As Cohen puts it, the 
model’s face is “weirdly and inappropriately undisturbed, a flawless vessel emptied of its 
proper contents – life itself” (2005:111). The death drive is the appearance of an ideal of 
lifeless life that the irrational remake similarly strives for. Daniel Protopopoff has even 
written that “the remake effaces its age”, that is, it alters the chronology we assign to film, its 
very historicity (1989:13). We should complement this with Serge Daney’s observation that 
all American films are already ageless, such that the American film has no wrinkles and never 
will have (cited in Mazdon, 2000:85), something echoed in Brian Grazer’s statement that 
Psycho “doesn’t deal with trends or fashions; the drama, suspense and horror work 
independently of any particular era” (speaking in D-J, 1999). While the usual sense of the 
term ‘repression’ is concerned with representations, primary repression is concerned with 
pure presentations, or how the drives are lived. When Lacan designates every drive as a death 
drive, this is what he means, for he is referring to the silent, pure presentation within 
representation, the originary repression within repression. Given Protopopoff and Daney’s 
statements, the American remake could be considered the cinematic equivalent of Dorian 
Gray and his portrait.  
  We must utilise a model of complex differentiation in which this presentation in 
Hollywood remaking of “external disturbing and diverting influences” (2001:37), to quote 
Freud, is revealed. Finally, if we (re)view Freud’s statement on the death drive in the context 
of Deleuze’s time-image that we have been exploring here (including our work on The 
Terminator and The Conversation), his words should resonate anew: 
 
It would be in contradiction to the conservative nature of the drives if the goal of life were a 
state of things which had never yet been attained. On the contrary, it must be an old state of 
things, an initial state from which the living entity has at one time or other departed and to   183
which it is striving to return by the circuitous paths along which its development leads 
(2001:37). 
 
And why does the remake do so? Because there is an ‘it’ contained inside the original in 
which we have a vested interest. Therein resides the true meaning of beauty manufacturer 
L’Oréal’s famous slogan, “Because you’re worth it”, which is also the meaning behind 
Lacan’s formula for drive: S◊D (1998:209). We must read this alongside Coca-Cola’s slogan 
“This is it!”, for this is where the hidden truth effaced by immortality lies. In fact, the famous 
beauty slogan initially began life as “Because I’m worth it”, and was only changed in the mid-
2000s, a telling inflection. In late 2009, the slogan was changed again to “Because we’re 
worth it” (and for the children’s version, “Because we’re worth it too!”). This is such a 
wonderful example of Deleuze’s ‘grammatical perspectivism’, which is, if you remember, the 
only way to observe the phantom of the death drive.  
  Zanger argues that there is a “veil of censorship” dictating the manner in which 
“official”, that is, overtly declared remakes, can be told (suffice it to recall the furore 
surrounding Van Sant’s Psycho). Thus, while “all official versions seek to present themselves 
as the ‘ultimate truth,’ to the exclusion of all others […] all the disguised versions seek to 
present the traumatic elements of the story” (Zanger, 2006:107) uninhibited by this regulatory 
mode of censorship. Zanger also points out Michel de Certeau’s argument that ‘historical 
knowledge’ is “more about contemporary interests and identities and less about preserving the 
otherness of the past. In this sense, history functions as a tool by which one generation 
expresses its difference from it predecessors” (2006:126-7). However, we must be careful 
here, because this is not exactly ‘it’ either. Lacan states something similar about 
psychoanalysis, where interpretation cannot be bent to any desired meaning, but instead 
“designates only a single series of signifiers. But the subject may in effect occupy various 
places, depending on whether one places him under one or other of these signifiers” 
(1998:209). Thus we should emphasise that meaning shifts around the position of the subject, 
such that it matters not how close to historical accuracy one ‘true’ account is over another 
‘false’ account, but, rather, what the prevailing contemporary attitudes have to say on the 
matter. Linda Ruth Williams also points out that film narratives are historically contingent, 
but adds that these “slippages backwards […] which change the way we read back through a 
history or a narrative, occur collectively, and infect our ways of reading” (1995:144-5), 
implying that spectatorship is indeed a collective process. I would go one step further and 
suggest that these contemporary interests and identities are always unconscious, the subject of 
cultural drives. The beauty of the irrational remake is that it enables the link between the 
source, its ‘unknown knowledge’, and the historical knowledge associated with the status quo   184
of the original to be re-opened, thus keeping the discourse-time, as well as the story-time, 
open to analytical interpretation.  
  Lacan coined the term ‘factor c’ (‘facteur c’) as “the constant characteristic of any 
given cultural milieu” (cited in Evans, 2007:59). For Lacan, ahistoricism is the factor c of 
America, which is why it is so antithetical to psychoanalysis. Perhaps we should reverse the 
‘factor c’ and call it the c factor, and then make the leap to ‘X Factor’, the popular reality TV 
show in which simulacra-phantasms are annually manufactured by media mogul Simon 
Cowell to sell cover versions of pop songs by the truck-load. Is this not the apogee of what 
might be termed a ‘remake culture’? To return to anti-aging creams, another world-wide 
beauty manufacturer is called ‘Max-Factor’. Is it just a coincidence that each of these 
companies seem to resonate with Lacan’s term for America’s ahistoricism, that the 
“‘American way of life’ revolves around such signifiers as ‘happiness’ ‘adaptation’, ‘human 
relations’ and ‘human engineering’” (Evans, 2007:59)? Founded in 1909, Max Factor was 
established by a real Max Factor (Maximilian Faktorowicz), who became the first person to 
introduce cosmetics to the growing film industry in Hollywood in the early 1920s (Baxten, 
2008:62). He is also credited as popularising the term ‘make-up’, as in ‘to make up (one’s 
face)’ with reference to cosmetics in early cinema. Is not history ‘made up’ also? This is why 
Lacan links the American ‘way of life’ with obscurantism, as something “characterized by the 
revival of notions long since refuted in the field of psycho-analysis, such as the predominance 
of the functions of the ego” (Lacan, 1992:127), a reference to the psychoanalytic school of 
‘Ego-Psychology’. In modern parlance, we speak of the term ‘life-style’ (as in ‘balanced’, 
‘healthy’), but what is this ‘style’ of life? One is tempted to conjure up images of men and 
women who, having lost a considerable amount of weight, then stand next to a cardboard cut-
out of their former selves with an air of self-satisfaction at having found their ‘factor’ (and 
people condemn remakes as ‘hollow’ versions of their originals). Does this image not 
successfully convey the distance between the registers ‘I’ and ‘me’ – one flat and reduced to a 
two-dimensional cut out of reality ‘there and then’, the other here and now in full corporeal 
presence? Let us dare to look beyond the signifiers at the death drive silently teeming just 
beneath this sheen of immortality, which barely conceals some ‘thing’ much deeper waiting 
to be ‘made up’ by we ‘other historians’. For in actual fact, the true meaning of the L’Oréal 
slogan, “Because you’re worth it”, is that there is a Thing (pure jouissance), an ‘It’, in which 
there is a vested worth. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF THE REMAKE 
 
“The map is the treasure.” 
 
-  Will Rood, cited in Marks-Tarlow (2008:1). 
 
 
To have one’s cherry pie and eat it: Institutional, spectatorial, and structural repetition 
 
In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan offered a radical and 
controversial reappraisal of Freudian psychoanalysis. He proposed to rethink the very 
foundations on which psychoanalysis was based, asking himself: “what conceptual status 
must we give to four of the terms introduced by Freud as fundamental concepts, namely, the 
unconscious, repetition, the transference, and the drive” (Lacan, 1998:12)? For Lacan, these 
fundamentals were intended to bring some much-needed coherence and gravity into the 
science of psychoanalysis. I have claimed something similar in relation to the remake, that is, 
the reappraisal of remake studies as a serious academic object of study. Furthermore, it is no 
coincidence that the ‘four fundamental concepts of the remake’, as I shall call them, are the 
same as those of psychoanalysis: we have the depth of the remake unconscious, the repetition 
of the remake’s return to the original Idea, the transference of the remake as the shift of 
perspective and the ‘Thing’, the jouissance of the remake’s drive, or what is in the remake, 
more than the remake, to paraphrase Lacan (1998:20).   
  Can these four fundamentals of remaking be put to use elsewhere in film theory, 
beyond the industry category of ‘the remake’? There are, I think, three intertwined levels of 
remaking in Hollywood cinema that we should consider as vital components of cinematic 
repetition: (1) on a marketing level, we get institutional-repetition, for example: when films 
get re-released in the form of ‘director’s cuts’ (as popularised by Ridley Scott), ‘special 
editions’ (James Cameron’s specialty), and ‘re-mastered versions’ (for example, the twentieth 
anniversary edition of the original Star Wars trilogy in 1997); when classic films are 
‘restored’ when in danger of becoming extinct simply because the film stock is deteriorating 
(see Usai, 2001); when scenes are ‘quoted’ verbatim outside of their textual base, that is, 
literally uprooted into another medium (via the inter-textual relay, including television spots, 
commercials, advertisements, trailers, posters, etc.); even a film score being used in trailers 
for other films to trade off the original’s reputation (Charlie Clouser’s score from the horror 
smash-hit Saw, for instance, is frequently used in other horror films). Each of these examples   187
is dealing with cinematic reverberations in a broader sense than the category currently covers, 
but there is nonetheless (even in film restoration) an ‘original’ that is both created in the past 
and annihilated in the present, while a ‘version’ of that original is created in the present and 
preserved for the future.  
  (2) On a reception level, we get spectatorial-repetition, which acknowledges that 
since films are made by both the cinematic institution and the audience, they are necessarily 
remade by both also. We can use Pierre Bourdieu’s term ‘symbolic goods’ to understand the 
circulation of films in the marketplace which create certain viewing habits, such as re-
watching certain films, from repeat viewings in cinema to DVD consumption. The concept of 
the circulation of symbolic goods in cinema has recently taken on a bitter-sweet edge for the 
film industry with the proliferation of file-sharing on the internet, where films (particularly 
new releases) are circulated between users online. The MPAA have attributed around $6.1 
billion in losses (McBride & Fowler, 2006), and have several court cases pending in an 
attempt to plug this circulation. Here we have an example of cinematic repetition-as-
circulation, a communal activity that, once again, is seen as both venerating and destroying (at 
least for the studios and their shareholders) the institution of cinema. On a different level, one 
must also consider the way the circulation of ‘symbolic goods’ changes through history, and 
in different technological, socio-historical, economic, and nationalistic contexts (for example, 
a film like Independence Day from 1996 changes in light of advanced CGI effects, to post-
9/11 or post-recession audiences, or simply in foreign countries). We must also think about 
the option for audiences to control their own mode of spectatorship with the advent of home 
video and the ability to pause, rewind, and repeat. More recently, DVD chapter selections 
have increased this control, and Christopher Nolan’s Memento is an exemplary case here 
since there is an option on the DVD to watch this reverse-ordered film in chronological 
order. In addition, films often include ‘alternate endings’, cut scenes, and restored footage 
(notably in the horror genre, where DVD releases contain “Previously unseen footage”, boast 
the inclusion of “What you didn’t see in the theatres”, and are re-titled “Extreme edition”, etc. 
to reflect this). Ultimately, to take spectatorial-repetition to the next level, we must utilise 
André Malraux (1951)’s term “musée imaginaire” (imaginary archive), coined to refer to the 
accumulation of all viewing experiences in any given spectator’s mind. For Malraux, we must 
consider the creation and recreation of the ‘spectator’, as s/he is the accretion of ‘viewings’, 
not just cinematically, but culturally and socially as well. Furthermore, our imaginary archive 
is itself disturbed, made problematic, by each new viewing and reviewing of a ‘stored’ film. 
Thus in terms of viewing a film, the spectator him/herself is multiply remaking; not 
consistently or with design, but arbitrarily and incoherently. Consider that Psycho goes 
through several ‘times’ just in reviewing it, for while first-time viewers in 1960 interpreted 
Marion and Norman’s conversation from the perspective of the stolen $40,000, second- and   188
third-time viewers were looking for the clues and warnings of what they know is about to 
come, and viewers outside of that moment in 1960 would have the film’s historical event in 
mind.  
  (3) Finally, on a purely elementary level, we get the repetition intrinsic to the 
cinematic edifice itself – the level of cinema as a manifold construct, or what we might call 
structural-repetition. Raymond Bellour writes that “repetition is internal when it pertains to 
the very body of the film, to its most elementary and paradoxical level: that of the single 
frame […] an endless repetition, twenty-four times per second” (1979:66). Thus we are 
always dealing with repetition in cinema, for “within the same shot, each frame is an earlier 
version of the frame about to be seen” (Zanger, 2006:13). It is evident in those self-differing 
elements that constitute the final print that long before remakers put their own spin on them, 
before the ‘director’s cut’ and the ‘special edition’, before spectators arrive to order and 
reorder narratives, and even before an editor has decided which cuts to use and rejected 
others, that the cinematic medium is in-and-of-itself a medium of repetition. It is perhaps little 
wonder then that Deleuze focuses his attention on cinema as the central philosophical medium 
for the twentieth century.  
  Having broadened the definition of ‘remaking’, let us see these new repetitions at 
work in Terry Gilliam’s Twelve Monkeys. One scene is particularly illuminating, and comes at 
the precise moment when the time-traveller, James Cole, having finally convinced his 
abductee, Kathryn Railly, of his time travelling experiences, discovers he now doubts his own 
story (and sanity). The scene opens with a scene-within-a-scene from Hitchcock’s Vertigo, 
before it is revealed that James and Kathryn are at a ‘24 Hour Hitchcock Fest’ applying 
disguises to aid in their escape. The ‘internal’ scene from Vertigo is the one where Scottie and 
Madeleine are amongst the sequoias and Madeleine utters the famous phrase as she traces the 
rings of a felled tree: “Here I was born, and there I died. It was only a moment for you, you 
took no notice.” The ‘external’ scene features James and Kathryn sitting in the cinema, and 
the rest of James’s dialogue is intercut with Scottie’s dialogue from Vertigo which can be 
heard in the background. This creates an interesting inter-textual cross-referencing effect as 
James’s dialogue is both about, and seems to be reflected in, Scottie’s dialogue, and the 
responses of both women are completely effaced:  
 
-  James Cole: “I think I’ve seen this movie [Vertigo] before, when I was a kid I saw it on TV. I 
did see it before…”  
-  [Scottie: “Have you been here before, when?”] 
-  James: “…I don’t recognise this…  
-  [Scottie: “Tell me, Madeleine, tell me!”]   189
-  James: “…It’s just like what’s happening with us, like the past. The movie never changes, it 
can’t change but… every time you see it, it seems different because you were different. You 
see different things.” 
 
The dialogue of both Kathryn and Madeleine are effaced during this exchange which seems to 
be between James and Scottie, as though a fundamental rule of cross-textual interaction has 
been violated here.  
  This scene in Twelve Monkeys is first-and-foremost an example of ‘proper’ remaking, 
of remaking as an industry category, since it is (loosely at least) based on elements of 
Hitchcock’s Vertigo and Chris Marker’s La Jetée (itself based on Vertigo, so a triple-folded 
remake). La Jetée even replicates the scene with the sequoias where, rather than pointing out 
one’s death in the past, the protagonist points out his birth in the future. In addition though, 
this scene in Twelve Monkeys is engaging in institutional-repetition as it lifts the scene from 
Vertigo directly, unequivocally, and with a fetishistic mandate. This scene is not film 
quotation but film replication: it not only parallels the narrative of Vertigo (creating an 
alternate dimension to it, as in La Jetée) but is in a directly negative dialogue with it, that is, 
one that must be constructed by the spectator who literally reads between the lines. This 
moment of spectatorial-repetition establishes a moment beyond the diegesis, where, just as 
James’s amateur philosophising on the contextualisation of the cinematic spectator discusses 
the way audiences continually construct and reconstruct films according to their own 
positioning within the narrative, so too is the film making a non-diegetic point about the way 
repetition works generally in film. Just as James struggles with his own imaginary archive, so 
too does the Vertigo scene evoke the archival knowledge of the Twelve Monkeys audience, 
sitting in a different cinema. The last word goes to Kathryn who rightly uses the expression: 
“If you can’t change anything because it’s already happened, you may as well smell the 
flowers.” Is this not what the sense of enjoyment is in film, of the enjoyment in the mise-en-
scène, of losing oneself in the pure image beyond its textual meaning? One cannot influence 
the filmic event, but on a relational level, one can approach that sense of predestination in 
film with a series of unconscious choices. In short, while an audience cannot change the 
outcome of a film, they can make connections and form new experiences within the work.  
  It is wholly appropriate that in the next scene James is violently awoken by the avian 
monsters from The Birds, the next film on the ‘Hitchcock fest’, which of course is itself 
reinforcing the Hitchcockian canon. Here, unlike the original, the birds explode without prior 
warning, and despite the fact that we know we are watching a film, like James, the explosion 
of ‘the birds’ in the diegesis and The Birds textually, is startling. Then, to compound matters, 
as James leaves the cinema somewhat bewildered by the intrusion of The Birds into his 
dreams, he sees Kathryn wearing a blonde wig, while the ‘transformation’ music from Vertigo   190
is playing in the non-diegetic sound. Somehow, it is as though the internal film-within-a-film 
– already an inter-textual influence – has exploded into the external film world like the birds 
from the cinema screen. This is structural-repetition in its essence, in that, as Lacan argued, 
“the symptom is in itself, through and through, signification, that is to say, truth, truth taking 
shape” (cited in Evans, 2007:204). It is this sense of the work ‘taking shape’ through what we 
might call the ‘repetition-work’ of the symptom, a work in movement where each circuit of 
the möbius loop reveals something further of Hollywood cinema’s unconscious knowledge. 
This scene illustrates that if, like James, we stop moving, if we fall asleep, the revelation stops 
also and only the traumatic explosion of the Real (the birds) will snap us back into the picture. 
Significantly, the spectator does not see James fall asleep prior to his violent awakening. 
Rather, in this moment, in this edit, the spectator is asleep also in much the same way as we 
are actually watching Vertigo in the prior scene. The cinema screen within the diegesis does 
not frame this image for us; this is a dual window that opens onto not just another reality, but 
multiple fantasies. The motto here is that there is no escape from the filmind in the Deleuzian 
time-image, or, as Deleuze puts it: “Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but 
does change something in the mind which contemplates it” (2009a:90).  
  We should consider remakes in a similar way, for when Van Sant attempts to collapse 
1998 into 1960, and Sluizer attempts a collision between The Netherlands/France and 
America, they have clearly failed on the one hand, and yet illuminated something remarkably 
well-hidden in the original, on the other. We have used Deleuze’s concept of ‘irrational 
cutting’ to describe this phenomenon concealed in the work, more than itself, and I believe 
the ‘irrational remake’, as I have called it, must be approached with a consideration of the 
memory implicit to the series as a whole, and the time-image as distinct from the movement-
image. Crucially, we must acknowledge that analysis of the irrational remake is impossible 
without first analysing its discursive base, that is, the complex repetition in the true remake 
that supports it. Thus my chapter 4 required the knowledge gained from chapter 3 for it to 
make sense, and so forth. Inter-dependence is crucial to this thesis, and just as the irrational 
remake relies on the true remake, so too do I hope to have shown that Lacanian film theory 
relies on Deleuzian filmosophy. Of course both need to re-engage with film history.  
  That more has not been made of Deleuze’s dividing of the action-image and the time-
image along classical and post-classical lines is proof of this, for the debate in film history 
about this very division rages on to this day (see Schatz, 1993 and Corrigan, 1991). Is it not 
about time that film-philosophy engaged in these very issues? We need not reframe the films 
but remake studies itself; these films are what Žižek calls universal singulars – elements of 
cinematic repetition the same in every symbolic universe. It is the theory which needs 
expanding, for as Deleuze frequently argued, it is not enough to ask “What difference is 
there?” as this always leads to the similarly unhelpful question “What resemblance is there?”   191
Nothing can come of this line of inquiry, for the answer is simply that: “Nothing”. Like the 
neuropath we must shift the problems and like the psychopath we must repose the questions. I 
propose that we ask three questions posed by Elizabeth Grosz in a different context:  
 
(1)  Can it [the work] survive such assaults [the becoming-other] on its autonomy? 
(2)  Can it become something – many things – other than what it is and how it presently functions?  
(3)  If its present function is an effect of the crystallization of its history within, inside, its present, 
can its future be something else (1995:136)? 
 
In response to these questions we can simply look back on our three main chapters: (1) in 
chapter 1, we illustrated that remake theory needed serious revision but that, ultimately, it not 
only survives a Deleuzo-Lacanian assault but emerges stronger for it. I hope to have provided 
a preliminary outline for where this new theorisation should start, and intend this as a starting 
point for subsequent discussions (‘making’ a new theory). (2) In chapters 2 and 3, we 
presented case studies that demonstrated not only that the original work becomes many things 
in remaking, but that the original itself is already functioning otherwise (texts that are 
multiply ‘remaking’). Finally, in chapter 4, we have shown that the present is always an effect 
of history becoming what it already was, and that the future is wherefrom the symptom 
returns (illustrating the ‘unmaking’ in Hollywood remaking).  
  Furthermore, this thesis has followed a möbius topology: chapter 1 is the making to 
chapter 4’s unmaking; chapter 2 is one type of remaking to chapter 3’s other type of 
remaking; and if one were to place a mirror down the centre, one would, like the image on the 
title page, hopefully see a chiastic tear. The antithesis has at every remove been within the 
thesis: memento mori in amor fati as the memory/love of death/fate; the alien facehugger and 
the terminator metaphors as the machinic organ/organic machine; and the zombie and ghost 
as the soulless body/bodiless soul. I cannot stress enough how important this is, nor the fact 
that while other Deleuzian scholars might see remakes as ‘simulacra-phantasms’, or bad 
repetitions to be denounced as ‘false’, I see them with a Lacanian twist as constitutively 
revealing the lacunae that abound in American cultural forms. For the remake theorist, these 
simulacra reveal the holes in Hollywood cinema, around which film history becomes film 
‘hystory’. These are blind spots otherwise concealed by ideological structures intended to 
obscure them. That the ideo-critical framework contributes to Hollywood’s continuing 
Americanisation of cinematic otherness, both canonical and foreign, is interesting enough 
given its absolute incapacity to control its own output in a market increasingly given over to 
market needs instead of demands. If we return to Lacan’s famous question, “che vuoi?” 
(2003:345), it is just possible to see the outline of its contemporary cinematic translation, not   192
just as “What do audiences want – what films do they demand to see?”, but also, “What 
makes contemporary audiences tick – what films do they need to see?”  
  But who is asking this question? Once again, “the studios” is the wrong answer, for 
while we have a discernible subject-supposed-to-know controlling the proliferation of 
remakes, I would suggest, rather, that at best we are faced with a poor dealer, whose shuffling 
of the cards is resulting in ever greater numbers of ‘ghost hands’ (to recall Greenberg) but 
who is by no means to blame for this “rear-view mirror” (Groen, 1998) culture. While this 
thesis has argued that time is unstable in Hollywood history, it is nonetheless in the post-
classical form that we get the emergence of the time-image. In a phenomenon that began in 
Italy towards the end of the 1940s, France at the end of the 1950s, and then in West Germany 
around the late 1960s (Frampton, 2006:61), Deleuze notices a complete resignification of 
time in film, and he sees it originating in Hitchcock in Hollywood. I would suggest that, far 
from orchestrating this revolution, the studio is merely exploiting it on a commercial level 
only. On a deeper level, there is always instability and irrational cutting. One often hears 
attributed to remakes the familiar complaint: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!”, however, this 
thesis has argued that it is not the case that Hollywood is attempting to fix unbroken originals 
but, on the contrary, that the original is already broken, and yet, like the zombie, it continues 
to function. This is the real problem: not that remakes attempt to ‘fix’ unbroken originals, but 
that they highlight the imperfections inherent to the original, their hidden, competing streams 
of thought. To reiterate Žižek: the Real is not an inert presence curving symbolic space by 
introducing gaps and inconsistencies, but, rather, it is the gaps and inconsistencies in the 
symbolic that create the Real (Žižek, 2006a:73). Above all else, remakes age originals while 
at the same time reassuring against their erasure, containing the fleeting image of death which 
vanishes as soon as it appears. Our voracious appetite for the Hollywood remake is 
undiminished and to be sure, Hollywood is more than content to keep churning them out. Is 
not psychoanalytic film theory in a similar position: broken, and yet continuing to function in 
the face of its supposed death?  
  However, the worst thing for film studies would be to continue reading the ‘vulgar’ 
Deleuzian elegy for Lacan, and worse still to propagate vulgar Deleuzian film studies itself. 
Where Lacan sought to focus on the difficult and frustrating aspects of Freud’s work that 
others distorted, debased, fragmented and ignored, we should do the same with Deleuze. I 
hope that now we can read remakes with Deleuze’s earlier works, Repetition and Difference, 
and The Logic of Sense, to root out his wider philosophical musings and create a truly rich 
and vibrant filmosophy alongside the populist tones of his Anti-Oedipus and his volumes on 
cinema. However, I hope to have also shown that we should not simply reject the popular 
field of Deleuze in favour of the ‘other Deleuze’ while claiming something like “the real 
Deleuze is more complex that ‘this’”. While it is clear to see that the ‘popular Deleuze’ has   193
been thoroughly misunderstood (in western scholarship at least), perhaps we should follow 
Žižek’s lead when he writes that “if there is something to be learned from the history of 
thought, from Christianity to Marx and Heidegger, it is that the roots of misappropriations are 
to be sought in the ‘original’ thinker himself” (2004b). Perhaps the ‘popular Deleuze’ might 
even be used to unlock this ‘other Deleuze’, and vice versa, although this is surely for others 
to continue. 
  I think the filmosophical potential for studying remakes is now open and ready to be 
explored, such that we can begin to appreciate the full implications of Joachim Du Bellay’s 
statement that one should “carefully follow the virtues of good works, devour them and after 
having digested them well, transform them into your own blood” (cited in Mancini, 1989:44). 
This Hegelian notion is more than suitable, not only for the remake, but the genre film and the 
very question of repetition in cinema. It also alters the view of the remake as ‘constipated’, as 
restricting the flow of ‘originality’ in Hollywood filmmaking. The view that Hegel is a 
philosopher of ‘constipation’ (not least held by Deleuze!) is refuted by Žižek, who argues 
instead that Hegel is the ultimate philosopher of release, or what Žižek himself calls 
“Hegelian shitting” (2008a:xii). Žižek writes that where a philosopher like Theodore Adorno 
might consider the Hegelian absolute Substance-subject as thoroughly constipated, “the belly 
turned mind” whereby the subject has “swallowed the entire indigestible Otherness” 
(2008a:xii), we should instead consider Hegel’s subject as thoroughly emptied. Hegel’s 
classic ‘synthesising’ reconciliation of difference is not the result of some pseudo-magical 
dissolution, but, rather, the means “to enact a parallax shift by means of which antagonisms 
are recognized ‘as such’ and thereby perceived in their ‘positive’ role” (Žižek, 2008a:xviii). 
The remake is no different. Where critics see constipation, we should see release; where they 
(often correctly) accuse studios of avarice in their decision-making, we should look for the ‘it-
Thing’ lurking beneath the corporate subject, the drive of the impossible encounter with the 
Real (tuché); and where social commentators see a lack of originality, we should perhaps 
show how the originals themselves already contain the very marks of repetition we see 
exploding on our screens in ever greater numbers. 
 
   
‘The Great Fucker’ and the remake (Fathers, fathers, everywhere…) 
 
On the set of Blade Runner a disagreement is reputed to have broken out between director 
Ridley Scott and actors Harrison Ford and Rutger Hauer. According to the documentary 
Dangerous Days: Making Blade Runner (2007), the disagreement concerned Deckard’s status 
as being either a replicant (Scott’s interpretation) or a human (Ford and Hauer’s 
interpretation). The disagreement intensified when, having assured the actors that Deckard   194
was definitely human, Scott went on to shoot and edit the film in such a way as to leave not 
just a question mark, but a clear indication that Deckard is indeed non-human. This deadlock 
can even be seen in another documentary, On the Edge of ‘Blade Runner’ (2000), in which 
the original screenwriter Hampton Fancher discusses the script with his replacement on the 
script, David Peoples, who each attribute any inflection in the script of Deckard’s status to the 
other (in a sense they cancel one another out, such that neither of them can be said to have 
written this ambiguity into the script). This crucial impasse is another ‘both/and’ situation, 
and it is in this vein that Ridley Scott’s reply to Harrison Ford and Rutger Hauer should have 
come, such that the only true response as to whether Deckard is a replicant or a human is the 
same as Freud’s answer “Yes please!” to the question “Tea or coffee?” Like the Hegelian 
dialectical mediation between the modes of making and remaking via unmaking, the story is 
both versions, stretching out in both directions of time and taking in a complex and 
inconsistent multitude of fantasmatic frameworks. Is not the paradox of Blade Runner (that of 
having a subject who knows s/he is a replicant) the same as that of the original that knows it is 
a remake (or, alternatively, of the remake that knows it is an original)? The issue here goes 
right back to that most central of Freudian theses: paternity, for how can we ever truly know 
who our parents are? We almost covered the issue of paternity in chapter 4 with our 
discussion of the symbolic and imaginary fathers in T2. However, to the eagle-eyed Lacanian, 
there is another kind of father that was left neglected. 
  To approach this third father, let us indulge in another of Blade Runner’s great 
‘both/and’ moments. While one of the replicants, Leon (Brion James), seems more bothered 
by his maternal identity
*, the leader of the replicants, Roy Batty (Hauer), is more concerned 
with his paternal identity. Indeed, when Roy tricks his way into the Tyrell Corporation – his 
place of ‘birth’ – he effectively ‘meets his maker’. In this scene, Roy makes overt references 
to the father and creation, and in one particularly striking example he creates an odd meld of 
‘father’ and ‘fucker’ when addressing his architect, Tyrell (Joe Turkel), just prior to 
murdering him in an oedipal transgression. In the scene, Tyrell asks Roy what his problem is, 
to which Roy retorts: “Death […] I want more life, fucker/father”. According to the 
production notes, Hauer deliberately pronounced the last word such that it could be either 
‘fucker’ or ‘father’ depending on the version (theatrical or TV) of the film (Hauer, cited in 
Lauzirika, 2007). However, let us continue our Deleuzian ‘both/and’ reading and suggest that 
this is an Oedipal expletive, thus both ‘fucker’ and ‘father’ at the same time.  
                                                 
* During a replicant test, Leon shoots another blade-runner after being asked to “Describe in single 
words only the good things that come into your mind about… your mother”. This clearly echoes 
Freud’s famous, “Tell me about your mother”, except here the answer is: “Death to the analyst!” Later 
in the film, Leon functions as the memento mori, telling Deckard that it is “Time to die!”   195
  It is here that we arrive at our missing third father, who is of course the Real father. 
This is Lacan’s least defined paternal figure, and is clearly the one with which he struggled 
most. The Real father is the agent of symbolic castration, who Lacan describes as the one who 
“effectively occupies” the mother, and to whom he ascribes the moniker of the “Great 
Fucker” (1992:307). At one stage, Lacan likens the Real father to the sperm itself, but 
qualifies this by noting that “nobody has ever thought of himself as the son of a 
spermatozoon” (cited in Evans, 2007:63). Since a degree of uncertainty surrounds the true 
identity of the father (as opposed to the mother, who is always “certain”), the Real father is 
the one who is “said to be” the child’s real, biological father. As such, the ‘Real’ father is not 
simply the real (that is, biological) father, but the father of the Real, an effect of language, or 
the Real of language. Harold Bloom (consciously or not) acknowledges as much when he 
writes that “it was a great marvel that they were in the father without knowing him” (1997:3), 
a father he labels the “Great Precursor”, a figure of anxiety for the subject. Tyrell is an 
example of the Lacanian Great Fucker; both an effect of, and bringing into effect, the 
language of creation itself. At the same time however, he also signifies loss and death for 
Roy, bearing out Lacan’s sense that “the first object he [the subject] proposes for this parental 
desire whose object is unknown is his own loss – Can he lose me? The phantasy of one’s 
death, of one’s disappearance, is the first object that the subject has to bring into play in this 
dialectic” (1998:214). We saw in our chapter on Spoorloos that it is here where one lack is 
superimposed on another. To reiterate: this is Lacan’s Great Fucker, another name for whom 
could have been the Great Lack. 
  To return to David Lynch, it is Frank in Blue Velvet who desires to become the Great 
Fucker, as he shouts “Let’s fuck! I’ll fuck anything that moves!”, aggressively establishing 
himself as the self-willed creator. In another scene, Dorothy mistakenly greets Frank with 
“Hello, baby”, to which he responds angrily, “Shut up! It’s Daddy, you shit-head!”, clearly 
irked by her linguistic slip. However, the ultimate indication that Frank wants to be the Great 
Fucker comes in Ben (Dean Stockwell)’s nightmarish apartment, when a toast is proposed to 
Frank’s “health”. Frank, however, has a different toast in mind: “Ah shit, let’s drink to 
something else. Let’s drink to fucking. Yeah, say: ‘Here’s to your fuck, Frank’”, to which 
everyone obliges. The icing on the Freudian cake comes when Frank seems to break down 
after Ben mimes along to Roy Orbison’s ‘In Dreams’, a song which opens with the lines “A 
candy-coloured clown they call the sandman”. Surely this scene alone demonstrates a great 
affinity between the Great Fucker and the Freudian uncanny (which analyses E. T. A. 
Hoffmann’s short story, ‘The Sandman’). As Žižek writes, Frank is a ridiculous character and 
yet, one who must be approached with total seriousness (2002a:19).   
  In remake terms, the Lacanian figure of the ‘Great Fucker’ is analogous to our 
irrational remake: it is only a remake because we say it is, such that it is an effect of film   196
historicising. The symbolic and imaginary fathers are easily aligned with other kinds of 
remaking also: the symbolic father, for instance, is that element of the law inherent to an 
‘original’, or ‘making’ (our examples of Hitchcock’s Psycho, Sluizer’s Spoorloos, et al.), the 
text which dispenses jouissance and ‘quilts’ the Idea in a primal baptism, freezing the 
‘spiritual event’. The creative misprison associated with the symbolic father comes as the 
transgression of the nom du père, and as this is a dead father, it is internalised in the memory 
of its own name via the fetish scene (‘shower/toilet scene’, ‘living burial’, etc). Lacan 
suggests that there is some homophony between ‘nom-du-père’ and ‘non-du-père’ (that is, the 
‘no’ of the father), which in remake terms is reflected in the prohibitive “No!” greeting any 
would-be remaker approaching a Great Precursor text. By contrast, the imaginary father is the 
element of remaking that dares to enjoy itself at the expense of the original (Van Sant’s 
Psycho, Sluizer’s The Vanishing, et al.). These true remakes are usually received negatively, 
but ravenously ‘enjoyed’ in a similar way to the superegoic imperative to “Enjoy!”, as in 
“Enjoy Coke!” We can, of course, flip these designations over and play around with them a 
little if we wish. 
  The irrational remake is not an empty symbolic restaging of the original moment 
devoid of its substance, but an actual return to the Real moment itself (or at least what is ‘said 
to be’ the Real moment). During analysis, the role of the analyst is not to become the spectre 
of the father, to invoke a ‘theatre of shadows’ whereby the patient can settle with past traumas 
via an effigy; the analyst is, as Žižek writes, “a presence in front of which the past battle has 
to be fought out ‘for real’” (2008c:118). Perhaps an irrational remaking of Spoorloos is to be 
found in Guillaume Canet’s taut thriller, Tell No One (2006), which fully realises the notion 
that the vanishing woman’s disappearance was all an elaborate plan staged for the gaze of the 
‘man who wanted to know’ (the connection to Vertigo is self-evident here). While Miramax 
and Focus own the rights to the English-language remake of Tell No One (due to begin 
principle photography in 2010), perhaps this is one foreign film they really should reconsider, 
for one cannot copy the Great Fucker (try, for instance, to imagine a remake of The 
Conversation). To quote Janet Leigh, the irrational remake really is a “once-only” film.  
  Suffice it to recall the lesson of the trompe-l’œil (‘trick the eye’) genre of art. Is not 
the ultimate symbol of the irrational remake that of the death skull which passes, fleetingly, 
across our screens at the end of Psycho in-between the image of Norman’s smiling face and 
Marion’s car being dredged from the swamp (fig. 4.7)? A lesser director would have had the 
skull completely replace Norman’s face, but Hitchcock astutely recognises in it the stain of 
anamorphosis, which disappears if looked at straight on. Compare this passing image with 
that of the most famous of the trompe-l’œil paintings, Hans Holbein’s ‘The Ambassadors’, 
which when looked at from the side, reveals a similar skull in the bottom of the picture.  
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Fig. 5.2: Hans Holbein’s ‘The Ambassadors’ (1533) and the anamorphic stain (bottom, centre) 
 
Lacan likened the trompe-l’œil to the ‘soul’ of the objet petit a (1998:112), and described the 
fleeting skull in Holbein’s ‘The Ambassadors’ as a “singular object floating in the 
foreground, which is there to be looked at, in order to catch, I would almost say, to catch in its 
trap, the observer, that is to say, us” (1998:92). This is also the description of the irrational 
remake, for no other form of repetition includes in its own textuality the very reflection of the 
gaze itself, that is, the viewer’s own extra-diegetic position. The scene in Psycho II where 
Mary thinks she may have trumped Norman after finding his peephole is one such scene 
where, in fact, all that is reflected is the gaze itself looking back, such that gazing subject and 
gazed-upon object are intolerably locked into one another, throwing each into instability. 
Who is looking here? Lacan might have been describing this scene in Psycho II when he 
wrote that “it is not at the level of the other whose gaze surprises the subject looking through 
the keyhole. It is that the other surprises him, the subject, as entirely hidden gaze” (1998:182). 
The shock is that of the Freudian uncanny, wherein that which should have remained hidden – 
the perverted gaze – is revealed. While most remakes seek to replace and honour their 
originals, they ultimately fail to do either: true remakes always fail to replace their original 
models and homages always fail to honour theirs (as Leitch argues, a re-release of the original 
is the only true homage). These remakes do, however, pass this hidden skull on to new forms. 
  Aside from the transition into the final scene in Psycho, the equivalent of the hidden 
skull in Hollywood cinema is that of the central image from The Silence of the Lambs, where 
Clarice discovers a moth (already a symbol of ‘change’) in a dead girl’s throat post-mortem 
(recalling Freud’s dream of Irma’s injection). Having suspected this to be a piece of flotsam,   198
Clarice soon discovers that it was placed there, by the killer, specifically for the gaze of the 
investigators. Suddenly, something insignificant is radically redescribed, and when the moth 
is examined further and opened up for inspection, it reveals a skull not unlike that of 
Holbein’s painting. 
 
 
Fig. 5.3: The ‘death’s head moth’ in The Silence of the Lambs 
 
Lacan’s description of the floating object in Holbein’s painting relates to this image in The 
Silence of the Lambs, for he writes that the skull “reflects our own nothingness, in the figure 
of the death’s head” (1998:92). That the variety of moth in the film is known as the ‘death’s-
head moth’ further illustrates that this image of death is not simply ‘death’ as such, but life 
from death, the memento mori in which we should be reminded “Don’t forget to die!” The 
key word here is ‘change’, or as Deleuze would put it, becoming, because for ‘Buffalo Bill’ 
the repetition of this act (whose patterning is regarded by Lecter as ‘desperately random’ – in 
that it is not random at all) requires an audience. In this way, the remake and Buffalo Bill are 
not too dissimilar: while the latter is making a “girl suit out of real girls” by skinning his 
victims’ hides, the remake is making a film suit out of real film skins! 
  For Žižek, this is the difference between ‘reality’ and the ‘Real’: the former is our 
manner of dealing with the latter, of preventing it from encroaching upon our daily existence, 
of maintaining a gap between what we ‘desire’ and what we really desire. Lacan writes that it 
is important that we realise “that we speak in analytic discourse about what the verb ‘to fuck’ 
(foutre) enunciates perfectly well. We speak therein of fucking, and we say that it’s not 
working out (ça ne va pas)” (1999:32). The point is not the success of the procedure, but its 
failure, such that it is only when something is not working out for the subject that s/he works 
it out anyway. There is always something missing, some objet a facehugging monstrosity of a 
machinic Thing which ‘escapes discourse’. In essence, reproduction only occurs thanks to 
“missing” (ratage – failing) what was intended, such that “it is by missing that jouissance that   199
it reproduces – in other words, by fucking” (Lacan, 1999:121). The Great Fucker does not 
fuck to escape the Real, but is ‘the Fuck’ itself. Walter Benjamin reminds us that the greatest 
crime for a reader (or spectator) is to leave language in the state it was found, to forgo the 
practice of reinscribing history at each pass (1977:69-82), indicating the Bakhtinian sense of 
dialogism, or a living language (“heteroglossia”), of the “intense interanimation and struggle 
between one’s own and another’s word” (2001:1187). Has there ever been a greater need for 
psychoanalysis in film criticism, for how else are we to see the rising phantom, the skull of 
the death drive, if not in the cinematic unconscious? Thus in honour of the unknown, I 
propose a Lynchian toast to the remake, one that might hopefully revitalise remake theory in 
looking at new forms of repetition as they unfold: Here’s to the remake ‘Fuck’. 
  But, finally, this Fuck needs to ‘come’, not once but twice – it must come again. 
Consider that each of the originals in this thesis, from Psycho to Blade Runner, Spoorloos to 
David Lynch himself had to fail once before they found their place in Hollywood history. 
Mark Kermode notes that when it was re-released as a director’s cut in the 1990s, “history 
had finally caught up with Blade Runner […] it was clear that Blade Runner had actually 
shaped the face of the future” (Kermode, cited in Abbott, 2000). The French language 
frequently provides Lacan with opportunity for wordplay, connotation, and polyvalence, and 
none more so perhaps than the title of his last seminar, ‘Encore’. As a noun, ‘encore’ alludes 
to the sense of a brief performance to follow on from a main performance. As an interjection, 
the sense of “encore!” extends to an audience’s demand for the performer to return. However, 
as an adverb, ‘encore’ can mean ‘still’, as in “Why are you still here?”; ‘more’, as in “Would 
you like more?”; ‘again’, as in “Once again”; and ‘yet’, as in “This is not yet finished!”. 
Clearly, the irony of this being Lacan’s last seminar is not lost on him, as he writes: “Why not 
stop the encore now?” (1999:146), meaning not that this last seminar is his encore, the final 
brief performance before the real end, but, rather, that every seminar is an encore, each 
repeating and desisting in an ongoing ‘encore’. There is no continuation for Lacan any more 
than there is an end. Like the sexual relationship, his seminars come and go, and in the first 
instance they fail. It is my claim that the remake is also an ‘encore’, a brief and failed return 
to something that was itself already a return, one that asks us as audiences if we have had 
enough, or, perhaps, if we want more. The question I want to ask is, as a Deleuzo-
psychoanalyst: What’s the difference?  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix a: Horror remake box office stats: 1982-present 
 
Remake  Opening  Lifetime Gross 
1.  The Ring  $15,015,393  $129,128,133 
2.  The Grudge  $39,128,715  $110,359,362 
3.  The Haunting  $33,435,140  $91,411,151 
4.  The Texas Chainsaw Massacre  $28,094,014  $80,571,655 
5.  The Ring Two  $35,065,237  $76,231,249 
6.  The Amityville Horror   $23,507,007  $65,233,369 
7.  Friday the 13
th   $40,570,365  $65,002,019 
8.  The Stepford Wives  $21,406,781  $59,484,742 
9.  Dawn of the Dead  $26,722,575  $59,020,957 
10.  Halloween   $26,362,367  $58,272,029 
11.  The Omen   $16,026,496  $54,607,383 
12.  My Bloody Valentine 3-D  $21,241,456  $51,545,952 
13.  When a Stranger Calls  $21,607,203  $47,860,214 
14.  Prom Night   $20,804,941  $43,869,350 
15.  Thirteen Ghosts  $15,165,355  $41,867,960 
16.  The Hills Have Eyes  $15,708,512  $41,778,863 
17.  House on Haunted Hill  $15,946,032  $40,846,082 
18.  The Fly  $7,007,423  $40,456,565 
19.  The Grudge 2  $20,825,300  $39,143,839 
20.  The Last House on the Left   $14,118,685  $32,752,215 
21.  House of Wax  $12,077,236  $32,064,800 
22.  The Eye  $12,425,776  $31,418,697 
23.  Mirrors  $11,161,074  $30,691,439 
24.  The Fog   $11,752,917  $29,550,869 
25.  The Uninvited  $10,325,824  $28,596,818 
26.  One Missed Call  $12,511,473  $26,890,041 
27.  Shutter  $10,447,559  $25,928,550 
28.  Dark Water  $9,939,251  $25,473,352 
29.  Invasion of the Body Snatchers  $1,298,129  $24,946,533 
30.  The Wicker Man  $9,610,204  $23,649,127 
31.  Psycho   $10,031,850  $21,456,130 
32.  The Hills Have Eyes 2  $9,686,362  $20,804,166 
33.  Pulse  $8,203,822  $20,264,436 
34.  The Hitcher   $7,818,239  $16,472,961 
35.  Black Christmas   $3,723,364  $16,273,581   201
36.  The Invasion  $5,951,409  $15,074,191 
37.  The Thing  $3,107,897  $13,782,838 
38.  Village of the Damned  $3,222,450  $9,418,365 
39.  The Blob  $2,644,920  $8,247,943 
40.  Cat People  $1,617,636  $7,000,000 
41.  Willard  $4,010,593  $6,886,089 
42.  Night of the Living Dead  $2,884,679  $5,835,247 
43.  Invaders From Mars  $2,046,576  $4,884,663 
44.  Funny Games  $544,833  $1,294,919 
45.  Body Snatchers  $31,494  $428,868 
46.  Night of the Living Dead 3D  $215,300  $271,000 
 
 
Appendix b: ‘True remakes’ of Alfred Hitchcock  
 
Remake  Original 
1.  A Perfect Murder (Andrew 
Davis, 1998)  
Dial M for Murder (1954)  
2.  The Birds (Martin Campbell, 
2010)  
The Birds (1963)  
3.  Disturbia (D. J. Caruso, 2007)   Rear Window (1954)  
4.  Jamaica Inn (Lawrence Gordon 
Clark, 1985)  
Jamaica Inn (1939)  
5.  The Lady Vanishes (Anthony 
Page, 1979)  
The Lady Vanishes (1938)  
6.  Lifepod (Ron Silver, 1993)   Lifeboat (1944)  
7.  The Man Who Knew Too Much 
(Alfred Hitchcock, 1956)  
The Man Who Knew Too Much (1934)  
8.  Notorious (Colin Bucksey, 1992)   Notorious (1946)  
9.  Once You Meet a Stranger 
(Tommy Lee Wallace, 1996)  
10.  Strangers on a Train (Noam 
Murro, 2006)  
 
Strangers on a Train (1951)  
11.  Psycho (Gus Van Sant, 1998)   Psycho (1960)  
12.  Rear Window (Jeff Bleckner, 
1998)  
Rear Window (1954)  
13.  Rebecca (Jim O’Brien, 1997)   Rebecca (1940)  
14.  The Secret Agent (Christopher 
Hampton, 1996)  
Sabotage (1936) 
15.  Shadow of a Doubt (Karen  Shadow of a Doubt (1943)    202
Arthur, 1991)  
16.  Suspicion (Andrew Grieve, 
1987)  
Suspicion (1941)  
17.  The Thirty-Nine Steps (Don 
Sharp, 1978)  
18.  The 39 Steps (Ralph Thomas, 
1959)  
 
The 39 Steps (1935) 
19.  Under Capricorn (Rod Hardy 
1983)  
Under Capricorn (1949)  
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